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A	  heavy	  focus	  has	  recently	  been	  placed	  on	  the	  current	  state	  of	  each	  country’s	  
critical	   infrastructure	  security.	  Unfortunately,	  widely	  deployed	  supervisory	  control	  
and	   data	   acquisition	   (SCADA)	   protocols	   provide	   little	   to	   no	   inherent	   security	  
controls	  while	  traditional	  security	  mechanisms	  prove	  largely	  ineffective	  in	  industrial	  
control	   environments.	  Moreover,	   the	   recent	   advent	   of	   advanced	  persistent	   threats	  
(APTs)	   has	   highlighted	   the	   relative	   ineffectiveness	   of	   existing	   SCADA-­‐centric	  
security	  solutions.	  	  
In	   this	   thesis	   I	  will	   identify	  various	  algorithmic	   strategies	   for	  detecting	  and	  
mitigating	   common	  APT	  attack	   vectors	   impacting	   SCADA	  environments.	   Primarily,	  
the	   integration	   of	   flow-­‐based	   intrusion	   detection	   systems,	   passive	   device	  
fingerprinting,	  low-­‐interaction	  honeypots,	  and	  traditional	  signature-­‐based	  intrusion	  
detection	   technologies	   provides	   a	   highly	   effective	   capacity	   for	   detecting	   common	  
attack	   vectors	   used	   by	   APTs.	   Finally	   I	   will	   show	   how	   the	   integration	   of	   these	  
technologies	   into	   a	   single	   security	   solution	   has	   provided	   a	   verifiably	   robust	   and	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Chapter	  1.	  	  Introduction	  
	  
Following	   recent	   industrial	   control	   security	   (ICS)	   incidents	   like	   the	   Stuxnet	  
worm	   outbreak	   in	   Iran,	   much	   focus	   has	   been	   put	   on	   the	   current	   state	   of	   each	  
country’s	   critical	   infrastructure	   security.	   Part	   of	   this	   concern	   lies	   in	   the	   quality	   of	  
currently	  deployed	  network	  security	  mechanisms	  used	  to	  protect	  our	  most	  sensitive	  
networks.	  	  
Supervisory	  control	  and	  data	  acquisition	  (SCADA)	  networks	  are	  responsible	  for	  
managing	   the	   critical	   infrastructure	   that	   keeps	   each	   country	   operating	   smoothly.	  
This	   includes	   crucial	   infrastructure	   components	   like	   power	   distribution	   stations,	  
water	   treatment	   plants,	   transportation	   infrastructure,	   etc.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   a	   SCADA	  
system	  disruption,	  critical	  infrastructure	  systems	  supervising	  the	  operational	  facets	  
of	  each	  society	  could	  fail	  to	  provide	  the	  resources	  needed	  to	  run	  an	  economy.	  	  
At	   first,	   network	   infrastructures	   used	   to	   facilitate	   SCADA	   communications	  
appear	   to	   resemble	   traditional	   IT	   networks;	   however,	   they	   differ	   tremendously.	  
SCADA	  networks	  tend	  to	  have	  a	  static	  amount	  of	  client	  devices,	  their	  communication	  
flows	   are	   predictable,	   communication	   protocols	   are	   often	   proprietary,	   and	   high	  
availability	   is	   absolutely	   paramount.	   Due	   to	   the	   unique	   nature	   of	   these	   networks,	  
traditional	  IT	  security	  protection	  and	  mitigation	  mechanisms	  prove	  to	  be	  ineffective.	  
Furthermore,	  widely	  deployed	  SCADA	  protocols	  like	  DNP3	  and	  Modbus	  provide	  no	  
inherent	  security	  controls.	  This	  makes	  managing	  security	  inherently	  difficult.	  Ideally	  
these	  protocols	  would	  be	  replaced	  with	  newer,	  more	  secure	  variations;	  however,	  the	  
need	   for	   backwards	   compatibility	   and	   high	   availability	   inhibits	   the	   adoption	   of	  
newer	  protocols.	  	  	  
Because	   of	   this	   dependence	   on	   legacy	   hardware	   and	   software,	   we	   must	   rely	  
heavily	  on	  effective	  security	  event	  detection	  and	  mitigation	  algorithms	  as	  we	  begin	  
to	   phase	   out	   legacy	   SCADA	   systems.	   Unfortunately	   the	   critical	   nature	   of	   SCADA	  
	  
2	  
creates	  a	  catch-­‐22	  when	  dealing	  with	  security	  events:	  false	  positive	  security	  events	  
on	   a	   network,	   if	   blocked,	   can	   significantly	   impact	   system	   functionality,	   possibly	  
causing	   a	   SCADA	   environment	   to	   transition	   to	   an	   unstable	   state.	   Because	   of	   this,	  
security	  events	  need	  to	  be	  handled	  tactfully	  as	  to	  not	  impact	  normal	  operations.	  
	  
1.1	   Problem	  Statement	  
	  
Unfortunately	   our	   reliance	   on	   legacy	   hardware	   and	   software	   has	   created	   a	  
perfect	  storm	  of	  sorts,	  leaving	  our	  most	  critical	  networks	  vulnerable	  to	  a	  plethora	  of	  
attack	   vectors.	   This	   is	   particularly	   true	   in	   the	   case	   of	   advanced	   persistent	   threats	  
(APTs)	   attacking	   complex	   networks	   over	   long	   periods	   of	   time.	   Advanced	   attack	  
vectors	   like	   illegitimate	   credential	   use,	   device	   impersonation	   attacks,	   zero-­‐day	  
exploits,	  and	  targeted	  malware	  are	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  detect	  in	  typical	  networks,	  
let	  alone	  SCADA	  environments.	  
To	   solve	   these	   issues,	  we	  must	  work	   towards	   deploying	   security	   technologies	  
capable	  of	  detecting	  both	  traditional	  and	  APT-­‐style	  attacks	  while	  handling	  security	  
event	  mitigation	  effectively	  in	  a	  non-­‐blocking	  manner.	  	  
A	   variety	   of	   SCADA-­‐specific	   security	   technologies	   exist,	   ranging	   from	   inline	  
legacy-­‐ready	   cryptography	   devices	   to	   intrusion	   detection	   systems	   capable	   of	  
detecting	   anomalous	   connections	   within	   a	   network.	   However,	   most	   proposed	  
solutions	   to	   SCADA’s	   inherent	   security	   problems	  have	   a	   binary	   approach	   to	   event	  
detection	   and	   mitigation:	   either	   reject	   available	   security	   controls	   due	   to	   lack	   of	  
functionality	  or	  accept	  a	  single	  detection	  mechanism	  in	  hopes	  that	  it	  is	  sufficient.	  As	  
history	  has	   taught	  us	  many	   times,	   a	   single	   approach	   to	   security	   event	  detection	   is	  




1.2	   Contribution	  
	  
To	   this	  end,	   I	  believe	   leveraging	  the	  defense	   in	  depth	  principle	  within	  security	  
event	   detection	   and	   mitigation	   algorithms	   can	   provide	   the	   targeted	   and	   robust	  
solution	  we	  seek	  for	  SCADA	  networks.	  Like	  strategies	  taken	  to	  secure	  IT	  networks,	  
security	   event	   detection	   technologies	   deployed	   in	   SCADA	   environments	   should	  
provide	   a	   multi-­‐layered	   approach	   to	   event	   detection.	   This	   detection	   in	   depth	  
approach	  is	  capable	  of	  increasing	  security	  event	  detection	  rates	  while	  reducing	  false	  
positives.	   Furthermore,	   the	   integration	   of	   multiple	   detection	   and	   mitigation	  
technologies	  allows	  us	  to	  couple	  the	  best	  features	  of	  each	  system	  together,	  creating	  a	  
robust	  and	  well-­‐rounded	  framework	  for	  handing	  security	  events	  in	  SCADA	  networks.	  	  
In	   this	   thesis	   I	  will	   propose	   and	  measure	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   integrating	   four	  
security	   technologies	   –	   flow-­‐based	   intrusion	   detection,	   network	   device	  
fingerprinting,	   just-­‐in-­‐time	   honeypots,	   and	   traditional	   signature-­‐based	   intrusion	  
detection	  systems	  –	  into	  a	  single	  algorithm	  capable	  of	  providing	  detection	  in	  depth	  
for	  SCADA	  environments.	  Furthermore,	  I	  will	  explore	  how	  the	  proposed	  solution	  is	  
capable	  of	  detecting	  and	  handling	  advanced	  attack	  vectors	  perpetrated	  by	  advanced	  
persistent	   threats	   without	   adversely	   impacting	   the	   availability	   of	   the	   monitored	  
environment.	  
I	   hope	   that	   enabling	   the	   evolution	   and	   integration	   of	   multiple	   security	  
technologies	  can	  help	  us	  mitigate	  risk	  within	  our	  most	  critical	  networks,	  buying	  us	  





1.3	   Thesis	  Organization	  
	  
In	   this	   thesis	   I	   will	   overview	   a	   variety	   of	   topics,	   ranging	   from	   SCADA	   and	  
industrial	   control	   system	   basics	   to	   the	   implementation	   and	   evaluation	   of	   my	  
proposed	  solution.	  I	  hope	  to	  provide	  a	  well-­‐rounded	  view	  of	  the	  current	  threatscape,	  
including	   existing	   security	   technologies,	   deficiencies,	   and	   mitigation	   strategies	  
capable	  of	  detecting	  advanced	  network	  attack	  vectors.	  
In	   Chapter	   2	   I	   will	   provide	   an	   introduction	   to	   SCADA,	   including	   its	   origins,	  
protocols,	  and	  history	  of	  convergence	  with	  corporate	  networks.	  This	  will	  solidify	  a	  
baseline	  of	  understanding	  before	  moving	  on	  securing	  SCADA	  environments.	  
Next,	  I	  will	  lay	  the	  groundwork	  regarding	  the	  current	  state	  of	  security	  in	  SCADA.	  
A	   variety	   of	   topics	   will	   be	   discussed,	   including	   network	   security	   considerations,	  
related	   industry	   standards,	   typical	   attack	   vectors,	   protocol-­‐level	   risk	   mitigation	  
strategies,	  and	  approaches	  to	  incident	  detection.	  
Once	   all	   background	   information	   has	   been	   discussed,	   I	   will	   take	   a	   look	   at	  
advanced	   persistent	   threats	   (APTs),	   including	   their	   past	   and	   present	   impact	   on	  
SCADA	  environments.	  To	  provide	  a	  well-­‐rounded	  view	  of	  the	  current	  situation,	  I	  will	  
define	   their	   common	   characteristics,	   attack	   lifecycle,	   attack	   vectors,	   evasion	  
strategies,	  and	  recent	  attributed	  events.	  
In	   Chapter	   5	   I	   will	   provide	   a	   10,000-­‐foot	   architectural	   view	   of	   my	   proposed	  
security	   event	   detection	   algorithm	   and	   its	   inner	  workings.	   The	   proposed	   solution	  
will	  be	  compared	  to	  existing	  security	  solutions	  while	  showing	  how	  it	  meets	  various	  
requirements	  for	  detecting	  advanced	  persistent	  threats	  in	  SCADA	  networks.	  	  
Next,	  I	  will	  take	  a	  look	  at	  how	  the	  integration	  of	  multiple	  technologies	  within	  my	  
proposed	   algorithm	   can	   provide	   a	   viable	   solution	   to	   the	   security	   event	   detection	  
requirements	   outlined	   in	   chapter	   five.	   A	   detailed	   look	   at	   each	   component	   of	   the	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system	  will	  be	  provided,	  including	  the	  logical	  and	  operational	  design	  of	  the	  system’s	  
event	  detection	  and	  mitigation	  algorithm.	  
Finally	   in	  Chapter	  6,	   I	  will	   showcase	   the	  proposed	  solution’s	  effectiveness	  and	  
efficiency	  by	  exposing	  it	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  scenarios	  often	  perpetrated	  by	  an	  advanced	  
attacker.	  I	  will,	  through	  example,	  show	  how	  my	  solution	  is	  capable	  of	  detecting	  and	  
managing	  all	  major	  advanced	  network	  attack	  vectors	  without	  negatively	   impacting	  
the	  efficiency	  and	  latency	  of	  the	  monitored	  SCADA	  network.	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Chapter	  2.	  	  Background	  
	  
Supervisory	   control	   and	   data	   acquisition	   (SCADA)	   systems	   provide	   an	  
automated	  process	  for	  gathering	  real	  time	  data,	  controlling	  industrial	  processes,	  and	  
monitoring	  industrial	  equipment	  that	  is	  physically	  dispersed.	  Utility	  companies	  and	  
various	  industries	  have	  used	  industrial	  automation	  systems	  for	  decades	  to	  automate	  
natural	  gas,	  hydro,	  water,	  nuclear,	  and	  manufacturing	  facilities.	  	  
Consisting	  of	  sensors,	  actuators,	  and	  control	  software,	  SCADA	  networks	  provide	  
industrial	   automation	  while	  providing	   real	   time	  data	   to	  human	  operators.	  Remote	  
terminal	  units,	  known	  as	  RTUs,	  gather	  telemetry	  data	  from	  various	  physical	  sources	  
like	  switches,	  breakers,	  pumps,	   temperature	  sensors,	  pressure	  sensors,	  and	  valves.	  
RTUs	   are	   typically	   network-­‐enabled	   embedded	   devices	   that	   are	   designed	   to	  
withstand	   harsh	   operating	   environments,	   particularly	   the	   outdoors.	   These	   remote	  
devices	  send	  data	  to	  a	  master	  terminal	  unit	  (MTU)	  that	  is	  responsible	  for	  controlling	  
the	  actions	  performed	  by	  each	  RTU.	  Data	  collected	  from	  an	  MTU	  is	  then	  presented	  to	  
a	  human	  operator	  via	  a	  human	  machine	  interface,	  providing	  real	  time	  control	  of	  the	  
automated	  system.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  an	  emergency,	  a	  human	  operator	  is	  alerted	  to	  any	  
critical	  state	  changes,	  allowing	  him	  or	  her	  to	  correct	  the	  situation	  in	  real	  time.	  
At	   first	  glance	  SCADA	  networks	  appear	   to	  be	  similar	   to	   IT	  networks;	  however,	  
this	   is	   not	   the	   case.	   Due	   to	   the	   absolute	   real-­‐time	   nature	   of	   such	   systems,	   SCADA	  
networks	  are	  usually	   referred	   to	  as	   "hard	  real	   time"	  systems.	  Traditionally	  SCADA	  
networks	   were	   physically	   isolated,	   providing	   some	   inherent	   level	   of	   security;	  
however,	  as	  protocols	  like	  TCP/IP	  continued	  to	  proliferate,	  SCADA	  networks	  slowly	  
converged	  with	  both	  corporate	  intranets	  and	  the	  Internet.	  The	  gradual	  evolution	  of	  





2.1 Origins	  of	  SCADA	  
	  
Dating	  back	  to	  the	  1960's,	  SCADA	  networks	  have	  been	  a	  vital	  component	  used	  
for	  utility	  and	   infrastructure	  management	  around	   the	  globe.	   [37]	  Remote	   terminal	  
units	   were	   traditionally	   managed	   by	   mainframe	   computers,	   creating	   a	   highly	  
centralized	   network	   layout	   that	   could	   be	   monitored	   and	   manipulated	   by	   human	  
operators.	   [37][65]	   During	   this	   time,	   SCADA	   networks	   were	   not	   fully	   automated;	  
however,	   they	  did	  provide	  a	  mechanism	  for	  reliably	  collecting	  telemetry	  data	  from	  
physically	  dispersed	  devices.	  [65]	  Human	  operators	  could	  view,	  analyze,	  and	  assess	  
collected	  data	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  which	  actions	  needed	  to	  be	  performed	  upon	  the	  
system.	   Commands	  would	   then	  be	   entered	   in	   the	  mainframe,	   allowing	   them	   to	  be	  
sent	   to	   the	   appropriate	   remote	   terminal	   unit.	   [37]	   In	   between	   the	   mainframe	  
computer	   and	   remote	   terminal	   units	   laid	   the	   master	   terminal	   unit	   (MTU).	   Its	  
responsibility	  was	  merely	  to	  replay	  data	  from	  the	  mainframe	  over	  dedicated	  serial	  
or	   leased	   lines	   that	   connected	   remote	   terminal	   units.	   No	   data	   analysis	   was	  
performed	  by	  the	  MTUs;	  they	  only	  acted	  as	  an	  intermediary	  device.	  [37][65]	  
Up	  until	  the	  1990's,	  few	  changes	  occurred	  in	  the	  way	  SCADA	  networks	  operated.	  
[37][65][68]	   However,	   as	   technology	   developed	   rapidly,	   the	   advent	   of	   cheap	   and	  
intelligent	   RTU	   devices	   allowed	   industrial	   operators	   to	   replace	   dumb	   units	   with	  
network-­‐enabled	  and	  intelligent	  programmable	  logic	  controllers	  (PLCs).	  These	  PLCs	  
allowed	   operators	   to	   program	   various	   logic-­‐driven	   programs	   that	   provided	   some	  
level	   of	   intelligent	   and	   autonomous	   decision	   making.	   [26]	   Remote	   terminal	   units	  
were	  then	  able	  to	  collect	  analog	  data	  from	  various	  physical	  sources,	  analyze	  the	  data,	  
and	   relay	   only	   relevant	   information	   to	   the	   master	   terminal	   unit.	   This	   marked	   a	  
massive	  change	  in	  the	  way	  we	  used	  SCADA	  networks.	  
When	   SCADA	   systems	   first	   started	  being	  deployed	   in	   the	   1960's,	   the	   need	   for	  
low-­‐latency	   communication	  networks	   superseded	  any	   security	   concerns	   regarding	  
SCADA	  systems.	  Traditionally	  SCADA	  systems	  were	  entirely	   isolated	   from	  all	  other	  
networks,	   providing	   an	   inherently	   positive	   security	   stance.	   [37]	   However,	   as	   the	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proliferation	  of	  physically	  independent	  network	  protocols	  like	  TCP/IP	  continued	  to	  
increase,	  so	  did	  the	  adoption	  of	  Ethernet-­‐enabled	  RTU	  devices.	  [32][42]	  Eventually,	  
SCADA	  networks	   started	   to	   converge	  with	   corporate	   intranets,	   providing	  business	  
logic	   insight	   into	   the	   operation	   of	   industrial	   control	   systems.	   Naturally,	   this	  
introduced	   many	   security	   and	   availability	   concerns.	   These	   once	   isolated	   systems	  
now	   became	   vulnerable	   to	   both	   internal	   and	   external	   attacks.	   In	   addition,	   since	  
security	   was	   not	   a	   paramount	   concern	   during	   initial	   deployment,	   the	   current	  
security	   stance	  of	   SCADA	  network	  protocols	   became	  extremely	  poor.	   In	   fact,	  most	  
SCADA	   protocols	   provide	   no	   mechanisms	   for	   ensuring	   confidentiality,	   integrity,	  
authentication,	  authenticity,	  or	  non-­‐repudiation.	  [28][52][90]	  These	  security	  issues	  
will	  be	  discussed	  in	  detail	  later	  on	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
	  
2.2 SCADA	  Architecture	  
 
SCADA	   networks	   generally	   consist	   of	   four	   main	   components:	   control	   center	  
software,	   operator	   interfaces,	   field	   devices,	   and	   wide	   area	   telecommunication	  
networks.	  [20]	  Working	  together,	  these	  components	  provide	  industrial	  automation	  
while	  ensuring	  human	  intervention	  is	  possible.	  	  
	  
2.2.1 Control	  Center	  	  
	  
Within	   the	   control	   center	   lie	   multiple	   hardware	   and	   software	   components	  
responsible	   for	   collecting,	   analyzing,	   and	   archiving	   data	   from	   field	   devices.	   These	  
components	   are	   linked	   together	   over	   a	   common	   management	   network.	   Control	  
centers	   generally	   contain	   a	   few	   essential	   components:	   master	   terminal	   units,	  
engineer	  workstations,	  database	  servers,	  business	  logic	  servers,	  and	  a	  data	  historian.	  
Each	  component	  has	  a	  specific	  role	  within	  the	  industrial	  control	  setting.	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First,	   the	   master	   terminal	   unit	   acts	   as	   a	   SCADA	   server,	   providing	   a	   remote	  
termination	  point	   for	   physically	   dispersed	   remote	   terminal	   units.	   It	   is	   responsible	  
for	   collecting	   field	   device	   measurements	   that	   have	   been	   sent	   over	   various	  
communication	  mediums.	  These	  may	  include	  leased	  lines,	  serial	  lines,	  satellite	  links,	  
cellular	   links,	  etc.	  Once	  data	  has	  been	  received,	   irrelevant	   information	   is	  discarded	  
(like	  frame	  headers)	  and	  relevant	  data	  is	  sent	  to	  both	  the	  human	  machine	  interface	  
and	  data	  historian.	  	  
The	   real	   time	   nature	   of	   SCADA	   systems	   elicits	   the	   need	   for	   long-­‐term	   system	  
state	   information	   storage.	   The	   data	   historian,	   working	   together	   with	   various	  
database	  deployments,	  provides	  a	   long-­‐term	  storage	  medium	   for	  a	  SCADA	  system.	  
All	  sensor	  and	  actuator	  data	  flowing	  between	  the	  control	  center	  and	  field	  devices	  is	  
archived	   for	   future	   analysis.	   In	   addition,	   all	   actions	   performed	   within	   the	   SCADA	  
system	   are	   archived.	   This	   provides	   a	   set	   of	   data	   capable	   of	   describing	   the	   past,	  
present,	  and	  possible	  future	  states	  of	  the	  industrial	  control	  system.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  an	  
emergency,	   the	   data	   historian	   can	   be	   queried	   to	   determine	  which	   physical	   action	  
caused	  the	  system	  to	  transition	  to	  an	  unstable	  state.	  	  
Working	   hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	   the	   data	   historian,	   business	   logic	   servers	   provide	  
insight	  into	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  operations	  of	  the	  SCADA	  network.	  These	  servers	  may	  act	  
as	   an	   intermediary	   between	   the	   control	   center	   network	   and	   a	   corporate	   intranet.	  
Generally	  speaking,	  business	  logic	  severs	  sit	  in	  a	  network	  demilitarized	  zone	  (DMZ),	  
talking	  to	  the	  data	  historian	  on	  behalf	  of	  external,	  authenticated	  users.	  	  
Lastly,	   engineering	  workstations	   facilitate	   the	   everyday	   operations	  within	   the	  
industrial	   control	   networks.	   Engineers	   may	   use	   these	   workstations	   to	   run	  
simulations,	  extract	  data	  from	  the	  data	  historian,	  or	  execute	  various	  projects	  within	  
the	   control	   center.	   In	   addition,	   they	   provide	   granular	   control	   over	   the	   SCADA	  
network.	   This	   may	   include	   modifying	   HMI	   applications	   and	   reconfiguring	   control	  




2.2.2 Operator	  Interface	  
	  
Also	   located	   within	   the	   control	   center	   network,	   the	   operator	   interface	   is	  
responsible	  for	  acting	  as	  an	  intermediary	  between	  the	  SCADA	  network	  and	  human	  
operators.	  This	  human	  machine	  interface	  (HMI)	  allows	  humans	  to	  access	  and	  assess	  
data	   collected	   from	   various	   field	   devices	   and	   interacts	  with	   the	   industrial	   control	  
process.	  [20]	  
	  
2.2.3 Field	  Devices	  
	  
Field	   devices,	   also	   known	   as	   control	   devices,	   are	   integral	   to	   implementing	  
process	   control	   logic	   within	   remote	   locations.	   These	   devices	   provide	   automated,	  
intelligent	  system	  management	  by	  interfacing	  with	  various	  I/O	  devices	  like	  remote	  
terminal	   units	   (RTUs),	   programmable	   logic	   controllers	   (PLCs),	   and	   intelligent	  
electronic	   devices	   (IEDs).	   [20]	   By	   collecting	   real-­‐time	   data	   from	   I/O	   sensors,	   field	  
devices	  are	  capable	  of	  performing	  control	  actions	  on	  various	  actuator	  devices.	  	  
Some	   field	   devices,	   particularly	   RTUs	   and	   PLCs,	   are	   designed	   to	   allow	   their	  
program	  logic	  to	  be	  updated	  remotely.	   [20]	  Thanks	  to	  this	   functionality,	  most	   field	  
devices	  can	  be	  deployed	  physically	  while	  only	  ever	  being	  managed	  remotely.	  	  
In	   some	   cases,	   field	   devices	   are	   not	   capable	   of	   directly	   interacting	  with	  wide-­‐
area	  SCADA	  networks.	   [18][20]	   In	   such	  a	   case,	  SCADA	  gateway	  devices,	   like	   front-­‐
end	  processors	  (FEPs),	  are	  used	  to	  bridge	  field	  devices	  to	  wide	  area	  networks.	  [20]	  
Acting	  as	  an	  intermediary,	  FEPs	  forward	  sensor	  and	  actuator	  information,	  generally	  
collected	   from	   serial-­‐only	   devices,	   to	   master	   terminal	   units	   located	   within	   the	  
control	  center	  network.	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2.3 Wide-­‐Area	  SCADA	  Networks	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  facilitate	  communications	  between	  devices	  within	  SCADA	  networks,	  
various	  industrial	  control	  protocols	  have	  been	  developed.	  These	  protocols	  run	  over	  
numerous	   physical	   mediums	   to	   provide	   wide-­‐area	   connectivity.	   Primarily,	   the	  
Modbus	   and	  DNP3	  protocols	   have	  been	  used	   in	  North	  America	   to	   ensure	   efficient	  
hard	  real-­‐time	  communications.	  As	  SCADA	  continues	  to	  converge	  with	  traditional	  IT	  
networks,	  these	  protocols	  continue	  to	  evolve	  as	  well.	  The	  widespread	  use	  of	  TCP/IP	  
within	   communication	   networks	   has	   facilitated	   the	   adoption	   of	   IP-­‐based	   SCADA	  
protocols	  like	  Modbus	  TCP.	  [51]	  
	  
2.3.1 Wired	  Communications	  
	  
Wide	   area	   communications	   between	   field	   devices	   and	   a	   control	   center	   may	  
occur	   over	   many	   different	   mediums.	   These	   may	   include:	   telephone,	   serial,	   fiber,	  
Ethernet	  lines,	  and	  corporate	  intranet	  leased	  lines.	  [40][51]	  Traditionally	  serial	  and	  
plain	   old	   telephone	   systems	   (POTS)	   were	   the	   most	   deployed	   communication	  
mediums.	  [51]	  
As	   times	  changed	  and	   technology	  evolved,	  SCADA	  systems	  slowly	   transitioned	  
to	   IP-­‐based	  networks.	  Naturally,	  newer	   technologies	   like	  Ethernet	  began	  replacing	  
older,	  slower	  serial	  lines.	  [56]	  
	  
2.3.2 Wireless	  Communications	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	  wired	   communication	  mediums,	  wireless	   communications	   have	  
also	  recently	  become	  popular	  for	  long	  distance	  SCADA	  deployments.	  [51]	  Thanks	  to	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the	   ever-­‐increasing	   reliability	   and	   bandwidth	   of	   wireless	   networks,	   wireless	  
deployments	  have	  become	  a	  viable	  and	  robust	  option	  when	  deploying	  field	  devices.	  	  
Field	  devices	  deployed	  in	  SCADA	  networks	  can	  leverage	  many	  different	  wireless	  
mediums	   like:	   ZigBee,	   various	   licensed	   and	   unlicensed	   spectrums,	   cellular	   links,	  
WiMAX,	  and	  even	  satellite	  links.	  [51]	  
	  
2.4 Common	  SCADA	  Communication	  Protocols	  
	  
Thanks	   to	   the	   highly	   customized	   nature	   of	   SCADA	   and	   industrial	   control	  
networks,	   the	   American	   Gas	   Associate	   claims	   there	   are	   approximately	   150-­‐200	  
proprietary	   SCADA	   protocol	   variations.	   [42]	   Most	   of	   these	   proprietary	   protocols	  
were	  created	  and	  deployed	  during	  SCADA’s	  developing	  years;	  however,	  more	  recent	  
deployments	   have	   embraced	   industry	   protocol	   standards	   like	  Modbus	   and	   DNP3.	  
Primarily,	   the	   Modbus	   and	   DNP3	   protocols	   have	   been	   used	   in	   North	   America	   to	  
ensure	   efficient	   hard	   real-­‐time	   communications.	   These	   standards	   provide	   well-­‐
documented	   guidelines	   for	   implementing	   industry-­‐accepted	   and	   highly	   robust	  
SCADA	  communication	  mechanisms.	  [42]	  
	  
2.4.1 Modbus	  Protocol	  
	  
The	  Modbus	  protocol	  suite,	  popular	  in	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  sectors,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  oldest	  
and	  most	  widely	  used	  SCADA	  protocols.	  [41][75]	  The	  protocol	  suite	  can	  be	  broken	  
into	  two	  main	  versions:	  Modbus	  Serial	  and	  Modbus	  TCP.	  [41]	  Each	  protocol	  provides	  
mechanisms	   for	   both	   unicast	   and	   multicast	   transmissions	   between	   one	   or	   more	  
master	  (MTU)	  units	  and	  one	  or	  more	  slave	  (RTU)	  devices.	  [41]	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Modbus	  Serial	   supports	   two	   serial	   encoding	  modes:	  ASCII	   and	  RTU.	  For	   serial	  
networks,	  a	  single	  master	  is	  capable	  of	  communicating	  with	  up	  to	  240	  slave	  devices	  
per	  serial	  line.	  	  
Secondarily,	   Modbus	   TCP	   offers	   additional	   flexibility,	   supporting	   Modbus	  
deployments	   over	   IP	   networks.	   Working	   at	   the	   application	   layer,	   this	   version	   of	  
Modbus	   is	   capable	   of	   facilitating	   communications	   between	   an	   infinite	   number	   of	  
devices.	  Generally,	  one	  or	  more	  master	  devices	  are	  responsible	  for	  managing	  a	  pre-­‐
set	   number	   of	   slave	   devices.	   Unlike	   its	   serial	   counterpart,	   Modbus	   TCP	   allows	  
remote	  terminal	  units	  to	  be	  managed	  by	  more	  than	  one	  master	  device.	  [41][75]	  
Although	  Modbus	   provides	   robust	   legacy	   hardware	   support,	   security	  was	   not	  
kept	   in	   mind	   during	   the	   development	   phase	   of	   the	   protocol.	   The	   lack	   of	   security	  
controls	   supported	   by	   the	   Modbus	   protocol	   suite	   makes	   it	   susceptible	   to	   various	  
attacks	   like:	  message	   spoofing,	  modification,	   and	   replay;	   denial	   of	   service	   attacks;	  
and	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	  attacks.	  These	  specific	  attacks	  will	  be	  discusses	  later	  in	  this	  
thesis.	  
	  
2.4.2 DNP3	  Protocol	  
	  
Westronic	  Inc.	  developed	  the	  Distributed	  Network	  Protocol	  (DNP3)	  in	  the	  early	  
1990’s	  to	  provide	  a	  standardized	  solution	  for	  communications	  between	  SCADA	  MTU	  
and	  RTU	  devices.	  [28]	  Taking	  the	  SCADA	  world	  by	  storm,	  DNP3	  has	  been	  deployed	  
by	  over	  75%	  of	  North	  American	  electric	  utility	  companies.	  [28][29][52]	  Part	  of	  this	  
protocol’s	   popularity	   lies	   in	   its	   extreme	   flexibility;	   it	   supports	  many	   physical	   and	  
data	   link	   topologies	   like	  Ethernet,	   licensed	   radio,	   frame	   relay	  networks,	   and	   fiber.	  
[37]	  In	  addition,	  DNP3	  provides	  full	  backwards	  compatibility	  with	  the	  once	  popular	  




DNP3’s	   usage	   generally	   falls	   within	   the	   confines	   of	   a	   traditional	   client-­‐server	  
network	   topology.	   A	   master	   device,	   often	   located	   in	   the	   control	   center,	  
communicates	   with	   one	   or	   more	   field	   devices	   using	   DNP3	   running	   over	   various	  
physical	  and	  data-­‐link	  layers.	  In	  order	  to	  provide	  additional	  efficiency	  in	  real-­‐world	  
deployments,	   the	   protocol	   is	   able	   to	   facilitate	   communications	   between	   a	   single	  
master	  device	  and	  multiple	  remote	  terminal	  units.	  [37]	  
DNP3	   protocol	   communication	   messages	   fall	   into	   three	   categories:	   point-­‐to-­‐
point,	   multicast,	   and	   unsolicited	   responses.	   [28]	   Point-­‐to-­‐point	   DNP3	  
communications	   transpire	   between	   a	   single	  MTU	   and	   a	   single	   RTU.	   This	   situation	  
may	  occur	  when	  a	   remote	   station	   contains	  only	  a	   single,	   all	   encompassing	   remote	  
terminal	   unit.	   Secondarily,	   MTUs	   are	   able	   to	   send	   multicast	   messages	   to	   all	  
substation	   devices	   at	   once.	   For	   example,	   a	   control	   operator	   may	   want	   to	   read	  
actuator	  values	  from	  all	  devices	  in	  order	  to	  take	  a	  system	  state	  ‘snapshot’.	  [28][37]	  
Lastly,	  field	  devices	  are	  able	  to	  send	  unsolicited	  responses	  to	  a	  MTU	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  
emergency	   or	   other	   anomalous	   event.	   [28]	   This	   may	   transpire	   when	   a	   sensor	  
measurement	  on	  a	  PLC	  exceeds	   a	  maximum	   threshold	  value,	   as	  determined	  by	   its	  
logic	  program.	  	  
Although	   DNP3	   provides	   various	   robust	   and	   convenient	   network	  
communication	   topologies,	   like	   other	   SCADA	   protocols,	   security	   was	   not	   kept	   in	  
mind	   during	   its	   development	   phase.	   In	   addition,	   DNP3	   is	   susceptible	   to	   many	  
security	   attacks,	   mostly	   due	   to	   lack	   of	   authentication.	   These	   attacks	   include:	  
message	   spoofing,	  modification,	   and	   replay;	   denial	   of	   service	   attacks;	   and	  man-­‐in-­‐
the-­‐middle	  attacks.	  Specific	  attack	  vectors	  will	  be	  discusses	  later	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
	  
2.5 SCADA	  Convergence	  
	  
During	   the	  advent	  of	  SCADA	  technologies,	  a	  heavy	   focus	  was	  put	  on	  providing	  
robustness,	  safety,	  and	  reliability	  within	  these	  systems.	  SCADA’s	  strict	  requirements	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for	   high	   availability	   are	   apparent	   considering	   most	   systems	   have	   been	   running	  
stably	   over	   serial	   lines	   for	   decades.	   [56][87]	   In	   order	   to	   provide	   such	   stability,	  
SCADA	   networks	   were	   typically	   isolated	   from	   external	   communications.	   This	  
provided	  some	  inherent	  level	  of	  security.	  	  
However,	  the	  initial	  focus	  on	  robustness	  over	  security	  became	  detrimental	  after	  
the	   Internet	   became	   highly	   accessible	   in	   the	   1990’s.	   [56][60]	   The	   convenience	   of	  
Internet	  and	  WAN	  connectivity	  encouraged	  the	  integration	  of	  SCADA	  networks	  into	  
corporate	   LANs	   and	   intranets.	   This	   amalgamation	   provided	   increased	   bandwidth	  
and	   ease	   of	   deployment	  while	   enabling	   additional	   integration	  with	   business	   logic	  
processes.	   [60][87]	  Furthermore,	   redundant	  SCADA	  components	   like	  SCADA	  serial	  
gateway	  devices	  were	  retired	  from	  use,	  further	  reducing	  network	  complexity.	  	  
As	   SCADA	   continued	   to	   converge	  with	   IP-­‐based	   networks	   during	   the	   last	   few	  
decades,	   the	   attack	   surface	  of	   these	  networks	   increased.	   Since	  SCADA	  now	  closely	  
resembles	   traditional	   IT	   networks,	   many	   previously	   irrelevant	   security	  
vulnerabilities	   have	   been	   introduced.	   These	   include	   things	   like	   denial	   of	   service,	  








Chapter	  3.	  	  SCADA	  and	  Security	  
	  
3.1 	   Current	  State	  of	  SCADA	  Security	   	  
	  
Most	   security	   issues	   pertaining	   to	   SCADA	   networks	   occurred	   in	   the	   last	   few	  
decades	  as	  these	  networks	  became	  no	  longer	   isolated.	  [87]	  Naturally,	   the	  adoption	  
of	   IP-­‐based	   technologies	   introduced	   many	   security	   vulnerabilities	   into	   these	  
networks.	   [87]	   Unfortunately,	   although	   SCADA	   closely	   resembles	   IT	   networks,	  
traditional	  security	  mitigation	  technologies	  are	  not	  an	  option	  due	  to	  their	  impact	  on	  
availability.	  [87]	  
Even	  in	  cases	  where	  equipment	  is	  identified	  as	  being	  vulnerable,	  change	  control	  
is	   still	   a	   major	   priority.	   Devices	   will	   often	   remain	   unpatched	   and	   vulnerable	   for	  
decades.	   [51]	  After	  all,	  most	   industrial	  control	  networks	  cannot	  be	  taken	  down	  for	  
maintenance.	  	  
In	   addition,	   security	   auditing	  within	   SCADA	   networks	   is	   scarce	   due	   to	   lack	   of	  
security	   awareness	   training	   and	   safe	   security	   auditing	   frameworks.	   [87]	   Many	  
SCADA	  security	  standards	  exist;	  however,	  lack	  of	  security	  awareness	  prevents	  these	  
standards	  from	  being	  adopted.	  Some	  network	  operators	  may	  not	  even	  be	  aware	  of	  
the	  underlying	  security	  issues	  of	  their	  SCADA	  deployment.	  [39][56]	  
Finally,	   widely	   deployed	   SCADA	   protocols	   like	   DNP3	   and	   Modbus	   have	   no	  
inherent	  security	  controls.	  This	  makes	  managing	  security	  inherently	  difficult.	  Ideally	  
these	  protocols	  would	  be	  replaced	  with	  newer,	  more	  secure	  variations;	  however,	  the	  
need	   for	   backwards	   compatibility	   and	   high	   availability	   impacts	   the	   adoption	   of	  




3.1.1 The	  Importance	  of	  SCADA	  Security	  
	  
SCADA	   networks	   are	   responsible	   for	  managing	   the	   critical	   infrastructure	   that	  
keeps	  our	  country	  operating.	  This	   includes	  control	  systems	  for	  power	  distribution,	  
water	   treatment,	   transportation	   infrastructure,	   etc.	   In	   the	   case	  of	   a	   SCADA	  system	  
disruption,	   the	  critical	   infrastructure	  components	  controlling	  our	  society	  could	   fail	  
to	   provide	   the	   resources	   needed	   to	   run	   our	   economy.	   Critical	   infrastructure	   is	   an	  
essential	   component	   required	   for	   the	   smooth	   operation	   of	   a	   government	   and	   its	  
economy.	  [63]	  
Following	   the	   terrorism	   attacks	   on	   September	   11th,	   2001,	   the	   security	   of	  
national	   resources	   in	   countries	   around	   the	   world	   have	   been	   put	   in	   the	   limelight.	  
Typically	   both	   governments	   and	   companies	   responsible	   for	   protecting	   critical	  
infrastructure	  have	  overlooked	  SCADA	  security.	  [56]	  This	  is	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  
security	   controls	   available,	   and	   the	   inability	   to	   upgrade	   systems	   that	   are	   heavily	  
relied	  upon.	   [53][56]	  Cyber	  warfare	  has	  become	  an	   integral	  component	  of	  modern	  
warfare;	   this	   can	  be	   seen	   in	   the	   recent	   supposed	   ‘state-­‐sponsored’	   attacks	   against	  
Iran’s	  nuclear	   facilities.	   [22]	  For	  years,	   countries	   like	  China	  and	  North	  Korea	  have	  
been	  openly	   training	   technology	  experts	   in	  preparation	   for	   cyber	  attacks.	   [31][50]	  
This	  fundamental	  shift	  towards	  state-­‐sponsored	  hacking	  cannot	  be	  ignored.	  	  
In	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  President’s	  Report	  on	  Critical	  Infrastructure	  highlights	  
the	   fact	   that	  vital	  critical	   infrastructure	  components	  are	  “susceptible	   to	  both	  cyber	  
and	  physical	   attacks.”	   [63]	   In	   addition,	   the	  United	   States	   Presidential	  Directive	   on	  
Homeland	  Security	  and	  Department	  of	  Energy	  discussed	  prioritizing	  the	  protection	  
of	   critical	   infrastructure	   assets	   from	   cyber	   attacks.	   [85]	   Improvements	   to	   SCADA	  
security	  do	  not	  affect	  a	  single	  country;	  some	  critical	  infrastructure	  is	  trans-­‐national,	  
providing	  assets	  for	  both	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  [35][63]	  
As	  SCADA	  networks	   continue	   to	   communicate	  using	   Internet	   technologies,	   the	  
need	  for	  SCADA	  security	  controls	   increases.	  The	  following	  government	  and	  private	  
groups	   are	   working	   towards	   various	   security	   controls	   and	   policy	   documents	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outlining	  industry	  best	  practices:	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security	  (DHS),	  National	  
Institute	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology	  (NIST),	  National	  Infrastructure	  Advisory	  Council	  
(NIAC),	   National	   Communication	   System	   (NCS),	   National	   Cyber	   Security	   Division	  
(NCSD),	   US-­‐CERT,	   Government	   of	   Canada,	   American	   Gas	   Association	   (AGA),	   and	  
many	  more.	  [63]	  
	   	  
3.1.2 SCADA	  Security	  Incidents	  
	  
When	  considering	  cyber	  security	  incidents	  pertaining	  to	  SCADA	  networks,	  three	  
main	  events	  come	   to	  mind.	  First,	   the	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security’s	   “Aurora”	  
attack;	   second,	   the	   recent	   state-­‐sponsored	   Stuxnet	   attack	   targeting	   Iran’s	   nuclear	  
facilities;	   and	   finally,	   the	   disgruntled	   potential	   employee	  who	   hacked	   into	   a	   city’s	  
waste	  management	  network	  in	  Queensland,	  Australia.	  [84][87][88]	  
The	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security	  conducted	   the	   ‘Aurora’	  attack	   in	  March	  
2007	   with	   engineers	   from	   Idaho	   National	   Laboratories.	   This	   operation	   aimed	   to	  
determine	   the	   impact	   cyber	   intrusions	   could	   have	   on	   physical	   infrastructure.	  
[84][88]	   The	   successful	   execution	   of	   a	   network	   attack	   against	   a	   physical	   asset	  
resulted	   in	   the	   “partial	   destruction	   of	   a	   $1	   million	   dollar	   large	   diesel-­‐electric	  
generator.”	  [88]	  
More	   recently,	   the	   Stuxnet	   malware	   attack	   against	   Iran’s	   nuclear	   facilities	  
showcased	   the	   threat	   malware	   poses	   to	   industrial	   control	   systems.	   Based	   on	   the	  
high	   complexity	   of	   the	   attack,	   the	   small	   form	   factor	   of	   the	   code,	   and	   the	   insider	  
knowledge	   required	   to	   execute	   the	   attack,	   some	   suggest	   the	   outbreak	   was	   state	  
sponsored.	   [22]	   This	   highly	   sophisticated,	   SCADA	   specific	   worm	   utilized	   multiple	  
zero-­‐day	  Windows	  exploits	  coupled	  with	  stolen	  certificates	  to	  replicate	  towards	  the	  
intended	  target.	  [22]	  
Malware	   is	   not	   the	   only	   reason	   for	   being	   concerned	   about	   SCADA	   security,	   as	  
seen	  in	  the	  Shire	  of	  Maroochy	  township	  attack	  in	  Queensland,	  Australia	  in	  the	  year	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2000.	  Vitek	  Boden	  was	  turned	  down	  from	  a	  job	  with	  the	  municipality,	  and	  “hacked	  
into	   the	   city’s	   wastewater	   management	   system.	   Over	   the	   course	   of	   two	   months,	  
Boden	   repeatedly	   drove	   around	   the	   Maroochy	   Shire	   Council	   area	   issuing	   radio	  
commands	  to	  sewage	  equipment	  and	  causing	  over	  230,000	  gallons	  of	  raw	  sewage	  to	  
spill	   into	   local	   parks,	   rivers,	   and	   even	   onto	   the	   grounds	   of	   a	   Hyatt	   Regency	  
Hotel.“	   [87]	   The	   system	   was	   tampered	   with	   approximately	   40	   times	   before	   the	  
attacks	   were	   actually	   detected.	   [1][88]	   This	   situation	   showcased	   the	   real	   risk	   of	  
insider	  attacks.	  
Lastly,	   although	   not	   a	   cyber	   security	   attack,	   the	   importance	   of	   change	  
management	   procedures	   was	   showcased	   in	   March	   2008	   in	   Baxley,	   Georgia.	   A	  
nuclear	  power	  plant	  in	  Baxley	  was	  forced	  to	  shutdown	  when	  an	  operator	  deployed	  a	  
software	   patch	   to	   a	   single	   computer.	   This	   patch	   caused	   communications	   to	   be	  
disrupted	  between	  two	  SCADA	  systems,	  causing	  system	  failure.	  [49]	  
	  
3.1.3 SCADA	  Security	  Standards	  
	  
Multiple	   industrial	   control	   system	   security	   standards	   have	   been	   proposed	   by	  
both	   public	   and	   private	   organizations.	   These	   documents	   outline	   SCADA	   and	  
industrial	   control	   system	  best	   practices,	   security	   assurance	  methods,	   and	   security	  
assessment	  methodologies.	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3.1.3.1 NIST	  System	  Protection	  Profile	  
	  
The	  National	  Institute	  of	  Standards	  and	  Technology	  published	  the	  NIST	  System	  
Protection	   Profile	   (SPP)	   in	   2004	   [80];	   this	   document	   outlines	   how	   to	   develop	  
formalized	   information	   assurance	   requirements	   for	   industrial	   control	   systems.	  
Noting	  the	  dissimilarities	  seen	  in	  varying	  types	  of	  industrial	  control	  systems,	  the	  SPP	  
document	  provides	  guidelines	  for	  creating	  protection	  profiles	  that	  target	  specific	  ICS	  
categories.	   [20]	   Functional	   and	   assurance	   requirements	   are	   outlined	   within	   this	  




Like	   the	   NIST	   SPP,	   the	   ISA-­‐SP99	   technical	   documents	   provide	   a	   security	  
implementation	   guide	   for	   both	   manufacturing	   and	   industrial	   control	   systems.	  
Together,	  these	  documents	  provide	  information	  about	  the	  specific	  security	  controls	  
available	   for	   industrial	   control	   networks.	   In	   addition,	   integration	   of	   these	  
technologies	  is	  discussed,	  outlining	  best	  practices	  and	  usage	  guidance.	  [20][73][74]	  
	  
3.1.3.3 AGA-­‐12	  Documents	  
	  
This	   set	   of	   documents,	   produced	   by	   the	   American	   Gas	   Association,	   outlines	  
methods	   for	   ensuring	   the	   confidentiality	   and	   integrity	   of	   encapsulated	   serial	  
protocols.	   In	   addition,	   these	   documents	   outline	   cryptographic	   and	   testing	  
requirements	   for	   encapsulated	   serial	   datagrams.	  A	  methodology	   for	   assessing	   and	  




3.1.3.4 NIST	  SP	  800-­‐82	  
	  
In	   2006,	   the	   NIST	   SP	   800-­‐82	   document	   was	   released	   to	   specifically	   address	  
SCADA	  and	   industrial	  control	  system	  security	   issues.	   It	   “discusses	  common	  system	  
topologies,	   threats	  and	  vulnerabilities,	  and	  suggest	  security	  countermeasures	  to	  be	  
used	   in	   mitigating	   risk.”	   [20][80]	   This	   document	   overviews	   available	   technical	  




The	   API-­‐1164	   Pipeline	   SCADA	   Security	   Standard	   provides	   a	   comprehensive	  
checklist	   of	   industry	   guidelines	   for	   ICS	   security	   best	   practices.	   [78]	   It	   addresses	  
“access	  control,	  communication,	  information	  distribution	  and	  classification,	  physical	  
security,	  data	  flow,	  network	  design,	  and	  a	  management	  system	  for	  personnel.”	  [20]	  
	  
3.1.4 Issues	  Inhibiting	  Security	  Adoption	  	  
	  
Many	   issues	   exist	   that	   impede	   the	   adoption	   of	   security	   controls	   and	   policies	  
within	   SCADA	   networks.	   These	   issues	   range	   from	   non-­‐standard	   auditing	  
frameworks	  to	  difficulties	  deploying	  device	  patches.	  	  
First,	   the	   sensitive	   nature	   of	   SCADA	   networks	   impedes	   our	   ability	   to	   deploy	  
mitigating	   technologies.	   Primarily,	   devices	   cannot	   be	   upgraded	   for	   years	   since	  
upgrades	   may	   impact	   crucial	   industrial	   processes.	   [56]	   Software	   patches	   can	   be	  
difficult	  to	  audit,	  and	  staged	  patch	  management	  strategies	  may	  not	  translate	  well	  to	  
SCADA	   networks.	   [39]	   In	   addition,	   experimental	   security	   technologies	   cannot	   be	  
tested	   within	   control	   systems	   due	   to	   the	   hard	   real	   time	   nature	   of	   SCADA.	   Going	  
hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  this,	  the	  replacement	  of	  legacy	  hardware	  and	  software	  is	  also	  not	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simple.	   [51]	  Many	   SCADA	   devices	   have	   been	   operating	   for	   decades	  without	   being	  
restarted	  or	  shut	  down.	  [56]	  This	  follows	  the	  common	  adage:	  why	  replace	  the	  device	  
if	  it	  is	  not	  ‘broken’?	  
Secondarily,	  as	  discussed	  previously,	  popular	  industrial	  control	  communication	  
protocols	   like	  DNP3	   and	  Modbus	  were	   not	   designed	  with	   security	   in	  mind.	   These	  
protocols	   do	   not	   provide	   any	   authentication	  mechanisms	   between	  MTU	   and	   RTU	  
devices.	   Stemming	   from	   this,	   these	   protocols	   are	   vulnerable	   to	   many	   different	  
security	  issues,	  including:	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	  and	  denial	  of	  service	  attacks,	  as	  well	  as	  
packet	   replay,	   modification,	   and	   forging	   attacks.	   The	   optimal	   solution	   to	   this	  
problem	   involves	   the	  development	   and	  deployment	   of	  more	   secure	  protocols	   that	  
provide	   full	  backwards	  compatibility.	  However,	   the	  development	  of	  such	  protocols	  
proves	  to	  be	  difficult	  due	  to	  the	  low	  computation	  resources	  available	  to	  RTU	  and	  PLC	  
devices.	  [12][28]	  
Although	  modern	  SCADA	  networks	  appear	  to	  closely	  resemble	  IT	  networks,	  the	  
hard	   real-­‐time	   nature	   of	   these	   systems	   prevents	   the	   deployment	   of	   traditional	  
security	   controls.	   Hard	   real-­‐time	   systems	   are	   required	   to	   meet	   communication	  
deadlines,	  every	  time.	  Unlike	  IT	  networks,	  even	  small	   increases	  in	  network	  latency	  
can	  severely	  disrupt	  SCADA	  operations.	  [29][51]	  This	  well-­‐defined	  requirement	  for	  
communication	   deadlines	   prevents	   the	   deployment	   of	   intrusive	   security	  
technologies	   like	   application	   layer	   firewalls,	   intrusion	   prevention	   systems,	   and	  
antivirus	  programs.	  [51][56]	  Such	  technologies	  introduce	  additional	  computational	  
or	  network	  overhead,	  negatively	  impacting	  these	  communication	  deadlines.	  	  
Additionally,	   more	   reliable	   technologies	   like	   firewalls,	   access	   control	  
mechanisms,	   and	   demilitarized	   zones	   (DMZ)	   can	   still	   impact	   availability	   if	  
misconfigured.	   [51]	   SCADA	  networks	   can	  be	   extremely	   complex	  depending	  on	   the	  
deployment,	   increasing	   the	  chances	  of	  misconfiguration.	  One	  example	   involves	   the	  
nuclear	   power	   plant	   in	   Baxley,	   Georgia	   that	   was	   forced	   to	   shutdown	   in	  March	   of	  
2008	  when	  an	  operator	  deployed	  a	  software	  patch	   to	  a	  single	  computer.	   [49]	  This	  
software	  patch	  alone	  did	  not	  cause	  the	  outage;	  in	  fact,	  the	  operator’s	  lack	  of	  system	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knowledge	   allowed	   the	   software	   patch	   to	   inhibit	   communication	   between	   two	  
network	  devices.	   [49]	  Examples	   like	   this	  highlight	   the	   importance	  of	   strict	   change	  
management	   within	   SCADA	   networks.	   Although	   patches	   and	   remediation	  
technologies	  may	  be	  available	  to	  operators,	  deployment	  may	  not	  be	  a	  viable	  option.	  	  
Finally,	  auditing	  the	  security	  stance	  of	  a	  SCADA	  network	  proves	  to	  be	  extremely	  
difficult.	  Although	  industry	  leaders	  like	  NIST	  provide	  auditing	  frameworks,	  the	  safe	  
execution	  of	  audits	  can	  be	  extremely	  difficult.	  These	  difficulties	  may	  range	  from	  an	  
operator’s	  lack	  of	  SCADA	  security	  knowledge	  to	  denial	  of	  service	  conditions	  created	  
from	   port	   scanning.	   Ideally,	   SCADA	   systems	   would	   follow	   strict	   industry	   security	  
guidelines;	   however,	   these	   guidelines	   need	   to	   be	   audited	   to	   ensure	   their	  
effectiveness.	  One	  important	  component	  of	  security	  auditing	  involves	  the	  detection	  
and	  exploitation	  of	  vulnerability	  through	  penetration	  testing.	  This	  type	  of	  auditing	  is	  
generally	  not	  possible	   thanks	   to	   its	   impact	  on	  SCADA	  system	  availability.	   [51][80]	  
For	  example,	  the	  execution	  of	  a	  simple	  port	  scan	  against	  a	  PLC	  device	  may	  cause	  it	  to	  
lose	  network	   connectivity.	   [51][56]	  Without	   the	   required	   security	  knowledge,	   it	   is	  
difficult	  for	  SCADA	  operators	  and	  management	  to	  successfully	  mediate	  risk	  and	  fully	  
understand	  the	  security	  stance	  of	  their	  network.	  	  
	  
3.2 	   Security	  Considerations	  for	  SCADA	  Networks	  
	  
Unlike	  IT	  networks,	  SCADA	  systems	  have	  a	  unique	  set	  of	  security	  considerations.	  
In	  particular,	  the	  general	  security	  concepts	  of	  ensuring	  confidentiality,	  integrity,	  and	  
availability	  have	  different	  focus	  areas	  when	  used	  in	  SCADA	  systems.	  Ideally	  SCADA	  
security	  solutions	  should	  be	  simple	  while	  providing	  well-­‐rounded	  security	  that	  does	  
not	  impact	  system	  availability.	  These	  considerations	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  




3.2.1 Availability	   	  
	  
Generally	   speaking,	   high	   availability	   is	   important	   to	   both	   IT	   and	   SCADA	  
networks.	   However,	   unlike	   IT	   networks,	   SCADA	   relies	   heavily	   on	   strict	  
communication	   deadlines	   in	   order	   to	   facilitate	   smooth	   system	   operations.	   These	  
networks	  are	  called	  “hard	  real-­‐time	  systems”:	  communication	  deadlines	  have	  to	  be	  
met	   continuously.	   [23][39]	   The	   introduction	   of	   additional	   communication	   latency	  
could	  prevent	  a	  SCADA	  system	  from	  operating	  properly.	  [51]	  These	  delays	  may	  even	  
cause	  the	  system	  to	  transition	  to	  an	  unstable	  state.	  	  
Because	   of	   this,	   the	   availability	   component	   of	   the	   CIA	   triad	   is	   considered	   the	  
most	   crucial.	   Stringent	   requirements	   for	   high	   availability	   impact	   an	   operator’s	  
ability	   to	   deploy	   security	   controls,	   upgrade	   devices,	   and	   implement	   new	   SCADA	  
communication	   protocols.	   [51][56]	   Any	   impact	   on	   availability	   is	   considered	  




Naturally,	   the	   integrity	   of	   communications	   within	   SCADA	   systems	   is	   also	  
paramount.	   The	   hard	   real-­‐time	   nature	   of	   SCADA	  does	   not	   provide	   any	  window	  of	  
opportunity	  for	  retransmitting	  corrupted	  packets.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  when	  analyzing	  
popular	   SCADA	   communication	   protocols	   like	   DNP3	   and	   Modbus.	   Most	   protocols	  
implement	   integrity	   checking	  mechanisms	   like	   cyclic	   redundancy	   checks	   (CRC)	   to	  
detect	   corrupted	   data	   frames.	   In	   some	   cases	   transportation	   layer	   integrity	   checks	  
alone	   may	   not	   be	   sufficient.	   Thus,	   protocols	   like	   DNP3	   may	   provide	   additional	  






Although	  not	  currently	  implemented	  within	  SCADA	  protocols,	  authentication	  is	  
considered	   a	   crucial	   and	   highly	   desirable	   security	   control.	   Currently	   deployed	  
SCADA	  protocols	  like	  DNP3	  and	  Modbus	  do	  not	  provide	  any	  inherent	  authentication	  
mechanisms	  to	  verify	  the	  identity	  of	  master	  and	  slave	  devices.	  [28][35][41]	  Instead,	  
typically	  a	  device	   identifier	   is	   located	  within	   the	  protocol	  header,	  proving	  minimal	  
identification	   information	   to	   the	   receiving	   device.	   Since	   this	   identification	  
mechanism	  is	  not	  implemented	  securely,	  it	  is	  trivial	  to	  forge	  protocol	  packets	  within	  
a	  SCADA	  network.	  [28][35][41]	  
Ideally,	   SCADA	  protocols	   should	   implement	   an	   authentication	  mechanism	   that	  
provides	   a	   verifiable	   and	   secure	   way	   of	   identifying	   the	   source	   of	   all	   data	  
transmissions.	   This	  would	   allow	   remote	   terminal	   units	   to	   verify	   control	  messages	  
were	   sent	   from	   a	  master	   terminal	   unit,	   for	   example.	   The	   fundamental	   security	   of	  
SCADA	   systems	   relies	   on	   the	   successful	   implementation	   of	   such	   authentication	  
controls.	   However,	   as	   noted	   previously,	   the	   deployment	   of	   new	   and	   improved	  




Similarly,	   implementations	   of	   authentication	   mechanisms	   within	   SCADA	  
networks	  should	  provide	  an	  unchallengeable	  way	  of	  identifying	  the	  source	  of	  a	  data	  
stream.	   Within	   IT	   security,	   this	   is	   generally	   called	   non-­‐repudiation.	   When	   an	  
effective	  authentication	  mechanism	  is	  deployed,	  there	  should	  be	  no	  way	  for	  a	  sender	  
to	   deny	   they	   ever	   sent	   a	   data	   transmission.	   This	   can	  be	   achieved,	   for	   example,	   by	  
using	   authentication	  mechanisms	   that	   rely	   on	  public	   key	   infrastructure.	  Naturally,	  
this	  requirement	  would	  be	  automatically	  resolved	  when	   implementing	  an	  effective	  





Contrary	   to	   typical	   security	   wisdom,	   the	   confidentiality	   of	   SCADA	   protocol	  
datagrams	   is	   not	   considered	   important.	   [35][51]	   In	   fact,	   the	   unwelcome	   use	   of	  
encryption	   technologies	   within	   SCADA	   networks	   may	   introduce	   system-­‐crippling	  
communication	   delays.	   Such	   delays	   tend	   to	   occur	   when	   an	   encryption	   algorithm	  
creates	  significant	  overhead	  on	  network	  or	  endpoint	  devices.	  [35][51]	  In	  particular,	  
field	  devices	  like	  remote	  terminal	  units	  and	  programmable	  logic	  controllers	  do	  not	  
have	   the	   computational	   capacity	   to	   perform	   cryptographic	   operations	   on	   network	  
packets.	  [51][56]	  
Most	   importantly,	   there	   is	   no	   need	   to	   provide	   confidentiality	   within	   SCADA	  
systems	   since	   all	   data	   transmissions	   are	   considered	   non-­‐sensitive.	  Why	   introduce	  
additional	   cryptographic	   overhead	  when	   confidentiality	   isn’t	   even	   a	   requirement?	  
Thus,	  confidentiality	  controls	  are	  generally	  not	  associated	  with	  SCADA	  protocols.	  	  
	  
3.2.6 Logging	  and	  Auditing	  
	  
At	  any	  moment	  in	  time,	  industrial	  control	  systems	  fall	  within	  a	  series	  of	  system	  
states	   that	  can	  be	  used	   to	  measure	   the	  responsiveness	  and	  status	  of	   the	  system.	  A	  
system	  may	   transition	   from	  a	   stable	   to	   instable	   state	   for	  various	  physical	   reasons.	  
These	   changes,	  measured	   by	   sensors	  within	   the	   SCADA	   system,	   are	   analyzed	   and	  
presented	  to	  a	  human	  operator	  via	  the	  human	  machine	  interface	  (HMI).	  	  
In	  order	  to	  improve	  the	  efficiency	  of	  an	  industrial	  control	  system,	  operators	  may	  
need	  to	  analyze	  historical	  information	  regarding	  the	  system	  and	  its	  state	  transitions.	  
This	   data	   is	   typically	   logged	   to	   the	   data	   historian	   and	   other	   backend	   database	  
servers.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   an	   emergency,	   this	   data	   needs	   to	   be	   recorded	   in	   order	   to	  
determine	  the	  source	  of	  the	  system	  instability.	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An	  important	  part	  of	  logging	  within	  SCADA	  systems	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  audit	  human	  
actions	   that	  manipulate	   the	   control	   system.	   [51]	  Audit	   logs	   should	   be	   recorded	   in	  
order	   to	   facilitate	   the	   analysis	   of	   human	   actions	   during	   a	   system	   emergency	   or	  
security	   breach.	   Currently,	   most	   control	   centers	   have	   a	   lax	   approach	   to	   security	  
auditing.	  [51]	  Primarily,	  audit	  trails	  are	  difficult	  to	  follow	  thanks	  to	  shared	  accounts	  
and	  default	  passwords.	  [51]	  In	  a	  secure	  SCADA	  system,	  user	  actions	  should	  be	  easily	  
logged	  and	  analyzed.	  	  
Lastly,	   implemented	   security	   policies	   and	   controls	   should	   be	   measurable.	  
Traditionally	  this	  is	  done	  using	  security	  audits.	  These	  audits	  may	  test	  user	  security	  
awareness,	  strength	  of	  passwords,	  presence	  of	  account	  sharing,	  testing	  of	  deployed	  
security	   controls,	   etc.	   As	  mentioned	   previously,	   this	   proves	   to	   be	   difficult	  without	  
impacting	  system	  availability.	  [51]	  
	  
3.2.7 Detection	  of	  Security	  Events	  
	  
Equally	   important	   is	   the	   system’s	   ability	   to	   detect	   the	   occurrence	   of	   security	  
events.	  These	  events	  may	  be	  insider	  attacks,	  system	  attacks	  via	  the	  corporate	  LAN	  or	  
Internet,	   or	   even	   physical	   attacks	   on	   field	   devices.	   The	   detection	   of	   such	   events	  
appears	   to	   be	   fairly	   simple:	   SCADA	   networks	   contain	   a	   predictable	   number	   of	  
devices	   that	   follow	   a	   predictable	   communication	   flow	   model.	   [59][80]	   One	   may	  
assume	  that	  anomalous	  events	  would	  also	  be	  easily	  detectable.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  
the	  case.	  [51][87]	  Thanks	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  security	  controls	  present	  in	  SCADA	  protocols,	  
packet	  forging,	  modification,	  and	  replay	  can	  be	  almost	  impossible	  to	  detect.	  [51][87]	  
An	  effective	  SCADA	  security	  solution	  leverages	  an	  overall	  system	  knowledge	  in	  
order	  to	  determine	  when	  packets	  have	  been	  forged	  or	  modified	  in	  transit.	  This	  can	  
be	  done	  using	  state-­‐based	  intrusion	  detection	  systems.	  The	  simplest	  way	  to	  provide	  
an	  effective	  security	  incident	  detection	  mechanism	  involves	  deploying	  secure	  SCADA	  
protocols.	  Attacks	  like	  packet	  replay,	  modification,	  and	  forging	  can	  be	  prevented	  at	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the	  protocol	   level.	   In	   this	   case,	  network	  security	  controls	   can	  provide	  a	  defense	   in	  




The	  lack	  of	  security	  controls	  present	  in	  SCADA	  systems	  is	  partly	  due	  to	  SCADA	  
networks	   originally	   being	   isolated.	   In	   the	   past,	   at	   the	   time	   of	   deployment,	   the	  
transition	  to	  IP	  based	  networks	  could	  not	  be	  predicted.	  [20][88]	  
Following	   this,	   the	   original	   isolated	   nature	   of	   SCADA	   can	   be	   simulated	   in	  
modernized	  networks	  using	  demilitarized	  zones	  (DMZ).	  DMZs	  provide	  a	  buffer	  zone	  
between	   internal	   and	   external	   local	   area	   networks.	   This	   buffer	   zone	   typically	   is	  
isolated	   by	   two	   firewalls:	   one	   between	   the	   external	   network	   and	   the	   DMZ,	   and	  
another	  between	  the	  DMZ	  and	  internal	  network.	  This	  isolation	  zone	  allows	  external	  
clients	  to	  connect	  to	  internal	  resources	  without	  significantly	  degrading	  the	  security	  
stance	   of	   the	   internal	   network.	   This	   is	   particularly	   useful	   for	   internet-­‐facing	  
resources	  like	  web	  servers.	  	  
In	  a	  SCADA	  system,	  a	  DMZ	  may	  provide	  a	  secure	  buffer	  zone	  between	  business	  
logic	  servers	  and	  the	  internal	  SCADA	  network.	  This	  would	  allow	  the	  network	  to	  be	  
connected	   safely	   to	   a	   corporate	   local	   area	   network.	   If	   deployed	   properly,	   the	  
bordering	   firewalls	   could	   provide	   granular	   flow	   control;	   ensuring	   exploitation	   of	  
DMZ	  servers	  could	  not	  overflow	  to	  the	  internal	  network.	  [51][87]	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
note	  that	  the	  security	  of	  a	  DMZ	  deployment	  relies	  highly	  on	  the	  proper	  configuration	  
of	  its	  isolating	  firewalls.	  	  	  
	  
	   	  
	  
29	  
3.2.9 Physical	  Controls	  
	  
Lastly,	   the	   utilization	   of	   physical	   security	   controls	   is	   paramount	   to	   the	  
operational	  security	  of	  SCADA	  systems.	  Both	  field	  devices	  and	  substations	  should	  be	  
physically	  hardened	  to	  prevent	  unauthorized	  intrusions.	  	  
Substations	   should	   be	   able	   to	   resist	   break	   in	   attempts	   using	   various	  
technologies.	  These	  may	  include	  electric	  fences,	  biometric	  access	  control,	  CCTV,	  etc.	  
In	  addition,	  field	  devices	  deployed	  outside	  substations	  should	  resist	  tampering.	  The	  
exploitation	   of	   field	   devices	   could	   circumvent	   network	   perimeter	   security,	  
potentially	   allowing	   an	   attacker	   to	   circumvent	   internal	   security	   controls.	   Physical	  
hardening	   may	   be	   used	   to	   prevent	   devices	   from	   being	   reprogrammed,	   flashed,	  
destroyed,	  or	  removed.	  [51]	  
 
3.3 	   SCADA	  Attack	  Vectors	  
	  
Due	   to	   SCADA’s	   insecure	   nature,	   many	   attacks	   currently	   exist,	   targeting	  
communication	  protocols,	   field	  devices,	  and	  internal	  control	  software.	  The	  Modbus	  
protocol	  alone	  has	  over	  48	  identified	  attacks,	  targeting	  both	  its	  serial	  and	  Ethernet	  
implementations.	  [41]	  Although	  attack	  methods	  differ	  depending	  on	  the	  protocol	  in	  
question,	  most	   attacks	   can	  be	   classified	   in	   eight	  different	  ways:	  message	   spoofing,	  
modification,	   and	   replay;	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	   and	   denial	   of	   service	   attacks;	   control	  
software	   and	   operating	   system	   exploitation;	   and	   physical	   attacks.	   These	   will	   be	  
discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  sections.	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3.3.1 Message	  Spoofing	  
	  
Message	   spoofing	   occurs	   when	   a	   malicious	   attacker	   forges	   SCADA	  
communication	  packets	  while	   pretending	   to	  be	   a	   legitimate	  device.	   These	   spoofed	  
packets	   are	   valid	   and	   untraceable	   due	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   security	   controls	   present	   in	  
common	  SCADA	  protocols.	   [28][41][90]	   If	   an	  attacker	  manages	   to	  gain	  access	   to	  a	  
control	   network,	   in	   theory	   they	   would	   be	   able	   to	   manipulate	   most	   field	   devices.	  
[28][41]	   This	   is	   sometimes	   referred	   to	   as	   “you	   ping	   it,	   you	   own	   it”	   syndrome.	   An	  
attacker	  could	  gain	  network	  access	  to	  devices	  by	  hacking	  into	  control	  networks	  from	  
the	   Internet,	   corporate	   LANs,	   or	   even	   by	   physically	   exploiting	   field	   devices.	   [51]	  
Once	  network	  access	  is	  available,	  the	  exploitation	  of	  SCADA	  devices	  becomes	  trivial.	  
For	  example,	  a	  malicious	  user	  could	  craft	  a	  multicast	  Modbus	  TCP	  packet,	  instructing	  
all	   Modbus-­‐enabled	   field	   devices	   to	   enter	   read-­‐only	   mode.	   This	   would	   prevent	  
control	   operators	   from	   manipulating	   actuators	   remotely,	   essentially	   causing	   the	  
SCADA	  system	  to	  become	  unresponsive.	  [28][41][51]	  
	  
3.3.2 Message	  Modification	  
	  
Similarity,	   the	   lack	   of	   authentication	   controls	   within	   SCADA	   protocols	   could	  
allow	   an	   attacker	   to	   modify	   control	   messages	   in	   transit.	   This	   type	   of	   exploit	   is	  
typically	  leveraged	  through	  a	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	  attack;	  however,	  it	  could	  also	  affect	  
queued	   data.	   Since	   there	   is	   no	   way	   to	   prevent	   message	   modification,	   all	   legacy	  
SCADA	  protocols	  are	  susceptible	  to	  this	  attack.	  [28][41][90]	  
A	  malicious	  attacker	  could	  leverage	  this	  issue	  to	  modify	  control	  commands	  sent	  
from	   the	   control	   center	   to	   remote	   field	   devices.	   This	   is	   best	   demonstrated	   in	  
multicast	  transmission	  scenarios.	  For	  example,	  when	  DNP3	  is	  used	  to	  send	  control	  
messages	   from	   one	   master	   to	   many	   slaves,	   the	   field	   devices	   do	   not	   reply	   to	   the	  
original	  message	  (as	  to	  avoid	  overwhelming	  the	  network).	  If	  such	  a	  control	  message	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was	   intercepted	  as	   it	   left	   the	  HMI,	  an	  attacker	  could	  modify	   the	  command,	  causing	  
the	  operator	  to	  be	  oblivious	  to	  the	  action	  actually	  performed.	  In	  theory,	  an	  attacker	  
could	   manipulate	   control	   messages	   leaving	   and	   entering	   the	   control	   center,	  
preventing	  human	  operators	  from	  ever	  detecting	  changes	  in	  the	  system.	  
	   	  
3.3.3 Replay	  Attacks	  
	  
Packet	  replay	  attacks	  occur	  when	  secure	  one-­‐time	  identifiers	  are	  not	  used	  on	  a	  
per-­‐packet	  basis.	  These	  nonce	  values	  should	  be	  unique	  for	  each	  transmission	  stream,	  
preventing	  attackers	  from	  reusing	  old	  packets.	  Protection	  against	  replay	  attacks	  can	  
be	   provided	   by	   a	   protocol’s	   authentication	   or	   cryptographic	   mechanism.	   It	   is	  
important	   to	   ensure	   session	   packets	   are	   unique	  while	   still	   allowing	   both	   sides	   to	  
verify	   the	  uniqueness	  of	   the	   session.	  For	  example,	   appending	  a	   random	  value	   to	  a	  
message	  before	  it	  is	  encrypted	  or	  signed	  can	  provide	  this	  kind	  of	  protection.	  	  
  
3.3.4 Man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐Middle	  Conditions	  
	  
Man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	   attacks	   occur	  when	   an	   attacker	   sits	   between	   a	   source	   and	  
destination	  device	   at	   the	  network	   level.	  This	   can	  occur	  physically,	   in	   the	   case	  of	   a	  
network	  tap,	  or	  logically	  through	  the	  manipulation	  of	  network	  routing	  and	  switching	  
technologies.	  The	  ability	  to	  intercept	  messages	  flowing	  between	  two	  network	  points	  
allows	  an	  attacker	  to	  modify	  messages	  while	  being	  transparent	  to	  each	  endpoint.	  	  
An	   attacker	   could	   leverage	   a	   man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	   condition	   to	   bring	   down	   a	  
SCADA	  system	  while	  ensuring	  human	  operators	  are	  not	  notified.	  This	  could	  happen	  
if	   an	   attacker	   was	   able	   to	   man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	   all	   communications	   between	   the	  
control	  center	  and	  remote	  devices.	  In	  addition,	  an	  attacker	  could	  leverage	  this	  kind	  
of	  attack	  to	  prevent	  operators	  from	  manipulating	  remote	  actuators.	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3.3.5 Denial	  of	  Service	  
	  
A	   denial	   of	   service	   (DOS)	   condition	   could	   occur	   both	   intentionally	   and	  
accidentally	  within	  SCADA	  networks.	  DOS	  conditions	  occur	  when	  a	  device,	  or	  set	  of	  
devices,	   becomes	   unavailable	   or	   unresponsive	   due	   to	   network	   congestion	   or	  
exploitation.	  	  
An	   attacker	   could	   create	   a	  DOS	   condition	   by	   overwhelming	   field	   devices	  with	  
packets,	   jamming	  network	  links	  with	  fake	  traffic,	  exploiting	  SCADA	  devices	  causing	  
them	  to	  crash,	  or	  sending	  commands	  to	  field	  devices	  in	  order	  to	  turn	  them	  off.	  These	  
attacks	   are	   easily	   identifiable	   when	   they	   saturate	   network	   links;	   however,	   more	  
discrete	   attacks	   that	  modify	   field	   devices	  may	  make	   it	   appear	   as	   if	   the	   device	   has	  
legitimately	  malfunctioned.	  
As	   mentioned	   previously,	   denial	   of	   service	   conditions	   can	   also	   occur	  
inadvertently.	  These	  types	  of	  accidents	  can	  transpire	  from	  things	  like	  routing	  loops,	  
misconfigured	   routing/switching	   devices,	   improperly	   applied	   software	   patches,	  
unverified	  and	  tested	  system	  updates,	  or	  even	  random	  human	  errors.	  [51]	  
 
3.3.6 Control	  Software	  Exploitation	  
	  
In	   scenarios	   where	   secure	   SCADA	   protocols	   have	   been	   deployed	   (like	   Secure	  
DNP,	  for	  example),	  an	  attacker	  may	  choose	  to	  manipulate	  or	  exploit	  control	  software.	  
Like	   many	   software	   applications,	   poor	   application	   development	   procedures	   can	  
produce	  both	  local	  and	  remotely	  exploitable	  software	  bugs.	  	  
Although	  many	  SCADA	  specific	  software	  exploits	  are	  not	  publically	  available,	  a	  
sophisticated	   attacker	   could	   gather	   information	   about	   deployed	   control	   software	  
and	   could	   discover	   a	   zero-­‐day	   vulnerability.	   Software	   vulnerabilities	   could	   be	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detected	   by	   leveraging	   software-­‐auditing	   tools	   like	   fuzzers	   and	   source	   code	  
analyzers.	  	  
Well-­‐rounded	   SCADA	   security	   implementations	   should	   provide	   a	   defense	   in	  
depth	   strategy	   to	   network	   protection.	   This	   involves	   the	   use	   of	   compensative	   and	  
reactive	   security	   controls,	   as	   well	   as	   auditing	   software	   for	   vulnerabilities.	   All	  
software	  deployed	  within	  control	  networks	  is	  potentially	  exploitable.	  	  
	  
3.3.7	   Operating	  System	  Exploitation	  
	  
As	  operating	  systems	  like	  Microsoft	  Windows	  became	  more	  popular	   in	  control	  
network	   deployments,	   the	   security	   risks	   associated	   with	   these	   operating	   systems	  
were	   assimilated	   into	   control	   network	   as	   well.	   In	   this	   capacity,	   the	   fundamental	  
exploitation	  of	  underlying	   technologies	  could	  allow	  an	  attacker	   to	   leverage	  attacks	  
on	  SCADA	  systems,	  just	  like	  in	  a	  typical	  IT	  network.	  [51][56]	  
Unfortunately,	   unlike	   its	   IT	   counterparts,	   SCADA	   networks	   cannot	   always	  
deploy	   operating	   system	   patches	   in	   a	   timely	   manner.	   [42][51]	   Untested	   and	  
unverified	   patches	   can	   cause	   systems	   to	   crash	   or	   lose	   connectivity	   with	   remote	  
devices.	   [49]	   Extra	   functionality	   shipped	  with	   commercial	   operating	   systems	   also	  
increases	  the	  attack	  surface	  of	  a	  machine.	  This	  includes	  technologies	  like	  Microsoft’s	  
server	  message	  block	  (SMB)	  and	  remote	  procedure	  call	  (RPC),	  which	  have	  a	  history	  
of	  being	  heavily	  exploited.	  Additionally,	  even	  in	  cases	  where	  operating	  systems	  are	  
patched	  regularly,	  these	  systems	  may	  still	  be	  vulnerable	  if	  not	  hardened	  and	  audited	  
regularly.	  After	  all,	  a	  system	  is	  only	  as	  secure	  as	  its	  weakest	  link.	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3.3.8	   Physical	  Attacks	  
	  
Lastly,	  physical	  attacks	  on	  field	  devices	  should	  not	  be	  overlooked.	  These	  attacks	  
could	   allow	   attackers	   to	   extract	   sensitive	   information,	   inject	   data	   into	   the	   control	  
network,	  or	  cause	  the	  device	  to	  become	  unresponsive.	  [51][58]	  
One	   great	   example	   of	   physical	   device	   security	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   smart	   grid	  
deployments.	   Advanced	   metering	   infrastructure	   (AMI)	   devices	   like	   smart	   meters	  
could	   be	   exploited	   to	   manipulate	   billing	   information,	   or	   even	   to	   spread	   malware	  
from	  meter	  to	  meter	  via	  a	  mesh	  communication	  network.	  [58]	  Exploitation	  of	   field	  
devices	  could	  potentially	  be	  used	  as	  a	  pivotal	  point	  for	  hopping	  back	  into	  the	  control	  
center	  network.	  [58]	  
	  
3.4 	   Protocol-­‐Level	  Risk	  Mitigation	  Strategies	  
	  
Some	   critical	   SCADA	   network	   attacks,	   like	   packet	   modification,	   forging,	   and	  
replay	   can	   be	   mitigated	   using	   security	   technologies	   at	   various	   levels	   of	   the	   OSI	  
model.	   Even	   though	   most	   SCADA	   protocols	   do	   not	   provide	   inherent	   security	  
mechanisms,	   the	   replacement	   of	   such	   protocols	   is	   infeasible.	   However,	   the	   legacy	  
requirements	   for	   future	   SCADA	   systems	   should	   not	   dissuade	   us	   from	   making	  
protocol-­‐level	  enhancements	  for	  future	  implementations.	  
Ideally,	  protocol	   level	   security	  enhancements	   should	  deliver	  absolute	   integrity	  
and	   non-­‐repudiation	   for	   all	   communication	   streams	   while	   providing	   mutual	  
authentication	   of	   devices	   (particularly	   for	   critical	   commands).	   These	   components,	  
working	  together,	  can	  provide	  protection	  against	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	  attacks,	  as	  well	  
as	  message	  modification,	  spoofing,	  and	  reply	  attacks.	  In	  addition,	  authentication	  and	  
non-­‐repudiation	   can	   provide	  more	  well	   rounded	   audit	   logs;	   this	   can	   be	   extremely	  
useful	   during	   security	   incident	   investigations.	   Additionally,	   enhanced	   SCADA	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protocols	   can	   prevent	   connection	   reset	   attacks	   that	   cause	   denial	   of	   service	  
conditions	  within	  SCADA	  network.	  	  
These	   improvements	   should	   be	   implemented	   in	   such	   a	   way	   as	   to	   not	  
significantly	   affect	   availability,	   by	   increasing	   the	   computational	   overhead	   or	  
bandwidth	   requirements	   of	   the	   system.	   Various	   security	   mechanisms	   that	   can	  
improve	   the	   overall	   security	   posture	   of	   SCADA	  networks	  will	   be	   discussed	   in	   this	  
section.	  	  
	  
3.4.1 Authentication	  and	  Integrity	  Using	  Digital	  Signatures	  
	  
Authentication	   using	   digital	   signatures	   allows	   control	  messages	   to	   be	   secured	  
using	  public-­‐key	  encryption	  technologies.	  This	  security	  mechanism	  provides	  mutual	  
authentication	   for	   network	   devices	   while	   ensuring	   the	   integrity	   of	   all	  
communication	   channels.	   Although	   not	   mandatory	   or	   even	   recommended,	   this	  
security	  mechanism	  can	  also	  protect	  the	  confidentiality	  of	  selected	  control	  messages.	  	  
During	  typical	  device	  communications,	  a	  message’s	  checksum	  is	  calculated	  then	  
appended	  with	  a	  nonce	  and	   timestamp.	  A	  digest	  of	   these	  values	   is	   then	  encrypted	  
with	   the	   sending	   device’s	   private	   key	   and	   sent	   to	   the	   receiving	   device	   over	   a	  
network	   connection.	   Once	   the	   packet	   is	   received,	   a	   device	   then	   recalculates	   the	  
message’s	   checksum	   using	   the	   message	   content,	   nonce,	   and	   timestamp.	   The	  
appended	  signed	  checksum	   is	   then	  decrypted	  using	   the	   sender’s	  public	  key	  and	   is	  
then	   compared	   to	   the	   calculated	   checksum,	   verifying	   the	   message	   integrity	   and	  
source.	  	  
This	  approach	  to	  network	  communication	  security	  protects	  against	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐
middle,	  message	  spoofing,	  modification,	  and	  replay	  attacks.	  Conversely,	  because	  this	  
security	   mechanism	   is	   implemented	   at	   the	   application	   layer,	   there	   is	   no	   way	   to	  
protect	  against	  denial	  of	  service	  attacks.	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Typically	   this	  methodology	   does	   not	   provide	  mutual	   authentication;	   however,	  
some	   deployments	   could	   provide	   mutual	   authentication	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   additional	  
computational	   overhead.	   Generally	   speaking,	   the	   use	   of	   public	   key	   encryption	  
increases	   the	   computational	   requirements	   of	   a	   system;	  however,	   efficiency	   can	  be	  
improved	   by	   deploying	   alternative	   encryption	   technologies	   like	   elliptic	   curve	  




The	   Secure	   Socket	   Layer	   (SSL)	   and	   Transportation	   Layer	   Security	   (TLS)	  
protocols	  provide	  another	  alternative	  for	  protecting	  SCADA	  communication	  streams.	  
These	   technologies	   provide	  mutual	   authentication,	   integrity,	   and	   confidentiality	   of	  
data	  in	  transit	  using	  digital	  signatures	  and	  public-­‐key	  encryption	  technologies.	  [37]	  
Much	   like	  digital	   signatures,	   SSL/TLS	  prevents	  man-­‐in-­‐the	  middle	  attacks,	   and	  
packet	   spoofing,	   modification,	   and	   reply	   attacks.	   This	   mechanism	   can	   be	  
implemented	  within	   the	   protocol	   itself	   or	   as	   a	  wrapper	   for	   various	   legacy	   SCADA	  
protocols.	  In	  addition,	  the	  IEC	  Technical	  Committee	  has	  approved	  the	  use	  of	  SSL/TLS	  
within	   ICS	  networks.	   [64]	  SSL/TLS	  has	  been	  successfully	  deployed	   in	  some	  SCADA	  
applications	  within	  the	  United	  States	  during	  the	  last	  decade.	  [64]	  
Nonetheless,	   SSL/TLS	   does	   not	   provide	   a	   perfect	   security	   solution	   for	   SCADA	  
systems.	   Some	   of	   its	   particular	   downsides	   include:	   known	   protocol	   weaknesses	  
[37][64],	  exploitable	  library	  implementations	  [37][64],	  excessive	  computational	  and	  
bandwidth	   overhead	   [37][64],	   and	   even	   the	   questionable	   reliability	   of	   external	  
certificate	   authorities	   (as	   seen	   in	   the	   Stuxnet	   attack).	   [22][31]	   Furthermore,	  
SSL/TLS	  does	  not	  provide	  evidence	  of	  data	  processing	   (non-­‐repudiation)	  and	  only	  




3.4.3 Authentication	  Using	  Challenge-­‐Response	  
	  
This	   security	   mechanism	   employs	   a	   shared	   secret	   cryptographic	   key	   that	  
provides	   a	   simple,	   yet	   reliable	   network	   authentication	   mechanism.	   Providing	  
integrity	  and	  authentication	  of	  SCADA	  communication	  streams,	  challenge-­‐response	  
security	   can	   protect	   against	   man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	   attacks,	   and	   message	   spoofing,	  
injection,	  and	  modification	  attacks.	  In	  addition,	  since	  each	  network	  device	  utilizes	  a	  
unique	  shared	  secret	  with	   the	  MTU,	  perfect	   forward	  secrecy	   is	  provided.	   [37]	  This	  
ensures	  the	  exploitation	  of	  a	  single	   field	  device	  cannot	  significantly	  undermine	  the	  
overall	  security	  stance	  of	  the	  SCADA	  system.	  
During	   typical	   network	   communications,	   the	   receiving	   device	   can	   request	   the	  
sender	  answers	  a	  ‘challenge’	  at	  any	  time.	  This	  challenge	  value,	  usually	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
a	  nonce,	  is	  merged	  with	  the	  known	  shared	  key	  then	  hashed.	  The	  resulting	  checksum	  
is	   then	   appended	   to	   the	   data	   being	   delivered,	   providing	   authentication	   of	   the	  
sending	  device	  while	  protecting	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  message.	  
The	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  challenge-­‐response	  security	  mechanism	  is	  reliant	  on	  its	  
proper	   implementation.	   Nonce	   values	   should	   be	   included	   in	   each	   message	   to	  
prevent	   packet	   replay	   attacks,	   ensuring	   packet	   uniqueness	   even	   when	   control	  
messages	   are	   static.	   Additionally,	   challenges	   should	   be	   mandatory	   for	   all	   critical	  
SCADA	   operations.	   This	   will	   provide	   optimal	   security	   while	   avoiding	   needless	  
authentication	  of	  non-­‐critical	  SCADA	  messages.	  	  
Like	   other	   security	   solutions,	   the	   challenge-­‐response	   mechanism	   can	  
detrimentally	  increase	  the	  computational	  overhead	  and	  bandwidth	  requirements	  of	  
SCADA	  systems.	  This	  can	  be	  partially	  offset	  by	  only	  authenticating	  critical	  messages.	  
In	   addition,	   the	   hashing	   algorithm	   used	   to	   calculate	   checksum	   values	   should	   be	  
selected	  based	  on	  its	  speed	  and	  effectiveness.	  Some	  hashing	  algorithms	  may	  not	  be	  
suitable	  for	  SCADA	  systems	  due	  to	  their	  high	  computational	  overhead.	  This	  will	  be	  
discussed	  further	  in	  section	  6.5.	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3.4.4 Authentication	  Using	  HMAC	  
	  
Hash-­‐based	   message	   authentication	   code	   (HMAC)	   provides	   an	   authentication	  
and	   integrity	   mechanism	   by	   combining	   hashing	   algorithms	   with	   a	   pre-­‐defined	  
cryptographic	  key.	  Depending	  on	  the	  hashing	  algorithm	  being	  used,	  this	  system	  can	  
be	   implemented	  with	   relatively	   low	   computation	   overhead.	   [44]	   This	   approach	   to	  
protocol	  security	  provides	  authentication,	   integrity,	  and	  protection	  against	  man-­‐in-­‐
the-­‐middle	   attacks,	   and	  message	   spoofing,	   injection	  and	   replay	  attacks.	  Due	   to	   the	  
nature	  of	  HMAC,	  confidentiality	  of	  messages	  cannot	  be	  provided.	  	  
Checksums	  generated	  by	  HMAC	  can	  be	  appended	  to	  existing	  messages,	  creating	  
a	   measurable	   and	   predictable	   overhead	   for	   each	   message.	   The	   system’s	   overall	  
strength	  relies	  on	  the	  security	  of	  the	  hashing	  mechanism	  being	  used.	  Thanks	  to	  the	  
implementation	   of	   nonce	   values,	   HMAC	   is	   not	   significantly	   affected	   by	   hash	  
collisions	  attacks	  when	  compared	  to	  a	  hashing	  algorithm	  alone.	  [48][66]	  This	  allows	  
more	   efficient	   hashing	   algorithms	   like	   MD5	   to	   be	   used,	   reducing	   computational	  
overhead	  for	  embedded	  field	  devices.	  
	  
3.4.5 Integrity	  Assurance	  Using	  Hashing	  Algorithms	  
	  
One-­‐way	   hashing	   algorithms	   are	   an	   integral	   component	   of	  most	   integrity	   and	  
authentication	   security	   mechanisms.	   Hash	   functions	   provide	   a	   non-­‐reversible	  
mechanism	  for	  mathematically	  reducing	  data	  into	  a	  reasonably	  unique,	  fixed-­‐length	  
value.	  Algorithms	  like	  MD5	  and	  SHA-­‐1	  are	  most	  commonly	  used,	  although	  both	  have	  
recently	   been	   shown	   to	   be	   weak.	   [44][48][66][83]	  When	   appended	   securely	   to	   a	  
message	   in	   transit,	   these	   algorithms	   provide	   a	   way	   to	   ensure	   data	   has	   not	   been	  
modified	  or	  inadvertently	  corrupted	  in	  transit.	  
Hashing	   algorithms,	   by	   design,	   are	   slow	   to	   compute.	   This	   is	   common	   to	   all	  
hashing	   algorithms	   in	   order	   to	   resist	   brute	   forcing	   attacks	   used	   to	   recover	   the	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original	   data.	   These	   algorithms	   are	   meant	   to	   provide	   integrity	   only,	   not	  
authentication	   or	   encryption.	   However,	   they	   may	   be	   used	   by	   various	   security	  
mechanisms	  (e.g.:	  HMAC)	  to	  provide	  an	  authentication	  component.	  	  
Their	  strength	  is	  proportional	  to	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  hashing	  algorithm	  used	  
within	  the	  system.	  Common	  hashing	  algorithms	  like	  MD5	  and	  SHA-­‐1	  are	  considered	  
weak.	   [44][48][66][83]	   In	   particular,	   MD5	   is	   susceptible	   to	   collision	   attacks,	  
allowing	  an	  attacker	  to	  pad	  legitimate	  messages	  with	  random	  data	  that	  produces	  a	  
valid	  hash	  value.	  [83]	  In	  addition,	  SHA-­‐1’s	  computation	  complexity	  has	  recently	  been	  
diminished	   by	   approximately	   21%	   through	   the	   use	   of	   pre-­‐computation.	   [79]	   This	  
increases	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  successful	  brute	  force	  attack.	  Properly	  implemented	  hashing	  
algorithms	  will	   implement	   a	   session-­‐unique	   salt	   value.	   This	   ensures	   that	   static	   or	  
predictable	   messages	   always	   produce	   a	   unique	   digest	   value,	   even	   when	  
retransmitted.	  	  
	  
3.4.6 Security	  Wrappers	  
	  
One	  alternative	  to	  integrating	  security	  controls	  within	  a	  new	  SCADA	  protocols	  is	  
to	   package	   legacy	   protocols	   inside	   a	   security	   wrapper.	   Although	   this	   provides	  
effective	  security	  and	  full	  backwards	  compatibility,	  this	  approach	  to	  security	  creates	  
too	  much	  computational	  overhead	  and	  increased	  bandwidth	  requirements.	  [26][37]	  
In	   addition,	   security	  wrappers	   tend	   to	   envelope	   the	  whole	   communication	   packet	  
within	  a	   crypto	   system.	  This	  may	  provide	   confidentiality,	   authentication,	   integrity,	  
and	   high	   availability	   (through	   denial-­‐of-­‐service	   mitigation);	   however,	   it	   adds	  
needless	  computational	  overhead.	  [12][28][41]	  In	  fact,	  the	  fundamental	  confidential	  
nature	  of	   security	  wrappers	   is	  entirely	  needless	   in	  SCADA	  systems:	   it	   is	  very	  clear	  
“from	  members	  […]	  throughout	  the	  industry	  that	  it	  [is]	  not	  necessary	  to	  protect	  data	  
from	  being	  overheard	  […].”	  [35]	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Detailed	   information	   about	   the	   use	   of	   SSL/TLS	   within	   SCADA	   networks	   is	  




Internet	   protocol	   security	   (IPSec)	   is	   a	   network-­‐layer	   security	   mechanism	  
capable	  of	  protecting	  IP	  communications,	  regardless	  of	  the	  transportation	  protocol	  
being	   used.	   It	   provides	   a	   security	   wrapper	   for	   all	   communications	   between	   two	  
network	   hosts.	   This	   ensures	   the	   integrity,	   authenticity,	   and	   availability	   of	   all	  
network	   communications.	   In	   addition,	   it	   provides	   inherent	   denial	   of	   service	  
protection	   since	   random	   data	   cannot	   be	   injected	   into	   a	   network	   stream.	   This	  
thwarts	   communication	   stream	   reset	   attacks.	   Mutual	   authentication	   is	   provided	  
during	   the	   communication	   channel	   negotiation	   phase,	   providing	   the	   basis	   for	  
establishing	  a	  cryptographically	  secure	  communication	  channel.	  	  
Although	  this	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  great	  security	  solution,	  as	  seen	  in	  IT	  networks,	  it	  is	  
not	  a	  viable	  solution	  for	  SCADA	  networks.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  its	  excessive	  computational	  
overhead	  and	  increased	  bandwidth	  requirements.	  [26][37]	  In	  addition,	  field	  devices	  
employing	   various	   embedded	   operating	   systems	   may	   not	   have	   the	   ability	   to	  
implement	  IPSec	  communication	  channels.	  [51][56]	  This	  prevents	  IPSec	  from	  being	  




3.4.6.3 Payload	  Encryption	  
	  
Generally	  speaking,	  payload	  encryption	  can	  be	   implemented	  at	  multiple	   layers	  
of	   the	   open	   systems	   interconnection	   (OSI)	   model.	   This	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   the	  
implementation	   of	   payload	   encryption	   within	   IPSec,	   or	   even	   application-­‐layer	  
public-­‐key	   encryption.	   Payload	   encryption	   provides	   confidentiality,	   integrity,	   and	  
possibly	  authentication	  (depending	  on	   implementation),	  preventing	  attackers	   from	  
performing	   passive	   traffic	   analysis	   on	   network	   communications.	   Additionally,	   it	  
protects	  against	  packet	  modification,	  injection,	  and	  replay	  attacks.	  
Primarily,	  payload	  encryption	  is	  considered	  a	  waste	  of	  time	  and	  resources	  when	  
implemented,	   as	   it	   detrimentally	   increases	   the	   computational	   and	   bandwidth	  
requirements	   of	   SCADA	   systems.	   [26][37]	   Most	   importantly,	   it	   is	   “very	   clear	  
direction	   from	  members	   […]	   throughout	   the	   industry	   that	   it	   [is]	   not	   necessary	   to	  
protect	  data	  from	  being	  overheard	  […].”	  [35]	  
	  
3.4.7 Secure	  DNP3	  
	  
Lastly,	   improvements	   to	   legacy	   SCADA	   protocols	   do	   exist.	   Secure	   DNP3	   is	   a	  
secure	  version	  of	   the	  DNP3	  protocol	   that	  provides	  application-­‐layer	  security	  while	  
still	   allowing	   full	   backwards	   compatibility.	   [35]	   It	   provides	   packet	   spoofing,	  
modification,	  and	  replay	  protection	  while	  delivering	  device	  authentication	  using	  the	  
challenge-­‐response	  security	  model	  and	  pre-­‐shared	  keys.	  [35]	  
This	  improved	  version	  of	  DNP3	  permits	  an	  authenticator	  device	  (i.e.:	  a	  MTU	  or	  
collector)	   to,	   at	   any	   time,	   request	   the	   sending	   device	   answer	   a	   challenge.	  When	   a	  
challenge	   is	   received,	   the	   sender	  will	   authenticate	   itself	   using	   the	   challenge	   value	  
and	  a	  HMAC	  calculation.	  In	  order	  to	  reduce	  computational	  complexity,	  in	  some	  cases	  
challenges	   can	   be	   reused	   for	   additional	   packets.	   This	   system	   does	   not	   need	   to	  
authenticate	   all	   packets;	   authentication	   is	   done	   selectively.	   [35]	   Additionally,	   this	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protocol	   works	   well	   in	   non	   connection-­‐oriented	   networks,	   particularly	   over	  
transportation	  layer	  protocols	  like	  UDP.	  [35]	  
Because	  message	  confidentiality	  is	  not	  required	  in	  SCADA	  systems	  [35],	  secure	  
DNP3	  does	  not	  provide	  this	  security	  mechanism.	  Additionally,	  the	  protocol	  provides	  
perfect	  forward	  secrecy	  [35];	  the	  divulgence	  of	  one	  key	  does	  not	  significantly	  impact	  
the	   security	   of	   the	   overall	   system.	   This	   protocol	   improvement	   provides	   a	   great	  
example	  for	  future	  improvements	  to	  other	  SCADA	  protocols.	  
	  
3.5 	   Incident	  Detection	  Using	  Intrusion	  Detection	  Systems	  
	  
Naturally,	   SCADA	   systems	  differ	   greatly	   from	   traditional	   IT	   networks	   in	  many	  
ways:	  they	  tend	  to	  have	  a	  static	  amount	  of	  client	  devices,	  their	  communication	  flows	  
are	  predictable,	  communication	  protocols	  are	  often	  proprietary,	  and	  the	  importance	  
of	   availability	   is	   crucial.	   Due	   to	   the	   hard	   availability	   nature	   of	   SCADA,	   many	  
traditional	  IT	  security	  protection	  and	  mitigation	  mechanisms	  prove	  to	  be	  ineffective.	  	  
Traditionally,	  computer	  networks	  lacking	  real-­‐time	  protection	  mechanisms	  rely	  
upon	  intrusion	  detection	  technologies	  to	  alert	  administrators	  about	  possible	  system	  
breaches.	   However,	   these	   traditional	   IDSs	   are	   not	   capable	   of	   accurately	   detecting	  
SCADA	  attacks,	  as	  many	  vectors	  are	  not	  identical	  to	  those	  seen	  in	  typical	  networks.	  
[93]	   In	   particular,	   the	  mitigation	   of	   zero-­‐day	   exploits	   (for	   example,	   the	  multitude	  
used	   in	   the	  Stuxnet	   attack)	   is	  difficult	  due	   to	  vague	   information	   regarding	   current	  
SCADA	  attack	  vectors.	  [93]	  
In	  the	  following	  sections	  we	  will	  explore	  current	  research	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  




3.5.1 Intrusion	  Detection	  Overview	  
	  
Regardless	   of	   underlying	   security	   event	   detection	   algorithms,	   all	   intrusion	  
detection	   systems	   (IDSs)	   are	   responsible	   for	   monitoring	   either	   a	   single	   host	   or	  
network	   link	   in	   real	   time	   for	  possible	   security	   events.	  Traffic	   and	   related	  data	   are	  
analyzed	  for	  malicious	  content	  or	  violations	  of	  preconfigured	  security	  policies.	  Two	  
main	  types	  of	  IDS	  systems	  exist:	  host-­‐based	  and	  network	  based.	  [3]	  
Host-­‐based	   IDS	   systems	   are	   responsible	   for	   protecting	   endpoint	   assets	   like	  
servers,	   workstations,	   and	   infrastructure	   devices.	   This	   type	   of	   IDS	   may	   detect	   a	  
variety	  of	  attacks,	  ranging	  from	  malware	  infections	  to	  exploit	  payloads	  destined	  for	  
the	   protected	   host.	   Generally	   speaking,	   host-­‐based	   IDS	   systems	   aim	   to	   detect	   a	  
plethora	   of	   attacks	   aimed	   at	   the	   monitored	   host.	   This	   type	   of	   detection	   in	   depth	  
provides	  a	  well-­‐rounded	  picture	  of	  the	  health	  of	  a	  network,	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  increased	  
computational	  overhead	  and	  reduced	  situational	  effectiveness.	  [3][93]	  
Conversely,	  network-­‐based	  IDS	  systems	  are	  used	  to	  detect	  the	  presence	  of,	  and	  
sometimes	   even	  protect	   against,	   network-­‐based	  attack	  vectors.	  These	   IDS	   systems	  
are	   typically	   deployed	   inline	   on	   critical	   network	   segments.	   For	   example,	   they	   are	  
often	  deployed	  between	  a	   corporate	   intranet	   and	  DMZ	   to	  detect	   incoming	  attacks.	  
Network-­‐based	  IDS	  systems	  are	  capable	  of	  being	  passive	  or	  reactive	  depending	  on	  
organizational	  requirements.	  [3][93]	  
Both	  types	  of	  IDS	  systems	  rely	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  mechanisms	  for	  detecting	  possible	  
attacks.	  These	  security	  event	  detection	  algorithms	  rely	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  approaches	  to	  
detect	  and	  mitigate	  events,	  ranging	  from	  malware	  detection	  to	  the	  identification	  of	  
statistically	  anomalous	  connections.	  Once	  possible	  attack	  vectors	  are	  identified,	  the	  
IDS	   system	   typically	  pushes	   alerts	   (and	   associated	   log	   information)	   to	   an	   external	  




Over	   the	  years	   IDS	  systems	  have	  evolved	   into	  highly	  effective	  mechanisms	   for	  
detecting	   both	   known	   and	   novel	   attacks	   against	   network	   devices.	   Unfortunately,	  
many	   of	   these	   robust	   and	   effective	   IDS	   systems	   are	   not	   directly	   transferrable	   to	  
SCADA	   environments:	   the	   incomparability	   between	   traditional	   IT	   and	   SCADA	  
networks	   creates	   a	   novel	   set	   of	   attack	   vectors	   and	   risks	   unknown	   to	   current	   IDS	  
algorithms.	  [93]	  
Currently	   multiple	   surveys	   exist	   that	   overview	   all	   current	   approaches	   to	  
retrofitting	  IDS	  systems	  within	  SCADA	  networks.	  However,	  the	  usage	  of	  various	  IDS	  
technologies	   is	   often	   criticized,	   particularly	   within	   the	   realm	   of	   Modbus	   TCP	  
networks.	  Drawing	  from	  a	  plethora	  of	  sources,	  most	  surveys	  have	  described	  how	  an	  
intrusion	   detection	   system	   must	   be	   coupled	   with	   human	   intervention	   and	   other	  
security	  technologies	  in	  order	  to	  be	  truly	  effective.	  [93]	  
Furthermore,	  current	  efforts	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  SCADA	  IDS	  development	  are	  shown	  
to	  be	  largely	  ineffective.	  One	  survey	  noted	  that	  most	  authors	  have	  not	  “tested	  [their	  
methodologies]	  on	  real	  operational	  SCADA	  system	  network	  traffic	  to	  validate	  [their]	  
assumptions.”	   [86]	   In	   addition,	   critical	   investigations	   into	   current	   approaches	   to	  
SCADA	   IDS	  deployments	   revealed	   the	   ineffectiveness	  of	   any	  single	  event	  detection	  
technique.	   One	   author	   showed	   how	   current	   IDS	   technologies	   designed	   for	   SCADA	  
networks	   failed	   to	   protect	   environments	   where	   communication	   protocols	   were	  
"proprietary	  and	  [...]	  often	  undocumented	  or	  ported	   from	  insecure	  serial	  protocols	  
to	  an	  Internet	  protocol	  (IP)	  network	  stack."	  [86]	  
Naturally,	  an	  ideal	  SCADA-­‐specific	  IDS	  system	  should	  rely	  upon	  a	  variety	  of	  IDS	  
technologies	   to	   provide	   detection	   in	   depth.	   The	   integration	   of	   multiple	   security	  
event	   detection	   technologies	   can	   provide	   a	   layered	   approach	   to	   event	   detection,	  
removing	  any	  single	  point	  failure.	  	  
In	  the	  following	  subsections,	  I	  will	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  all	  current	  network-­‐
based	   IDS	   algorithms	   used	   to	   provide	   security	   event	   detection	   in	   SCADA	   systems.	  
We	  will	  not	  look	  at	  host-­‐based	  IDS	  systems,	  as	  they	  are	  infeasible	  to	  deploy	  on	  most	  
proprietary	   and	   embedded	   SCADA	   devices.	   As	   we	   will	   see,	   no	   single	   technology	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exists	   that	   provides	   a	   perfect	   security	   solution	   for	   detecting	   security	   events	   on	  
SCADA	  networks.	  
	  
3.5.2 Signature-­‐based	  Intrusion	  Detection	  Systems	  
	  
The	   first	   line	   of	   defense	   used	   by	   most	   simple	   and	   legacy	   IDS	   devices	   is	   a	  
signature-­‐based	  intrusion	  detection	  algorithm.	  This	  rudimentary	  approach	  to	  event	  
detection	  relies	  up	  a	  set	  of	  pattern-­‐based	  signatures	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  detect	  the	  
presence	   of	   attacks.	   These	   signatures	   are	   generated	   for	   specific	   exploits	   or	   attack	  
vectors	  and	  offer	   little	  flexibility	  when	  used	  to	  analyze	  network	  traffic.	  As	  network	  
traffic	   flows	   through	   a	   signature-­‐based	   IDS	   system,	   it	   is	   analyzed	   for	   traffic	  
conforming	   to	   known	   attack	   signatures.	   If	   a	   signature	   is	   detected,	   an	   alert	   is	  
generated	  and	  sent	  to	  an	  external	  security	  event	  manager.	  In	  some	  cases,	  this	  type	  of	  
IDS	  is	  even	  capable	  of	  dropping	  traffic	  conforming	  to	  known	  attack	  signatures.	  
Unfortunately,	   the	   sole	   use	   of	   attack	   signatures	   creates	   a	   catch-­‐22	   situation:	  
generic	  signatures	  do	  not	  cover	  a	  broad	  number	  of	  attacks,	  whereas	  some	  signatures	  
must	   be	   explicitly	   created	   to	   detect	   specific	   attacks.	   [4][93]	   Typically,	   signature-­‐
based	  IDS	  algorithms	  can	  be	  subverted	  through	  the	  slight	  modification	  of	  an	  attack	  
pattern	   or	   payload	   –	   sometimes	   the	   fragmentation	   of	   packets	   can	   even	   provide	  
detection	   avoidance.	   [4]	   Generic	   signatures	   commonly	   focus	   on	   traditional	   IT	  
infrastructure	   exploits	   and	   related	   attacks	   (e.g.:	   viruses,	   worms,	   shellcode,	   etc.);	  
however,	  these	  vulnerabilities	  are	  only	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  total	  attack	  vectors	  impacting	  
SCADA	  networks.	  
Luckily,	   some	   SCADA	  protocol	   specific	   signatures	   have	   been	   created,	   allowing	  
signature-­‐based	  IDS	  systems	  to	  be	  more	  effective	  in	  SCADA	  networks.	  Most	  notably,	  
DigitalBond	  has	  developed	  attack	  signatures	  for	  the	  popular	  open-­‐source	  Snort	  IDS	  
software.	   [5][70]	   These	   signatures	   are	   capable	   of	   detecting	   rudimentary	   attacks	  
against	  popular	  ICS	  protocols	  like	  DNP3	  and	  Modbus.	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Unfortunately,	   IDS	   signatures	   designed	   to	   detect	   attacks	   over	   proprietary	  
SCADA	  protocols	   tend	   to	   be	   ineffective	   due	   to	   vendor-­‐specific	   implementations	   of	  
each	  protocol.	  [4]	  Furthermore,	  these	  signatures	  are	  not	  capable	  of	  detecting	  zero-­‐
day	   attacks,	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   repurposed	   malware	   conforming	   to	   known	  
signatures.	   [4][93]	   These	   IDS	   systems	   create	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   both	   false-­‐
positives	   and	   false-­‐negative	   rates	   are	   high	   –	   obviously	   not	   an	   ideal	   solution	   for	  
sensitive	  and	  critical	  SCADA	  networks.	  
	  
3.5.3 Anomaly-­‐based	  Intrusion	  Detection	  Systems	  
	  
Another	  fundamental	  approach	  to	  security	  event	  detection	  uses	  anomaly-­‐based	  
IDS	  algorithms	  to	  detect	  possible	  attacks.	  These	  systems	  rely	  upon	  the	  detection	  of	  
anomalous	  system,	  network	  traffic,	  or	  protocol	  behaviours	  to	  classify	  network	  traffic	  
as	  malicious.	  
Anomaly-­‐based	   IDS	   systems	   rely	   heavily	   on	   heuristics	   to	   identify	   and	   classify	  
network	  traffic.	  Heuristics	  algorithms	  compare	  traffic	  to	  a	  known	  baseline	  to	  detect	  
anomalous	  traffic.	  [14][91]	  When	  anomalous	  behaviour	  is	  detected,	  traffic	  is	  logged	  
or	  dropped	  and	  an	  alert	  is	  sent	  to	  an	  external	  security	  event	  manager.	  	  
Heuristic-­‐based	  IDS	  systems	  are	  able	  to	  reliably	  detect	  anomalous	  traffic	  -­‐	  port	  
scans,	  network	  foot	  printing,	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	  attacks,	  etc.	  –	  but	  are	   incapable	  of	  
detecting	   sophisticated	  attacks	  over	   legacy	  SCADA	  protocols.	   [91]	  For	  example,	   an	  
attacker	   may	   successfully	   manipulate	   an	   SCADA	   system	   using	   legitimate,	   albeit	  
forged,	   communication	   packets	   that	   appear	   to	   be	   from	   legitimate	   sources.	   These	  
attacks	  often	   target	  weak	  and	  security-­‐free	   legacy	  SCADA	  protocols	   like	  DNP3	  and	  
Modbus.	   IDS	  systems	  developed	   for	   IT	  networks	  were	  not	  designed	   to	  detect	  such	  
attacks	  and	  provide	  little	  to	  no	  protection	  when	  deployed	  in	  SCADA	  networks.	  [91]	  
Because	   these	   systems	   rely	   on	   a	   learning	   period	   for	   baseline	   generation,	   an	  
attacker	   can	   slowly	  manipulate	   a	   baseline	   to	   ensure	   a	   specific	   type	   of	   attack	   goes	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undetected.	  [14][91]	  Furthermore,	  if	  an	  attacker	  is	  present	  on	  the	  network	  prior	  to	  
the	   device	   being	   installed,	   they	   are	   able	   to	   fully	  manipulate	   the	   baseline	   creation	  
process	   –	   this	   allows	   the	   full	   subversion	   of	   this	   detection	  mechanism.	   Finally,	   the	  
network	  ‘features’	  used	  for	  baseline	  modeling	  are	  difficult	  to	  select	  yet	  highly	  impact	  
the	  effectiveness	  of	  this	  type	  of	  IDS.	  [91]	  
Studies	   have	   showed	   how	   anomaly	   detection	   can	   be	   used	   in	   various	   SCADA	  
networks,	   enabling	   the	  detection	  of	  malicious	  modifications	   to	  monitored	   systems	  
regardless	   of	   the	   devices	   being	   used.	   By	   using	   real	   data	   collected	   from	   an	   SCADA	  
network	  over	  a	  period	  of	  a	  year,	  and	  injecting	  random	  erroneous	  numbers	  into	  said	  
data,	   one	   author	   was	   able	   to	   mathematically	   measure	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   his	  
proposed	   technique.	   [14]	   In	   this	   study,	   anomaly	   was	   shown	   to	   be	   particularly	  
effective	  when	  detecting	  small	  abnormalities	  –	  resulting	  in	  an	  overall	  false-­‐positive	  
rate	   below	   4%.	   Naturally,	   this	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   good	   fit	   for	   SCADA	   networks	  
considering	  their	  static	  and	  predictable	  nature.	  
Although	   anomaly-­‐based	   IDS	   systems	   do	   not	   provide	   a	   catchall	   solution	   for	  
SCADA	  environment,	  they	  do	  provide	  a	  better	  alternative	  to	  rudimentary	  signature-­‐
based	   IDS	   systems.	   The	   proper	   implementation	   of	   anomaly-­‐based	   IDS	   algorithms	  
may	   provide	   a	   plausible	   approach	   to	   event	   detection	   if	   integrated	  with	   additional	  
security	  event	  detection	  technologies.	  	  
	  
3.5.4 Flow-­‐based	  Intrusion	  Detection	  Systems	  
	  
Contrary	   to	   other	   IDS	   methods	   used	   in	   SCADA	   systems,	   flow-­‐based	   IDS	  
algorithms	   tend	   to	  work	   extremely	  well	   due	   to	   the	   static	   devices	   and	   predictable	  
network	  flows	  present	  in	  SCADA	  networks.	  	  
As	   mentioned	   previously	   in	   this	   document,	   SCADA	   networks	   tend	   to	   have	   a	  
static	   number	   of	   network	   devices	   that	   are	   infrequently	   added	   or	   upgraded.	  
Furthermore,	   each	   device	   has	   a	   single	   purpose	   and	   tends	   to	   communicate	  with	   a	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static	  number	  of	  devices	  to	  perform	  its	  tasks.	  [10]	  Because	  of	  this	  static	  nature,	  it	  is	  
feasible	  to	  create	  a	  mapping	  between	  all	  possible	  host	  combinations	  on	  the	  network	  
to	   define	   which	   protocols	   are	   used	   between	   devices,	   including	   the	   direction	   of	  
communication	  flow.	  This	  can	  effectively	  create	  a	  network	  traffic	  baseline	  capable	  of	  
detecting	  anomalous	  communication	  patterns	  through	  flow	  analysis.	  
This	   flow-­‐based	   approach	   to	   intrusion	   detection	   can	   effectively	   detect	   brute	  
force	   network	   reconnaissance	   scans	  while	   also	   detecting	   advanced	   attack	   vectors	  
like	  device	   impersonation	  and	  network	  pivot	  attacks.	   [10]	  To	  create	  a	  baseline	   for	  
flow	  analysis,	  an	  IDS	  device	  needs	  to	  monitor	  the	  SCADA	  network	  during	  an	  initial	  
learning	  period.	  As	  new	  devices	  are	  added	  to	  the	  network,	  these	  changes	  need	  to	  be	  
explicitly	   added	   to	   the	   network	   baseline.	   Alternatively,	   the	   IDS	   system	   can	   be	   put	  
back	  into	  learning	  more	  for	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time.	  
Once	  the	  network	  baseline	  is	  created,	  traffic	   flowing	  through	  the	  IDS	  system	  is	  
compared	  to	  the	  flow-­‐based	  network	  baseline.	  Traffic	  not	  conforming	  to	  the	  baseline	  
is	  marked	  as	  malicious,	  thus	  pushing	  an	  alert	  to	  an	  external	  security	  event	  manager.	  
Depending	  on	  the	  specific	  environment	  in	  which	  the	  device	  is	  deployed,	  some	  flow-­‐
based	   IDS	   systems	   can	   terminate	   all	   connections	   not	   conforming	   to	   the	   network	  
baseline.	  
By	  monitoring	  communications	  in	  various	  parts	  of	  the	  network,	  flow-­‐based	  IDS	  
systems	   can	   be	   used	   to	   detect	   network-­‐level	   inconsistencies.	   Naturally,	   this	   is	  
heavily	   reliant	   on	   the	   proper	   and	   accurate	   generation	   of	   a	   network	   baseline.	  
Furthermore,	   if	   man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	   attacks	   go	   undetected,	   packet	   modification	  
attacks	   are	   capable	   of	   subverting	   flow-­‐based	   security	   controls	   since	   these	  
communication	  streams	  conform	  to	  the	  network	  baseline.	  	  
It	   is	   possible	   that	   flow-­‐based	   IDS	   algorithms	   can	   provide	   an	   almost	   perfect	  
security	   event	   detection	   mechanism	   for	   static	   and	   predictable	   SCADA	   networks;	  
however,	   they	   do	   not	   provide	   a	   catchall	   solution	   for	   detecting	   all	   types	   of	   attack	  
vectors.	   Ideally	   this	   type	  of	   IDS	  would	  be	  deployed	  with	  additional	   technologies	   to	  
provide	  a	  well-­‐rounded	  approach	  to	  security	  event	  detection.	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3.5.5 State-­‐based	  Intrusion	  Detection	  Systems	  
	  
Unlike	  typical	  anomaly-­‐based	  detection	  techniques,	  state-­‐based	  IDS	  systems	  are	  
capable	   of	   providing	   introspection	   into	   SCADA	   protocols.	   This	   allows	   the	   security	  
mechanism	  to	  identify	  protocol	  payloads	  that	  fall	  outside	  pre-­‐defined	  thresholds	  and	  
system	  state	  goals.	  [19][33][34]	  
This	   detection	   technique,	   similar	   to	   deep	   packet	   inspection,	   can	   detect	   cases	  
where	   attackers	   are	   attempting	   to	   fuzz	   SCADA	   protocol	   implementations	   on	  
network	  devices.	  [19]	  Fuzzing	  attacks	  can	  be	  used	  to	  identify	  poorly	  secured	  SCADA	  
devices	  that	  may	  be	  susceptible	  to	  overflow	  and	  logic-­‐based	  remote	  exploits.	  State-­‐
based	   IDS	   algorithms	   are	   capable	   of	   detecting	   both	   payload	   data	   unit	   anomalies	   -­‐	  
like	  malformed	  packets,	  fields	  exceeding	  standard	  lengths,	  etc.	  -­‐	  and	  application	  data	  
unit	  discrepancies,	  like	  invalid	  function	  codes	  being	  sent	  to	  remote	  devices.	  [19]	  [34]	  
By	   conforming	   SCADA	   system	  knowledge	   into	   a	   baseline	   “virtual	   image”	   state	  
machine,	   this	   type	   of	   algorithm	   can	   use	   customized	   rule	   languages	   to	   identify	  
malicious	   SCADA	   network	   states.	   [19][33]	   This	   provides	   deep	   insight	   into	   the	  
overall	  operational	  state	  of	  the	  SCADA	  environment,	  providing	  the	  ability	  to	  detect	  
patient	   and	   knowledgeable	   attackers	   attempting	   to	   slowly	   transition	   a	   SCADA	  
system	  to	  an	  unstable	  state.	  	  
Although	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  define	  specific	  critical	  states	  in	  SCADA	  systems,	  rarely	  
is	   such	   a	   state	   invoked	   through	   a	   single	   action	  within	   the	   system.	   Rather,	   attacks	  
tend	   to	   be	   multi-­‐faceted.	   By	   correlating	   low-­‐level	   monitoring	   and	   state	   detection	  
with	   general	   information	   about	   the	   state	   of	   the	   whole	   system,	   this	   type	   of	   IDS	  
system	  can	  successfully	  detect	  attacks	  with	  low	  false-­‐positive	  rates.	  [19][33][34]	  
We	  must	  note	  that	  a	  state	  machine’s	  effectiveness	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  quality	  
of	  its	  baseline	  and	  accuracy	  of	  its	  mapped	  states.	  Previous	  studies	  have	  shown	  how	  
state-­‐based	   intrusion	   detection	   systems,	   when	   coupled	   with	   traditional	   signature	  
detection	  methods,	   can	   provide	   a	   robust	   approach	   to	   security	   event	   detection.	   In	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addition,	   the	   deployment	   of	   state-­‐based	   IDS	   systems	   allows	   SCADA	   operators	   to	  
identify	  potentially	  dangerous	  situations	  within	  the	  monitored	  environment.	  
	  
3.6 	   Incident	  Detection	  Using	  Honeypots	  
	  
One	   major	   security	   event	   detection	   mechanism	   exists	   that	   is	   capable	   of	  
providing	  effective	  event	  detection	  and	  forensic	  information	  collection	  with	  no	  false	  
positives:	  honeypots.	  Honeypots	  are	  virtual	  (or	  physical)	  systems	  designed	  to	  mimic	  
real	   network	   devices	   and	   services,	   potentially	   luring	   attackers	   away	   from	  
production	   systems.	   Honeypots	   come	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   forms,	   ranging	   from	   simple	  
network	  connection	  listeners	  to	  full-­‐blown	  emulated	  services	  capable	  of	  interacting	  
with	  attackers.	  These	  systems	  can	  be	  combined	  into	  honeynets	  to	  create	  large-­‐scale	  
deployments	  capable	  of	  detecting	  security	  events	  throughout	  a	  large	  network	  block.	  
[21][25][81]	  	  	  
Honeypots	   are	   generally	   used	   as	   an	   effective	   early-­‐warning	   system	   for	  
identifying	  attackers	  already	  inside	  the	  network	  perimeter.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  advanced	  
persistent	  threats	  (APTs),	  honeypots	  increase	  the	  probability	  of	  detecting	  both	  APT	  
attacks	   and	   targeted	  malware.	   After	   all,	   an	   attacker	   is	   very	   likely	   to	   connect	   to	   a	  
honeypot	  system	  throughout	  an	  attack’s	  lifecycle.	  	  
Primarily,	  honeypot	  systems	  are	  designed	  to	  be	  very	  alluring	  to	  an	  attacker:	  they	  
commonly	  host	   exploitable	   services	  and	  emulate	  high-­‐risk	  network	  devices.	  These	  
systems	   often	   appear	   identical	   to	   real	   services	   in	   hopes	   of	   tricking	   attackers	   and	  
deflecting	   attacks	   away	   from	   mission-­‐critical	   devices	   and	   infrastructure.	   The	  
complexity	   and	   detectability	   of	   honeypot	   systems	   varies	   from	   deployment	   to	  




Since	   all	   honeypots	   are	   non-­‐production	   by	   nature,	   any	   connection	   established	  
with	   a	   honeypot	   can	   be	   considered	   malicious.	   Thus,	   this	   type	   of	   security	   event	  
detection	  mechanism	  produces	  no	  false-­‐positives	  by	  design.	  [21][25][81]	  Incoming	  
malicious	  connections	  are	  handled	  long	  enough	  to	  collect	  forensic	  information	  about	  
an	  attack,	  while	  real-­‐time	  alerts	  are	  pushed	  to	  an	  external	  security	  event	  manager.	  
Depending	  on	   the	   interaction	   level	  of	   the	  honeypot	  –	   low	  or	  high	  –	  an	  attacker	  or	  
automated	  piece	  of	  malware	  may	  be	  fooled	  long	  enough	  to	  use	  a	  zero-­‐day	  exploit	  or	  
other	   novel	   type	   of	   payload.	   Naturally,	   the	   collection	   of	   this	   type	   of	   information	  
provides	   invaluable	   insight	   into	   the	  attacks	  and	  exploits	  directly	   impacting	  SCADA	  
networks.	  
In	   the	   following	   subsections	   I	   will	   describe	   the	   three	  main	   types	   of	   honeypot	  
systems:	   low	   interaction,	   high	   interaction,	   and	   tarpits.	   Finally,	   the	   merits	   and	  
downsides	   of	   each	   system	   will	   be	   compared	   and	   contrasted	   to	   provide	   a	   well-­‐
rounded	  view	  of	  current	  honeypot	  functionality.	  	  
	  
3.6.1	   Low	  Interaction	  Honeypots	  
	  
The	  first	  and	  most	  rudimentary	  type	  of	  honeypot	  is	  a	  low-­‐interaction	  honeypot.	  
This	   type	   of	   system	   is	   designed	   to	   listen	   for,	   and	   emulate,	   a	   variety	   of	   vulnerable	  
network	  services	  in	  hopes	  of	  attracting	  an	  attacker.	  Listeners	  deployed	  by	  this	  type	  
of	   honeypot	   mimic	   vulnerable	   network	   services	   by	   using	   pre-­‐defined	   interaction	  
templates.	   [21][25][81]	   These	   honeypot	   services	   are	   then	   bound	   to	   the	   device’s	  
network	  interfaces	  and	  begin	  waiting	  for	  attacks.	  
Attacks	  directed	  towards	  low-­‐interaction	  honeypots	  do	  not	  get	  far	  before	  failing,	  
considering	   the	   emulated	   nature	   of	   all	   listening	   services.	   Some	   low-­‐interaction	  
honeypot	  software	   is	  capable	  of	   interacting	  with	  attackers	  over	  common	  protocols	  
(e.g.:	   HTTP,	   FTP);	   however,	   this	   functionality	   is	   limited	   to	   services	   explicitly	  
supported.	  [21]	  Because	  of	  the	  low-­‐interaction	  nature	  of	  these	  honeypots,	  attackers	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are	  not	  commonly	  fooled	  into	  believing	  services	  are	  real.	  [21][81]	  Luckily,	  the	  mere	  
presence	  of	  a	  network	  connection	  directed	  at	  the	  honeypot	  indicates	  the	  presence	  of	  
an	  attacker.	  
Although	   an	   attacker	   easily	   detects	   low-­‐interaction	   honeypots,	   they	   are	  
extremely	   effective	   for	   collecting	   samples	   of	   automated	   malware.	   Commonly	  
exploited	  services	  are	  generally	  supported	  by	  all	  low-­‐interaction	  honeypots	  and	  are	  
capable	   of	   simulating	   full	   service	   exploitation	   during	   automated	  malware	   attacks.	  
This	  results	  in	  the	  collection	  of	  malware	  samples	  with	  little	  to	  no	  effort.	  [21]	  	  
Naturally,	   these	   types	  of	  honeypots	  do	  not	  provide	  a	   catchall	   solution,	   as	   they	  
are	  not	  capable	  of	  providing	  detailed	   forensic	   information	  about	  attacks.	  However,	  
their	   simulated	   nature	   facilitates	   mass	   deployment	   while	   providing	   extreme	  
consolidation,	   low	   complexity,	   and	   low	   resource	   utilization.	   These	   types	   of	  
honeypots	   are	   perfect	   for	   harvesting	   malware	   samples	   or	   providing	   a	   wide-­‐scale	  
mechanism	   for	   detecting	   the	   presence	   of	  malicious	   connections	  within	   a	   network.	  
Furthermore,	  their	  entirely	  passive	  nature	  coupled	  with	  non-­‐existent	  false-­‐positive	  
rates	  proves	  ideal	  for	  deployment	  within	  SCADA	  networks.	  	  
	  
3.6.2	   High	  Interaction	  Honeypots	  
	  
In	   contrast,	   some	   honeypot	   software	   is	   capable	   of	   providing	   a	   high	   level	   of	  
interaction	  during	  attacks	  while	  remaining	  transparent	  to	  the	  attacker.	  These	  types	  
of	  honeypots	  –	  called	  high-­‐interaction	  honeypots	  -­‐	  provide	  real,	  yet	  fully	  monitored,	  
services	  capable	  of	  being	  exploited.	  [21][25][81]	  
Services	   provided	   by	   this	   type	   of	   honeypot	   tend	   to	  mimic	   deployed	   software	  
within	  the	  network	  and	  aim	  to	  deflect	  attacks	  from	  critical	  infrastructure.	  [25]	  This	  
is	  often	  done	  by	  creating	  one	  or	  more	  virtual	  machines	  loaded	  with	  real,	  exploitable	  
software.	  These	  virtual	  machines	  are	  then	  monitored	  either	  in-­‐band	  (often	  through	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kernel-­‐level	   rootkits)	   or	   out-­‐of-­‐band	   (e.g.:	   passive	   network	   taps)	   to	   collect	  
information	  about	  attacks.	  [25]	  	  
Thanks	   to	   their	   high-­‐interaction	   nature,	   these	   types	   of	   honeypots	   are	   able	   to	  
collect	   detailed	   information	   about	   all	   phases	   of	   an	   attack.	   This	   includes	   initial	  
network	   scans,	   exploits	   and	   payloads	   used	   to	   compromise	   the	   host,	   and	   actions	  
taken	  by	   the	   attacker	   post-­‐exploitation.	   [21][25][81]	  Naturally,	   this	   information	   is	  
invaluable	  when	  performing	  a	  post-­‐attack	  investigation.	  Furthermore,	  these	  types	  of	  
honeypots	   are	   capable	   of	   offering	   insight	   into	   zero-­‐day	   exploits	   and	   other	   novel	  
attack	   vectors	   used	   within	   SCADA	   systems.	   [21]	   Like	   low-­‐interaction	   honeypots,	  
these	  systems	  are	  capable	  of	  pushing	  alerts	  in	  real	  time	  to	  an	  external	  security	  event	  
manager.	  
Unfortunately,	  deploying	   these	  exploitable	  and	  sophisticated	  honeypots	   comes	  
at	   the	   cost	   of	   increased	   complexity,	   management	   overhead,	   and	   resource	  
requirements.	   [21][25][81]	   Furthermore,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   the	   successful	  
exploitation	   of	   high-­‐interaction	   honeypots	   can	   result	   in	   the	   subversion	   of	   IDS	  
software	   responsible	   for	   monitoring	   the	   system.	   Although	   this	   can	   be	   mitigated	  
through	  out-­‐of-­‐band	  monitoring,	  this	  type	  of	  monitoring	  may	  hamper	  the	  collection	  
of	  well-­‐rounded	  forensic	  information.	  Generally	  speaking,	  the	  complexity	  and	  cost	  of	  
deploying	  this	  type	  of	  honeypot	  inhibits	  its	  use.	  [21][81]	  
	  
3.6.3	   Tarpits	  
	  
Finally,	   some	   honeypots	   are	   designed	   to	   solely	   slow	   down	   network	  
reconnaissance	  and	  automated	  malware	  attacks	  against	  a	  monitored	  network.	  These	  
honeypots	  are	  called	  tarpits	  –	  fittingly	  named	  based	  on	  their	  intended	  functionality.	  	  
[11]	  
Tarpits	   aim	   to	   slow	   automated	   connections	   down	   to	   a	   snail’s	   pace.	   These	  
systems	  try	  to	  significantly	  hamper	  the	  ability	  for	  automated	  malware	  to	  propagate,	  
	  
54	  
as	  contacting	   the	   tarpit	   causes	  malware	   to	  continually	  wait	   for	  each	  connection	   to	  
terminate.	  By	  delaying	  packets	  almost	  to	  the	  point	  of	  termination,	  a	  tarpit	  can	  slow	  
down	  an	  attack	  long	  enough	  to	  trigger	  administrator	  intervention.	  [11]	  
These	   types	   of	   honeypots	   are	   extremely	   effective	   when	   used	   to	   detect	  
automated	   malware	   and	   reconnaissance	   attacks.	   [11]	   Tarpits	   are	   simple,	   require	  
little	  resources,	  and	  are	  capable	  of	  binding	  to	  hundreds	  of	  IP	  addresses	  with	  little	  to	  
no	  overhead.	  Furthermore,	   their	   ability	   to	  provide	  attack	  detection	  and	  mitigation	  
while	  being	  entirely	  passive	  proves	  invaluable	  for	  SCADA	  networks.	  [11]	  
Unfortunately,	   tarpits	  do	  not	  provide	  any	  useful	   information	  regarding	  attacks	  
taking	  place	  beyond	  simple	  connection	  information.	  Naturally,	  this	  information	  is	  of	  
little	   use	   to	   an	   administrator,	   considering	   additional	   security	   event	   detection	  
mechanisms	   may	   have	   already	   detected	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   automated	   attack.	  
Overall,	   tarpits	  provide	   little	  use	  other	   than	  slowing	  down	  automated	  connections.	  
This	  is	  especially	  true	  considering	  modern	  automated	  malware	  is	  threaded	  and	  will	  
not	  be	  impeded	  by	  having	  a	  single	  connection	  slowed	  down	  by	  a	  tarpit.	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Chapter	  4.	  	  SCADA	  and	  Advanced	  Persistent	  Threats	  (APTs)	  
	  
Advanced	   persistent	   threats	   (APTs)	   take	   on	   many	   forms,	   as	   seen	   during	  
numerous	   hacking	   incidents	   highlighted	   by	   the	   media	   in	   recent	   years.	   [16][24]	  
Although	   this	   term	   seems	   vague	   and	   all	   encompassing,	   the	   significance	   of	   APT	  
attacks	  should	  not	  be	  underestimated.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  such	  attacks	  and	  their	  
importance	   in	   industrial	   control	   security,	   one	   must	   first	   define	   and	   attempt	   to	  
understand	   APT	   attackers,	   their	   methods,	   and	   exploitation	   strategies	   they	  
commonly	  use.	  
	  
4.1 Advanced	  Persistent	  Threats	  
	  
The	   term	  advanced	  persistent	  threat	   (APT)	  was	  coined	  by	   the	  United	  States	  Air	  
Force	   in	   the	   mid	   2000’s	   to	   identify	   highly	   skilled	   and	   motivated	   cyber	   attackers	  
capable	   of	   infiltrating	   secure	  networks.	  The	  APT	   label	  was	   commonly	  used	  with	   a	  
numerical	   identifier	   to	   indicate	   a	   specific	   attacker	   without	   disclosing	   classified	  
information	  regarding	  their	  identity.	  [24][47][82]	  	  
As	   years	   progressed,	   external	   security	   companies	   like	   Mandiant	   and	   McAfee	  
began	  to	  see	  APT	  attacks	  targeting	  large	  corporations	  in	  various	  industries.	  [49]	  As	  
these	   types	   of	   attacks	   proliferated,	   the	   APT	   label	   was	   used	   to	   identify	   similarly	  
highly	   skilled	   and	   motivated	   attackers	   aiming	   to	   infiltrate	   and	   exfiltrate	   industry	  
secrets	  from	  private	  corporations.	  [24][30][82]	  
APTs,	  often	  working	  in	  groups,	  are	  usually	  funded	  by	  a	  third	  party	  or	  are	  highly	  
motivated	  through	  financial	  incentives.	  [12]	  Financial	  gain	  may	  range	  from	  payment	  
upon	   attack	   completion	   to	   funds	   gained	   from	   selling	   extremely	   sensitive	   trade	  
secrets.	   Unlike	   typical	   attackers,	   APTs	   may	   rely	   heavily	   on	   social	   engineering	   for	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initial	  network	  infiltration,	  considering	  the	  complexity	  and	  security	  controls	  present	  
in	  large,	  well-­‐secured	  networks.	  	  
One	   of	   the	   most	   well	   known	   APT	   attacks	   targeting	   the	   technology	   industry	  
occurred	   in	  2011	  against	  RSA,	  a	  security	  vendor	  providing	  one-­‐time	  token	  devices	  
(RSA	   SecureID)	   that	   protect	   companies	   around	   the	   globe.	   [44]	   Although	   the	   time	  
frame	  of	  the	  attack	  was	  not	  disclosed,	  exfiltrated	  information	  was	  sensitive	  enough	  
to	  justify	  public-­‐disclosure	  of	  the	  attack.	  This	  prompted	  RSA	  to	  warn	  customers	  that	  
token	  devices	  may	  be	  compromised.	  These	  types	  of	  extremely	  complex	  attacks	  have	  
occurred	   elsewhere	   in	   following	   years,	   including	   long-­‐term	   attacks	   against	   large	  




Initially,	   APT	   attacks	   appear	   to	   be	   similar	   to	   traditional	   network	   infiltration	  
attacks,	  which	  have	  occurred	  since	  the	  Internet	  evolved	  out	  of	  the	  primordial	  ooze	  of	  
the	   80’s.	   However,	   APT	   attacks	   (and	   attackers)	   differ	   in	   a	   few	   specific	  ways.	   [66]	  
APTs:	  
§ Have	  long-­‐term	  and	  specific	  objectives	  
§ Are	  highly	  persistent	  and	  motivated	  
§ Are	   funded	   either	   by	   a	   3rd	   party	   or	   are	   financially	   motivated	   by	   post-­‐
operation	  funding	  
§ Have	   the	   resources,	   tools,	   and	   skills	   needed	   to	   attack	   highly	   secured	  
networks	  
§ Have	  a	  high	  risk	  tolerance,	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  state	  sponsored	  attacks	  	  
In	  addition,	  the	  timeframes	  seen	  in	  APT	  attacks	  tend	  to	  be	  longer	  than	  typical	  cyber	  
attacks.	  [66]	  Statistics	  compiled	  by	  Mandiant	  indicate	  that	  the	  average	  APT	  attack	  is	  
sustained	  over	  a	  period	  of	  1	  year;	  while	  the	  maximum	  (known)	  attack	  duration	  was	  
5	  years.	  [54]	  Naturally,	  this	  highlights	  the	  highly	  persistent	  nature	  of	  APTs.	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4.1.2 Attack	  Lifecycle	  
	  
Like	   typical	   hackers,	   APTs	   generally	   conform	   to	   a	   lifecycle	   when	   exploiting	   a	  
targeted	   network.	   This	   lifecycle	   takes	   them	   from	   initial	   network	   infiltration	   to	  
creating	   a	   foothold	   and	   finally	   exploiting	   the	   intended	   target.	   [54]	   Unlike	   typical	  
hackers,	   the	   tools	   and	   techniques	  used	   to	   infiltrate	   and	  maintain	   their	   foothold	   in	  
the	  target	  network	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  complex.	  Generally	  speaking,	  the	  APT	  lifecycle	  is	  
as	  follows:	  
1. Define	  the	  final	  target	  within	  the	  target	  network	  
2. Perform	  reconnaissance	  	  
3. Penetrate	  the	  perimeter	  of	  the	  network	  
4. Escalate	  privileges	  
5. Create	  a	  foothold	  and	  maintain	  a	  network	  presence	  
6. Perform	  lateral	  reconnaissance	  
7. Exploit	  laterally	  through	  the	  network	  
8. Exfiltrate	  target	  information/data	  
The	   initial	   infiltration	   and	   foothold	   processes	   are	   particularly	   interesting,	  
considering	  their	  complexity.	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  infiltration	  tactics	  tend	  to	  be	  
more	   complex	   than	   traditional	   cyber	   attacks.	   Considering	   the	   complexity	   and	  
security	  stance	  of	  target	  networks,	  APTs	  generally	  resort	  to	  targeting	  people	  instead	  
of	  servers	  or	  workstations.	  [54]	  These	  types	  of	  human-­‐based	  attacks	  can	  be	  used	  to	  
bypass	   network	   perimeter	   security	   appliances.	   These	   types	   of	   attacks,	   generally	  
referred	   to	   as	   social	   engineering	   attacks,	   aim	   to	  manipulate	   people	   into	   divulging	  
passwords,	   downloading	   and	   executing	   binary	   files,	   emailing	   documents	   to	  
compromised	  accounts,	  etc.	  Social	  engineering	  attack	  vectors	  include	  things	  like:	  
§ Spear	  phishing	  
§ Spy	  phishing	  




§ Extortion	  	  
Furthermore,	  APTs	  generally	  utilize	  complex	  and	  customized	  malware/exploits	  
to	   maintain	   network	   persistence.	   [12][66]	   By	   leveraging	   custom	   exploits	   and	  
crimeware	  packs,	  APT	  attackers	  can	  further	  reduce	  the	  probability	  of	  being	  caught	  
while	  furthering	  their	  foothold	  on	  the	  target	  network.	  
	  
4.1.3 Types	  of	  APT	  Attacks	  
	  
Generally	  speaking	  most	  APT	  attacks	   fall	   into	   three	  general	  categories:	   insider	  
attacks,	   targeted	  malware,	   and	   network	   infiltration.	   These	   types	   of	   specific	   attack	  
methodologies	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   detail	   to	   further	   our	   understanding	   of	   our	  
adversary.	  	  
	  
4.1.3.1 Insider	  Attacks	  
	  
Unlike	  the	  attack	  vectors	  and	  methodologies	  used	  by	  typical	  hackers,	  some	  types	  
of	   APT	   attacks	   are	   more	   evasive	   due	   to	   the	   use	   of	   legitimate	   insider	   access	   and	  
credentials.	  In	  some	  cases,	  extremely	  persistent	  or	  motivated	  adversaries	  may	  gain	  
employment	   at	   a	   target,	   giving	   them	   first-­‐hand	   knowledge	   of	   the	   network	   and	  
providing	  them	  with	  a	  legitimate	  network	  presence.	  	  
Although	   most	   security	   hardening	   guidelines	   describe	   the	   use	   of	   defense	   in	  
depth	  strategies	  for	  network	  protection,	  these	  types	  of	  implementations	  may	  be	  rare	  
in	  non-­‐military	  networks.	   [30][82]	  Because	  of	   this,	   the	  malicious	  use	  of	   legitimate	  
internal	  network	  credential	  may	  be	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  detect	  or	  mitigate.	  In	  some	  
cases,	  network	  infiltration	  may	  not	  be	  detected	  until	  data	  begins	  to	  be	  exfiltrated	  via	  
the	   WAN.	   [12]	   Furthermore,	   an	   APT	   insider	   could	   install	   software	   onto	   internal	  
network	  devices	  to	  ensure	  network	  access	  even	  if	  their	  employment	  was	  terminated.	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Legitimate	  credentials	  could	  be	  used	  to	  escalate	  privileges	  locally	  and	  move	  laterally	  
through	  a	  network	  to	  the	  intended	  target.	  	  
Insider	   attacks	   usually	   pose	   a	   significant	   threat	   to	   network	   security	   and	   are	  
generally	  difficult	  to	  detect	  and	  prevent.	  
	  
4.1.3.2 Targeted	  Malware	  
	  
Conversely,	   not	   all	   APT	   attacks	   rely	   on	   skilled	   attackers	   performing	   manual	  
exploitation.	   In	   some	  well-­‐known	   cases	   (e.g.:	   Stuxnet),	   APTs	   have	   been	   known	   to	  
develop	   extremely	   complex	  malware	   capable	   of	  manoeuvring	   through	   an	   infected	  
network	  towards	  the	  intended	  target.	  [16][31]	  
This	  type	  of	  highly	  targeted	  malware	  could	  infect	  a	  target	  network	  via	  multiple	  
infection	  points.	  These	  include:	  
§ Email	   attachments	   from	   seemingly	   legitimate	   users	   (or	   other	   types	   of	  
related	  spear	  phishing	  attacks)	  
§ Exploiting	  Internet-­‐facing	  services	  at	  the	  network	  perimeter	  
§ Uploading	  malware	  to	  network	  file	  servers	  
§ Social	  engineering	  users	  into	  clicking	  on	  links,	  visiting	  websites,	  etc.	  
§ Loading	  malware	  on	  USB	  drives	  and	  leaving	  them	  around	  a	  business	  
§ Exploiting	  client	  machines	  through	  watering	  hole	  attacks	  
§ Infecting	  supply	  chains	  to	  jump	  into	  the	  target	  network	  
§ Infecting	  remote	  worker	  computers	  
Once	  the	  malware	  has	  been	  introduced	  into	  the	  network,	  it	  may	  lay	  dormant	  for	  
a	   period	   of	   time	   before	   infecting	   additional	   hosts.	   Over	   time	   the	   malware	   could	  
escalate	   privileges	   and	  move	   laterally	   throughout	   the	   network	   until	   the	   intended	  
target	  has	  been	  reached.	  In	  addition,	  the	  malware	  may	  connect	  back	  to	  a	  command	  
and	  control	  server,	  providing	  remote	  access	  to	  the	  target	  network.	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APT	  malware	  may	  use	  various	  techniques	  to	  avoid	  detection	  and	  retain	  network	  
access.	  [16][24][31][82]	  This	  could	  be	  done	  using:	  
§ Custom	  packers/crypters/mutators	  to	  evade	  antivirus	  technologies	  
§ Zero-­‐day	  exploits	  to	  infect	  other	  computers	  
§ Stolen	  certificates	  to	  sign	  its	  own	  software	  (as	  to	  appear	  legitimate)	  
§ Signed	  drivers	  to	  evade	  antivirus	  
§ Rootkits	  
§ Binders	  to	  attach	  to	  legitimate	  software	  
Modern	   day	  malware	   uses	  many	   of	   these	   techniques;	   however,	  more	   complex	  
attacks	   like	   stealing	   signing	   certificates	   and	   using	   zero-­‐day	   exploits	   help	  
differentiate	   APT	   malware	   attacks	   due	   the	   time	   and	   cost	   associated	   with	   such	  
techniques.	  
	  
4.1.3.3 Network	  Infiltration	  
	  
Lastly,	  most	  APT	  attacks	  are	  perpetrated	  by	  skilled	  attackers	  manually	  exploiting	  
a	   target	   network.	   [66]	   These	   attackers,	   sometimes	  working	   in	   large	   groups	   (even	  
thousands,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  APT-­‐1	  [71]),	  use	  various	  tools	  at	  their	  disposal	  to	  
work	  their	  way	  into	  the	  target	  network.	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  attacks	  discussed	  at	  the	  
beginning	  of	  this	  section.	  	  
These	  types	  of	  manual	  attacks	  are	  not	  uncommon,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  Aurora	  attack	  
of	  2009	  	  -­‐	  one	  of	  the	  first	  well-­‐known	  APT	  attacks	  that	  targeted	  a	  handful	  of	  fortune	  
500	   companies,	   with	   a	   focus	   on	   stealing	   trade	   secrets.	   [12]	   The	   Aurora	   attacks	  
started	   in	   early	   2009	   and	   lasted	   for	   most	   of	   the	   year	   before	   subsiding.	   After	  
collecting	   statistics	   and	   evidence	   regarding	   a	   large	   number	   of	   attacks,	   Mandiant	  
determined	  that	  social	  engineering	  attacks	  -­‐	  like	  spear	  phishing	  -­‐	  were	  used	  in	  most	  
cases	  to	  penetrate	  target	  networks.	  [11]	  Once	  inside	  the	  network,	  APTs	  used	  lateral	  
movements	   to	   exploit	   VIP	   targets	   and	   exfiltrate	   target	   data.	   The	   Aurora	   attacks	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leveraged	   zero-­‐day	   exploits,	   encryption,	   and	   custom	   exfiltration/obfuscation	  
techniques	  to	  evade	  detection.	  [12]	  
	  
4.1.4 Known	  Cases	  of	  SCADA-­‐Specific	  APT	  Attacks	  
	  
Although	   the	   APT	   cases	   mentioned	   so	   far	   have	   primarily	   targeted	   corporate	  
networks,	   these	   types	   of	   attacks	   pose	   a	   grave	   threat	   to	   every	   nation’s	   critical	  
infrastructure	  networks	  as	  well.	  Unlike	  traditional	  IT	  networks,	  SCADA	  deployments	  
tend	   to	   lack	   robust	   security	   controls,	   making	   their	   exploitation	   by	   an	   APT	   more	  
probable.	   In	   order	   to	   highlight	   this	   concern,	   below	   are	   a	   few	  well-­‐known	   cases	   of	  
advanced	  persistent	  threats	  attacking	  SCADA	  deployments	  throughout	  the	  world.	  	  
When	  considering	   cyber	   security	   incidents	  pertaining	   to	  SCADA	  networks,	   three	  
main	   events	   come	   to	  mind.	   First,	   the	  Department	   of	  Homeland	   Security’s	   “Aurora”	  
simulation;	  second,	  the	  recent	  state-­‐sponsored	  Stuxnet	  attack	  targeting	  Iran’s	  nuclear	  
facilities;	  and	  finally,	  the	  disgruntled	  prospective	  employee	  who	  hacked	  into	  a	  city’s	  
waste	  management	  network	  in	  Queensland,	  Australia.	  [50][51][52]	  
To	  simulate	  the	  plausibility	  of	  ATP	  attacks,	  the	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security	  
conducted	   the	   ‘Aurora’	   attack	   in	   March	   2007	   with	   engineers	   from	   Idaho	   National	  
Laboratories.	  This	  operation	  aimed	   to	  determine	   the	   impact	  cyber	   intrusions	  could	  
have	   on	   physical	   infrastructure.	   [50][52]	   The	   successful	   execution	   of	   a	   network	  
attack	   against	   a	   physical	   asset	   resulted	   in	   the	   “partial	   destruction	   of	   a	   $1	   million	  
dollar	  large	  diesel-­‐electric	  generator”.	  [52]	  	  	  
More	   recently,	   the	   Stuxnet	   malware	   attack	   against	   Iran’s	   nuclear	   facilities	  
showcased	  the	  threat	  APT	  malware	  poses	  to	  industrial	  control	  systems.	  According	  to	  
Symantec,	  this	  attack	  affected	  over	  100,000	  computers	  (60%	  of	  which	  where	  in	  Iran)	  
and	  targeted	  PLC	  and	  centrifuge	  devices.	  [22]	  Based	  on	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  attack,	  
the	   small	   form	   factor	   of	   the	   code,	   and	   insider	   knowledge	   required	   to	   execute	   the	  
attack,	   some	   suggest	   the	   outbreak	   was	   state	   sponsored.	   [50][52]	   This	   highly	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sophisticated	   SCADA-­‐specific	   worm	   utilized	   multiple	   zero-­‐day	   Windows	   exploits	  
coupled	  with	  stolen	  certificates	  to	  replicate	  towards	  the	  intended	  target.	  [52]	  
	  
Malware	  is	  not	  the	  only	  reason	  to	  be	  concerned	  about	  SCADA	  security,	  as	  seen	  in	  
the	   Shire	   of	  Maroochy	   township	   attack	   in	   Queensland,	   Australia	   in	   the	   year	   2000.	  
Vitek	  Boden	  was	  turned	  down	  from	  a	  job	  with	  the	  municipality	  and	  “hacked	  into	  the	  
city’s	   wastewater	   management	   system.	   Over	   the	   course	   of	   to	   months,	   Boden	  
repeatedly	  drove	  around	  the	  Maroochy	  Shire	  Council	  area	  issuing	  radio	  commands	  to	  
sewage	  equipment	  and	  causing	  over	  230,000	  gallons	  of	  raw	  sewage	  to	  spill	  into	  local	  
parks,	  rivers,	  and	  even	  onto	  the	  grounds	  of	  a	  Hyatt	  Regency	  Hotel”.	  [51]	  The	  system	  
was	   tampered	   with	   approximately	   40	   times	   before	   the	   attacks	   were	   actually	  
detected.	  [52]	  This	  situation	  showcased	  the	  real	  risk	  of	  insider	  attacks.	  
Lastly,	   although	   not	   a	   cyber	   security	   attack,	   the	   importance	   of	   change	  
management	  procedures	  was	  showcased	  in	  March	  2008	  in	  Baxley,	  Georgia.	  A	  nuclear	  
power	   plant	   in	   Baxley	   was	   forced	   to	   shutdown	   when	   an	   operator	   deployed	   a	  
software	   patch	   to	   a	   single	   computer.	   This	   patch	   caused	   communications	   to	   be	  
disrupted	  between	  two	  SCADA	  systems,	  causing	  system	  failure.	  [36]	  
	  
4.2 General	  Mitigation	  of	  APT	  Attacks	  
	  
The	  mitigation	  of	  highly	  complex	  APT	  attacks	  appears	  at	  first	  to	  be	  an	  extremely	  
difficult	  task	  –	  and	  it	  is.	  Currently,	  little	  research	  exists	  regarding	  the	  development	  of	  
next-­‐generation	   security	   solutions	   capable	   of	   detecting	   highly	   sophisticated	   and	  
strategically	  timed	  attacks.	  Like	  protecting	  against	  traditional	  network	  attacks,	  one	  
must	   focus	   on	   mitigating	   risk	   through	   the	   use	   of	   perimeter	   and	   interior	   security	  
technologies,	  providing	  defense	  in	  depth	  for	  each	  part	  of	  a	  network.	  [8][16][30][47]	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4.2.1 Perimeter	  vs.	  Interior	  Network	  Security	  	  
	  
In	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   implementation	   of	   defense	   in	   depth	   security	  
strategies,	  one	  must	  first	  understand	  the	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  perimeter	  
and	   interior	   security.	  Each	  of	   these	  network	   segments	   requires	   specific	  mitigation	  
technologies	  to	  ensure	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  target	  network.	  
A	  network’s	  perimeter	  generally	  refers	  to	  its	  Internet-­‐facing	  infrastructure.	  This	  
could	  include	  network	  components	  like	  a	  DMZ:	  a	  special	  security	  zone	  used	  to	  host	  
services	   like	  websites,	   email	   servers,	   and	   databases.	   Generally	   speaking,	   a	  DMZ	   is	  
used	   to	   provide	   some	   inherent	   segregation	   from	   internal	   resources.	   This	   helps	  
ensure	  the	  exploitation	  of	  Internet-­‐facing	  servers	  cannot	  be	  leveraged	  to	  pivot	  into	  
the	   internal	   network.	   However,	   in	   some	   cases	   misconfigured	   firewalls	   or	   DMZ	  
network	   configurations	   may	   needlessly	   expose	   internal	   services	   to	   this	   type	   of	  
attack.	  Ideally	  DMZ	  services	  would	  be	  entirely	  segregated	  from	  internal	  hosts	  or,	  in	  
cases	  where	   this	   is	   not	   possible,	   should	   be	   highly	   restricted	   in	   terms	   of	   potential	  
communication	   paths.	   To	   further	   protect	   the	   DMZ	   and	   ensure	   its	   isolation,	  
administrators	   may	   rely	   on	   network-­‐based	   intrusion	   detection	   systems	   to	   detect	  
and	  even	  prevent	  active	  attacks	  against	  their	  perimeter.	  	  
A	  network’s	  interior	  generally	  refers	  to	  internal	  hosts	  and	  services	  not	  intended	  
to	   be	   exposed	   to	   the	   Internet.	   Such	   services	   could	   include	   internal	   email	   servers,	  
source	   code	   repositories,	   file	   shares,	   etc.	   Naturally,	   these	   internal	   services	   may	  
contain	  extremely	  sensitive	  information,	  ranging	  from	  personal	  information	  to	  trade	  
secrets.	   Unlike	   the	   network	   perimeter,	   the	   interior	   is	   often	   less	   guarded	   against	  
attacks.	   [72]	   Typically,	   administrators	   rely	   on	   network	   controls	   and	   segregated	  
/grouped	   user	   accounts	   to	   isolate	   access	   to	   internal	   resources.	   Additionally,	   host-­‐
based	   technologies	   like	   antivirus	   and	   intrusion	   detection	   systems	  may	   be	   used	   to	  
detect	   and	  prevent	  workstation	   intrusions.	  Unfortunately	   the	  pliable	  nature	  of	   the	  
network	  interior	  often	  assists	  attackers	  in	  moving	  laterally	  throughout	  a	  corporate	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network.	  This	  pliability	   is	  often	  difficult	   to	   reduce	  without	   systematically	   affecting	  
legitimate	  users	  and	  the	  resources	  they	  require	  to	  complete	  their	  jobs.	  	  
	  
4.2.2 Defense	  in	  depth	  
	  
As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  significant	  difference	  in	  
security	  when	  comparing	  the	  exterior	  and	  interior	  network	  models.	  In	  cases	  where	  
the	   network	   perimeter	   is	   highly	   secured,	   APT	   attackers	   may	   resort	   to	   exploiting	  
human	  weaknesses	   in	  order	   to	   gain	   entry	   into	   the	  network.	  To	  ensure	   the	  overall	  
security	   stance	   of	   the	   network	   is	   not	   compromised	   in	   this	   manner,	   security	  
professionals	  must	  aim	  to	  provide	  defense	  in	  depth.	  	  	  
The	  defense	  in	  depth	  concept	  generally	  refers	  to	  the	  deployment	  and	  monitoring	  
of	   various	   network	   and	   host-­‐based	   security	   devices	   to	   provide	   well-­‐rounded	  
protection	   for	  a	  network.	   [72]	  Unlike	  traditional	  security	  controls	   that	   focus	  solely	  
on	   perimeter	   and	   workstation	   security,	   defense	   in	   depth	   must	   provide	   equal	  
protection	   of	   infrastructure	   devices,	   workstations,	   and	   servers	   throughout	   the	  
network.	   [72]	   Below	   are	   examples	   of	   various	   security	   mechanisms	   that,	   when	  
combined,	  can	  be	  used	  to	  provide	  this	  type	  of	  protection.	  
§ Protecting	  the	  perimeter	  network:	  
o Network-­‐based	  intrusion	  detection	  systems	  (NIDS)	  
o Host-­‐based	  intrusion	  detection	  systems	  (HIDS)	  
o Antivirus	  on	  servers	  
o Server	  hardening	  to	  industry	  standards	  
o Use	  of	  state-­‐based	  or	  application	  layer	  firewalls	  
o Reducing	  attack	  surface	  of	  servers	  
o Performing	  regular	  assessments	  and	  audits	  
§ Reducing	  the	  pliability	  of	  the	  interior	  network:	  
o Host-­‐based	  intrusion	  detection	  systems	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o Mandatory	  access	  control	  
o Group	  policy	  for	  managing	  workstations	  
o Mandatory	  antivirus	  installations	  
o Network	  access	  control	  
o Network-­‐based	  intrusion	  detection	  systems	  
o Network	  isolation	  using	  VLANs	  
o Firewalls	  restricting	  inter-­‐VLAN	  communications	  
§ Detecting	  exfiltration	  of	  data:	  
o Deep	  packet	  inspection	  at	  the	  perimeters	  
o Statistical	  analysis	  machines	  
o Robust	  and	  regularly	  reviewed	  logging	  
o Locking	   down	   workstations	   by	   removing/disabling	   USB	   ports,	   CD-­‐ROM	  
drives	  and	  floppy	  disk	  drives	  
o Restricting	  protocols	  allowed	  to	  exit	  to	  the	  WAN	  
o Checking	  employees	  when	  leaving	  the	  facility	  
§ Protecting	  against	  human	  manipulation:	  
o Provide	  a	  comprehensive	  security	  awareness	  training	  program	  
o Anti-­‐spam	  and	  anti-­‐phishing	  filters	  to	  reduce	  risk	  of	  exploitation	  
o Well-­‐defined	  consequences	  for	  not	  following	  security	  policies	  
o Acceptable	  use	  policies	  
o Sufficient	  background	  screening	  for	  new	  employees	  
§ Physical	  device	  protection:	  
o Physical	  isolation	  of	  datacenter	  and/or	  servers	  
o Man	  traps	  
o Biometrics	  for	  accessing	  sensitive	  areas	  
o Locks	  on	  workstations	  
o Tamper	  alarms	  for	  opening	  workstations	  
o Asset	  tags	  for	  tracking	  devices	  
By	   no	   means	   is	   the	   list	   above	   comprehensive;	   however,	   by	   using	   various	  
technologies	   in	   conjunction,	   an	   administration	   can	   provide	   a	   sufficient	   level	   of	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security	  for	  his	  or	  her	  network.	  This	  type	  of	  defense	  in	  depth	  strategy	  would	  make	  
the	  exploitation	  of	  devices	  more	  difficult	  and	  could	  prevent	  attackers	   from	  moving	  
laterally	  through	  a	  network.	  These	  security	  controls	  do	  not	  ensure	  the	  integrity	  and	  
security	  of	  a	  network;	  rather,	  they	  aim	  to	  reduce	  the	  network’s	  attack	  surface,	  while	  
making	  the	  detection	  of	  APT	  attackers	  more	  probable.	  [47][72][82]	  
	  
4.3 Detecting	  APT	  Attacks	  
	  
Considering	   the	   timespan	   and	   complexity	   of	   APT	   attacks	   seen	   against	   SCADA	  
deployments,	   the	  detection	  of	   advanced	  attack	  vectors	   seems	   incomprehensible	   at	  
times.	  In	  order	  to	  effectively	  identify,	  remediate,	  and	  protect	  against	  APTs,	  one	  must	  
first	   understand	   the	   strategies	   used	   to	   evade	   traditional	   security	   controls.	   By	  
correlating	  specific	  evasion	  techniques	  with	  the	  typical	  attack	  lifecycle	  seen	  in	  4.1.2,	  
one	   can	   break	   down	   advanced	   attacks	   into	   components,	   thus	   identifying	   specific	  
mitigation	  strategies	  for	  each	  facet	  of	  an	  attack.	  	  	  
	  
4.3.1 Strategies	  Used	  to	  Avoid	  Detection	  
	  
Considering	  the	  average	  APT	  attack	  duration,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  the	  complexity	  
of	  such	  attacks	  makes	  detection	  extremely	  difficult.	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  SCADA	  
networks	   tend	   to	   avoid	   integrating	   high-­‐interaction	   security	   controls	   due	   to	   their	  
effects	   on	   network	   latency	   and	   availability.	   One	   would	   assume	   that	   lack	   of	  
traditional	  security	  controls	  makes	  APT	  detection	  difficult;	  however,	  the	  opposite	  is	  
the	  case.	  Because	  of	  the	  highly	  static	  and	  predictable	  nature	  of	  SCADA	  environments,	  
the	   introduction	   of	   new	   network	   devices	   or	   communication	   streams	   is	   easily	  
identified.	   Below	   I	   will	   discuss	   the	   types	   of	   strategies	   that	   could	   be	   used	   by	   APT	  
attackers	  to	  evade	  detection	  in	  SCADA	  networks.	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Generally	   speaking,	   in	   order	   to	   evade	   detection	   in	   SCADA	   networks,	   APT	  
attackers	  need	   to	  blend	   in	  with	  normal	  network	  operations.	   [8][30]	  This	   could	  be	  
done	  by	  using	  legitimate	  credentials,	  impersonating	  devices,	  or	  by	  leveraging	  highly	  
targeted	   zero-­‐day	   exploits.	   	   By	   attempting	   to	   blend	   in	   with	   legitimate	   network	  
communication	   streams,	   APTs	   can	   manipulate	   devices	   without	   being	   flagged	   by	  
security	  appliances	  like	  network	  intrusion	  detection	  systems.	  [16][47]	  
	  
4.3.1.1 	  Use	  of	  Legitimate	  Credentials	  
	  
Ideally,	   an	   APT	   attacker	  would	   attempt	   to	   leverage	   legitimate	   user	   or	   system	  
credentials	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  detection.	  In	  order	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  such	  credentials,	  an	  
attacker	  may	  perform	  spear	  phishing	  or	  social	  engineering	  attackers,	  coercing	  users	  
to	   relinquish	   their	   credentials.	   In	   addition,	   some	   SCADA	   operators	   do	   not	   change	  
default	   usernames	   and	   passwords	   shipped	   with	   PLCs	   and	   other	   control	   system	  
devices.	   [16][47]	  Furthermore,	   the	  use	  of	  shared	  HMI	  credentials	   is	  more	  common	  
than	  expected	  within	   the	   industry.	   [16]	   If	   an	  attacker	  were	  able	   to	  gain	   legitimate	  
access	  to	  the	  HMI,	  SCADA	  systems	  could	  be	  manipulated	  in	  such	  a	  subtle	  way	  as	  to	  
be	  almost	  entirely	  undetectable.	  	  
	  
4.3.1.2 Impersonation	  of	  Legitimate	  Devices	  
	  
Like	   corporate	   networks,	   SCADA	   infrastructure	   is	   also	   susceptible	   to	   highly	  
sophisticated	  attacks.	  Attackers	  may	   infiltrate	  attached	  corporate	  networks	  to	  gain	  
access	  to	  SCADA	  infrastructure,	  or	  could	  even	  be	  insiders	  with	  privileged	  access	  and	  
information.	  In	  these	  cases	  one	  must	  assume	  the	  attacker	  has	  access	  to	  all	  network	  
security	  and	  infrastructure	  information.	  This	  information	  would	  include	  the	  number	  
of	   SCADA	  devices	   (RTUs,	  MTUs,	  HMIs,	   etc.)	  present	  on	   the	  network,	  device	   IP	  and	  
MAC	  addresses,	  device	  credentials,	  protocol-­‐level	  authentication	  credentials	  (if	  any),	  
	  
68	  
and	  user	  accounts.	  If	  an	  attacker	  knows	  this	  information	  then	  one	  must	  assume	  they	  
are	  able	  of	  perfectly	  impersonating	  legitimate	  devices.	  	  	  
Assuming	  physical	  security	  is	  present	  in	  the	  SCADA	  environment,	  the	  ability	  for	  
an	   insider	   to	   impersonate	   legitimate	   devices	   is	   extremely	   frightening.	   If	   a	   rogue	  
control	  system	  device,	  like	  a	  human	  machine	  interface	  (HMI),	  were	  introduced	  into	  
the	   network,	   communications	   between	   itself	   and	   MTU	   and	   RTU	   devices	   would	  
appear	  perfectly	  valid	  and	  non-­‐malicious.	  At	  a	  high	  level,	  such	  attacks	  would	  be	  hard	  
to	  detect.	  	  
When	   legitimate	   credentials	   are	   not	   accessible	   to	   an	   attacker,	   he	   or	   she	  may	  
resort	  to	  impersonating	  legitimate	  devices	  or	  introducing	  new	  devices	  to	  the	  SCADA	  
network.	   As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   most	   SCADA	   protocols	   (e.g.:	   Modbus,	   DNP3)	   are	  
easily	   forged.	   Because	   of	   this,	   it	   may	   be	   easier	   for	   an	   attacker	   to	   impersonate	   or	  
replay	   communications	   from	   an	   HMI	   instead	   of	   attempting	   to	   manipulate	   human	  
operators.	   In	   some	   ways	   one	   could	   even	   consider	   this	   type	   of	   attack	   extremely	  
stealthy.	   Since	   commands	   sent	   to	   PLCs	   and	   other	   remote	   devices	   rarely	   contain	  
mutual	  device	  authentication	  mechanisms,	  the	  impersonation	  of	  an	  HMI	  (or	  similar	  
control	  device)	  would	  be	  trivial	  once	  an	  attacker	  gained	  access	  to	  a	  network.	  
	  
4.3.1.3 Leveraging	  Zero-­‐day	  Exploits	  
	  
In	  cases	  where	  human	  manipulation	  is	  not	  possible	  or	  network	  communications	  
cannot	  be	  easily	  forged,	  a	  skilled	  and	  persistent	  attacker	  could	  reasonably	  procure	  a	  
zero-­‐day	  exploit	   to	  assist	   in	  network	  exploitation.	  These	  types	  of	  zero	   -­‐day	  attacks	  
would	  be	  difficult	  to	  detect,	  assuming	  they	  do	  not	  create	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  network	  
noise.	  	  
An	  attacker	  could	  first	  conduct	  network	  reconnaissance	  to	  determine	  the	  types	  
of	   PLC	   devices	   and	   software	   used	   within	   the	   SCADA	   environment.	   Next,	   the	   APT	  
could	   purchase	   or	   illegally	   acquire	   the	   target	   software	   or	   hardware	   in	   order	   to	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perform	  an	  offline	  security	  audit	  of	  the	  device.	  This	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  potentially	  
discover	  a	  novel	  exploit	  for	  devices	  or	  software	  without	  resorting	  to	  noisy	  network-­‐
based	   fuzzing	   attacks.	   Considering	   a	   multitude	   of	   PLC	   devices	   have	   publically	  
available	  exploit	  code,	  it	  is	  not	  unreasonable	  to	  assume	  the	  development	  of	  zero-­‐day	  
device	   and	   control	   system	   software	   exploits	   is	   beyond	   the	   capabilities	   of	   a	   skilled	  
and	  motivated	  attacker.	  
	  
4.3.1.4 Knowledge	  of	  Security	  Mechanisms	  
	  
Furthermore,	  information	  collected	  during	  the	  reconnaissance	  phase	  of	  the	  APT	  
lifecycle	   could	   be	   used	   to	   identify	   security	   mechanisms	   in	   place	   on	   the	   target	  
network.	   This	   type	   of	   information	   could	   be	   collected	   by	   leveraging	   social	  
engineering	   attacks	   against	   SCADA	   operators	   or	   through	   insider	   attacks.	   If	   an	  
attacker	  were	   capable	  of	   collecting	   this	   type	  of	   sensitive	   information	   -­‐	  which	   they	  
surely	   are	   -­‐	   it	   could	   be	   leveraged	   to	   hone	   various	   attacks	   to	   avoid	   detection.	  This	  
could	  include	  things	  like:	  
§ Refining	  network-­‐based	  attacks	  to	  avoid	  IDS	  detection	  
§ Manipulating	  network	  devices	  over	  time	  to	  avoid	  detection	  	  
§ Not	  communicating	  directly	  with	  devices	  that	  are	  heavily	  monitored	  
§ Manipulating	  remote	  devices	  and	  HMI	  communication	  to	  ensure	  human	  
operators	  are	  not	  notified	  of	  state	  changes	  
	  
4.3.1.5 Use	  of	  Covert	  Channels	  for	  Data	  Exfiltration	  
	  
Lastly,	   in	  some	  cases	  internal	  SCADA	  information	  may	  be	  significant	  enough	  to	  
justify	   its	   exfiltration.	   Unlike	   traditional	   IT	   networks,	   SCADA	   networks	   are	   rarely	  
connected	   directly	   to	   the	   Internet.	   Because	   of	   this,	   the	   exploitation	   of	   SCADA	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networks	   typically	   occurs	   by	   pivoting	   through	   attached	   corporate	   networks.	  
[16][47]	  
In	  some	  cases	  an	  attacker	  may	  be	  able	  to	  exfiltrate	  sensitive	  data	  directly	  out	  to	  
the	   Internet;	   however,	   it	   is	   more	   probable	   that	   data	   exfiltration	   will	   occur	   by	  
pivoting	   connections	   back	   through	   a	   corporate	   intranet.	   [12]	   Once	   back	   in	   the	  
corporate	   LAN,	   an	   attacker	  may	   disguise	   outbound	   connections	   using	   a	   variety	   of	  
techniques,	  like:	  
§ Encrypting	  communication	  channels	  
§ Uploading	  data	  to	  cloud-­‐based	  storage	  sites	  
§ Using	  email	  attachments	  
§ Posting	  to	  public	  Internet	  accounts	  like	  Twitter,	  Gmail,	  Facebook,	  etc.	  
§ Hiding	  data	  in	  images	  and	  documents	  using	  steganography	  
§ Remotely	  backing	  data	  up	  to	  a	  server	  
	  
4.3.2 Detection	  of	  Specific	  APT	  Attack	  Scenarios	  
	  
After	   looking	   at	   the	   types	   of	   evasive	   techniques	   used	   during	   APT	   attacks	   (as	  
seen	  in	  previous	  sections),	  it	  appears	  as	  if	  detecting	  such	  sophisticated	  techniques	  is	  
beyond	   the	   realm	   of	   existing	   technologies.	   In	   a	   way	   this	   is	   true	   –	   most	   security	  
technologies	  are	  only	  capable	  of	  detecting	  a	  subset	  of	  all	  possible	  attacks.	  Stepping	  
back	  and	  seeing	  the	  big	  picture	  allows	  one	  to	  see	  that	  even	  the	  most	  sophisticated	  
APT	  attacks	  follow	  well-­‐known	  attack	  methodologies.	  	  
By	  breaking	  down	  the	  attack	  lifecycle	  –	  and	  identifying	  specific	  techniques	  used	  
in	   SCADA	   APT	   attacks	   –	   one	   can	   create	   strategies	   for	   detecting	   each	   phase	   of	  
exploitation.	  Taking	  all	  of	  this	  into	  account,	  the	  summation	  of	  these	  technologies	  and	  
detection	   strategies	   can	   provide	   detection	   in	   depth	   –	   a	   more	   robust	   and	   well-­‐
rounded	  approach	  to	  incident	  detection.	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4.3.2.1 Network	  and	  Device	  Enumeration	  Phase	  
	  
During	  the	  exploratory	  phases	  of	  every	  exploitation	  attempt,	  the	  attacker	  must	  
learn	  about	  the	  systems,	  networks,	  and	  environments	  that	  are	  being	  targeted.	  This	  is	  
referred	   to	   as	   the	   information	   gathering	   phase	   of	   an	   attack.	   Typically,	   this	  
information	   is	   not	   publically	   available:	   the	   attacker	   must	   poke	   and	   prod	   at	   the	  
network,	   slowly	   coercing	   valuable	   information	   out	   of	   hardware	   and	   software	  
systems.	  Without	  sufficient	  knowledge	  of	  the	  targeted	  network,	  an	  APT	  is	  –	  at	  best	  –	  
working	  in	  the	  dark.	  Looking	  at	  the	  average	  timeline	  of	  these	  attacks,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  
patience	  and	  persistence	  is	  the	  key	  to	  success.	  	  
An	  attacker	  can	  gather	  infrastructure	  information	  in	  many	  ways,	  including:	  
§ Social	  engineering	  staff	  
§ Collecting	  information	  through	  an	  insider	  attack	  
§ Actively	  scanning	  the	  network	  to	  enumerate	  devices	  
§ Identifying	  software	  versions	  by	  connect	  to,	  or	  using,	  control	  software	  
§ Passively	   listening	  to	  network	  connections	  and	  fingerprinting	  devices	  using	  
anomalies	  in	  their	  network	  stack	  implementation	  
These	   types	   of	   information	   gathering	   techniques	   can	   reveal	   a	   plethora	   of	  
information	  about	  the	  target	  network,	  including:	  
§ Hosts	  that	  are	  online	  
§ DNS	  names	  
§ Open	  ports	  and	  listening	  services	  
§ Operating	  system	  versions	  
§ Network	  layout	  and	  depth	  
§ Physical	  Distance	  of	  devices	  based	  on	  their	  latency	  
§ Likely	  use	  of	  each	  host	  
§ Location	  of	  network	  gateways	  and	  security	  appliances	  
§ Possible	  exploits	  based	  on	  network	  traffic	  seen	  (e.g.:	  SMB,	  SNMP,	  etc.)	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Defending	  against	  many	  of	  these	  attacks	  –	  insider	  and	  social	  engineering	  attacks	  
in	   particular	   –	   depends	   heavily	   on	   the	   development	   and	   enforcement	   of	   effective	  
security	   policies.	   However,	   network-­‐based	   security	   technologies	   are	   capable	   of	  
detecting	   all	   types	   of	   active	   reconnaissance	   scans	   being	   performed	   on	   a	   network.	  	  
This	  includes	  actively	  scanning	  the	  network	  for	  hosts	  and	  other	  devices,	  along	  with	  
enumerating	  software	  running	  on	  servers	  and	  hosts.	  These	  types	  of	  reconnaissance	  
scans	   tend	   to	  be	  extremely	  noisy	  and	  often	  rely	  on	  brute-­‐force	  scanning	   IP	  ranges	  
and	  ports	  to	  identify	  live	  hosts	  and	  services.	  To	  a	  certain	  extent,	  these	  types	  of	  scans	  
tend	   to	   get	   lost	   in	   the	   noise	   of	   a	   typical	   network,	   blending	   in	   with	   normal	  
connections.	  	  
Thanks	   to	   the	   static	   nature	   of	   SCADA	   networks,	   the	   detection	   of	   these	   scans	  
becomes	   quite	   trivial.	   By	   profiling	   typical	   network	   connections,	   we	   can	   create	   a	  
baseline	   of	   the	   network	   and	   easily	   detect	   anomalous	   connections.	   This	   type	   of	  
connection	   analysis	   is	   known	   as	   flow-­‐based	   intrusion	   detection.	   The	   brute-­‐force	  
nature	   of	   many	   network	   reconnaissance	   scans	   is	   statistically	   likely	   to	   create	   a	  
connection	   that	   falls	   outside	   of	   this	   baseline.	   Furthermore,	   the	   static	   nature	   of	  
SCADA	   significantly	   reduces	   both	   the	   false-­‐positive	   and	   false	   negative	   rate	   of	  
incident	   detection.	   By	   coupling	   SCADA-­‐specific	   flow-­‐based	   intrusion	   detection	  
systems	  with	   traditional	   IT	   security	   technologies	   capable	   of	   detecting	   information	  
gathering	  scans,	  we	  can	  provide	  a	  more	  robust	  solution	  for	  detecting	  this	  phase	  of	  an	  
attack.	  
	  
4.3.2.2 Leveraging	  Legitimate	  Credentials	  
	  
Extremely	   sophisticated	   and	   persistent	   APT	   attacks	   may	   not	   always	   rely	   on	  
traditional	   network	   reconnaissance	   scans	   to	   detect	   existing	   infrastructure	   and	  
software.	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  a	  patient	  and	  cunning	  attacker	  
could	  collect	  this	  information	  through	  an	  insider	  or	  social	  engineering	  attack.	  In	  this	  
case,	   one	   must	   make	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   attacker	   has	   an	   almost	   perfect	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knowledge	  of	  the	  system:	  which	  devices	  and	  software	  are	  deployed,	  how	  everyday	  
operations	   are	   being	   conducted,	  where	   security	   technologies	   are	   deployed	   on	   the	  
network,	   etc.	   This	   type	   of	   attacker	   would	   leverage	   legitimate	   credentials	   –	   either	  
their	   own,	   or	   another’s	   –	   to	   perform	   system	   actions	   by	   using	   legitimate	   control	  
system	  software,	  like	  an	  HMI.	  	  
Naturally,	   this	   type	   of	   attack	   is	   the	   most	   dangerous	   and	   difficult	   to	   detect.	  
Initially	   it	   may	   seem	   as	   if	   the	   collection	   of	   credentials	   by	   an	   attacker	   would	   be	  
difficult,	  but	   this	   is	  not	   the	  case.	  Legitimate	  network	  credentials	  could	  be	  collected	  
through:	  
§ Phishing	  users	  (externally	  or	  internally)	  
§ Passively	  or	  actively	  sniffing	  network	  connections	  
§ Socially	  engineering	  users	  
§ Leveraging	  insider	  access	  (use	  of	  their	  own	  credentials)	  
§ Brute	  forcing	  or	  guessing	  weak	  credentials	  
§ Using	  a	  software’s	  default	  credentials	  
Some	   of	   these	   attacks	   seem	   implausible;	   however,	   a	   large	   number	   of	   SCADA	  
deployments	  still	  use	  default	  credentials,	  exposing	  their	  networks	  needlessly	  to	  this	  
kind	  of	  attack.	  In	  some	  cases	  fear	  alone	  –	  often	  perpetuated	  by	  vendors	  –	  is	  enough	  
to	  dissuade	  network	  administrators	   from	  changing	  default	   software	  and	  hardware	  
credentials.	  [16][47]	  
The	  best	  way	  to	  detect	  an	  attacker	  abusing	  legitimate	  credentials	  is	  to	  look	  for	  
anomalous	  connections	  occurring	  between	  hosts	  on	  the	  network.	  Like	  the	  strategy	  
used	   when	   detecting	   the	   exploratory	   phase	   of	   an	   attack,	   one	   can	   profile	   typical	  
interactions	  between	  network	  software	  to	  detect	  when	  credentials	  are	  being	  used	  to	  
perform	   actions	   the	   control	   system	   does	   not	   often	   see.	   This	   type	   of	   statistical	  
analysis	  is	  capable	  of	  detecting	  both	  insider	  and	  APT	  attacks.	  	  
Furthermore,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   hijack	   malicious	   connections	   part	   of	   credential	  
reuse	  attacks	  to	  collect	  critical	  information	  about	  the	  attack	  and	  its	  targets.	  Hijacking	  
	  
74	  
suspicious	  connections	  and	  redirecting	  them	  to	  a	  honeypot	  can	  provide	  insight	  into	  
attacks.	   This	   will	   fool	   the	   attacker	   into	   thinking	   the	   action	   has	   been	   successful,	  
buying	   an	   administrator	   time	   to	   respond	   to	   an	   incident	   and	   allowing	  us	   to	   collect	  
forensic	  and	  insightful	  information	  about	  an	  attack.	  
	  
4.3.2.3 Device	  Impersonation	  Attacks	  
	  
A	  novel	   solution	   for	  detecting	  device	   impersonation	  attacks	   involves	  passively	  
monitoring	  devices	  over	  the	  network	  to	  generate	  unique	  signatures	  that	  can	  be	  used	  
to	  uniquely	  identify	  individual	  devices.	  Such	  signatures	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  baseline	  for	  
comparison	  when	  monitoring	  the	  network	  in	  the	  future.	  This	  approach	  to	  intrusion	  
detection	  appears	  to	  be	  both	  simple	  and	  effective	  in	  the	  long	  term;	  SCADA	  networks	  
tend	  to	  have	  a	  static	  number	  of	  devices	  that	  are	  rarely	  (if	  ever)	  upgraded.	  	  
An	  example	  of	  such	  an	  attack	  scenario	  is	  when	  an	  attacker	  gains	  physical	  access	  
to	   a	   SCADA	   network	   running	   the	   Modbus	   protocol.	   This	   could	   be	   done	   through	  
physical	   intrusion	   or	   via	   any	   number	   of	   network	   attacks.	   Once	   an	   attacker	   has	  
gained	  access	  to	  the	  SCADA	  network,	  he	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  inject,	  modify,	  or	  drop	  any	  
number	   of	   Modbus	   packets	   with	   relative	   ease.	   Modbus	   packets	   could	   then	   be	  




	  	  	  	   	  
Figure	  1:	  A	  Man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐Middle	  Attack	  Between	  a	  HMI	  and	  PLC	  
	  
Since	  most	  SCADA	  protocols	  do	  not	  provide	  mechanisms	  to	  verify	  the	  integrity	  
or	   authenticity	   of	   communication	   streams,	   communication	   forging	   is	   extremely	  
trivial.	  Because	  of	  this,	  an	  attacker	  could	  intercept	  communications	  between	  a	  HMI	  
and	   RTU	   to	   modify	   packet	   contents	   and	   force	   the	   remote	   device	   to	   perform	   an	  
undesired	  action.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  1.	  Because	  the	  attacker	  has	  intercepted	  
a	   valid	   communication	   stream	   (merely	   modifying	   the	   packet’s	   contents),	   the	  
communication	  stream	  received	  by	  the	  PLC	  looks	  perfectly	  valid.	  	  
Another	   type	   of	   attack	   involves	   a	   knowledgeable	   attacker	   gaining	   access	   to	   a	  
SCADA	  network	  and	   introducing	  a	   legitimate	  management	  or	   repeater	  device,	   like	  
an	  HMI	  or	  master	  terminal	  unit	  (MTU).	  The	  malicious	  device	  looks	  like	  a	  legitimate	  
addition	   to	   the	  network	  and	  would	  be	   impersonating	  a	  device	   identifier	  used	  by	  a	  
legitimate	  network	   component.	  By	   impersonating	   such	  an	   identifier,	   the	  malicious	  
device	   can	   interact	   with	   other	   SCADA	   devices	   without	   needing	   to	   resort	   to	   noisy	  
network-­‐level	   man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	   attacks.	   These	   types	   of	   attacks	   are	   difficult	   to	  
detect	  since	  the	  attacker	  is	  trying	  to	  impersonate	  a	  real	  working	  device.	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In	   the	   case	   where	   a	   new	   device	   is	   added	   to	   the	   network,	   whether	   it	   is	  
impersonating	   a	   real	   device	   identifier	   or	   not,	   one	   can	   use	   flow-­‐based	   intrusion	  
detection	   technologies	   to	   detect	   the	   device	   on	   the	   network.	  Much	   like	   in	   network	  
reconnaissance	   scans,	   the	   device	   will	   inevitably	   communicate	   outside	   of	   the	  
network	  baseline	  (likely	  by	  creating	  an	  IP	  conflict	  or	  introducing	  itself	  on	  a	  network	  
segment	  as	  a	  new	  device),	  making	  it	  detectable.	  	  
The	  same	  is	  true	  in	  regards	  to	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	  attacks:	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  
machine	   facilitating	   the	   attack	   would	   be	   enough	   alone	   to	   detect	   the	   attack.	   If	   an	  
exploited	  network	  device	  were	  used	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  an	  attack,	  it	  is	  very	  likely	  
the	   communications	   needed	   to	   facilitate	   a	   man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	   attack	   (e.g.:	   ARP	  
poisoning,	  DNS	  poisoning,	  etc.)	  would	  have	  not	  naturally	  occurred	  from	  that	  device	  
in	  the	  past.	  Finally,	  in	  many	  cases	  traditional	  intrusion	  detection	  systems	  are	  easily	  
capable	   of	   detecting	   such	   attacks	  with	   a	   high	   amount	   of	   certainty	   thanks	   to	   their	  
noisy	  nature.	  [3][93]	  By	  coupling	  traditional	  technologies	  with	  flow-­‐based	  intrusion	  
detection	  techniques,	  we	  can	  certainly	  increase	  the	  probability	  of	  detecting	  an	  attack.	  	  
If	  an	  attacker	  were	  to	  forge	  communications	  from	  a	  network	  device,	  likely	  using	  
an	   existing	   and	   exploited	   intermediary	   device,	   it	   would	   be	   significantly	   more	  
difficult	   to	   detect	   such	   connections.	   In	   a	   way,	   one	   can	   almost	   say	   that	   these	  
connections	  are	  perfect	  by	  nature:	  they	  may	  conform	  to	  a	  SCADA	  protocol	  perfectly,	  
contain	  legitimate	  protocol	  actions,	  and	  may	  even	  appear	  to	  come	  from	  a	  legitimate	  
device	   and	   IP	   address.	   Sometimes	   these	   connections	   may	   be	   detectable	   by	   flow-­‐
based	  intrusion	  detection	  systems	  (for	  example,	  if	  the	  source	  device	  doesn’t	  usually	  
communicate	  with	  the	  target);	  however,	  one	  must	  assume	  the	  attacker	  has	  perfect	  
knowledge	  to	  craft	  these	  connections	  properly.	  	  How	  could	  one	  detect	  a	  set	  of	  forged	  
packets	  perfectly	  conforming	  to	  normal	  communication	  patterns	  between	  devices?	  	  
	  Differences	   in	   network-­‐stack	   implementations	   on	   all	   network	   devices	   can	  
create	   OSI	   layer	   1,	   2,	   and	   3	   packet	   anomalies	   when	   forming	   packets	   and	   placing	  
them	   on	   the	  wire.	   Often,	   various	   protocol	   options	   (like	   TTL,	  MSS,	   IP	   v6	   Flow	   IDs,	  
etc.)	  are	  left	  up	  to	  the	  underlying	  operating	  system	  after	  the	  packet	  has	  been	  formed	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in	   software.	   In	   some	   cases,	   these	   options	   may	   never	   be	   user-­‐definable	   (i.e.:	  
Windows)	  and	  may	  provide	  some	  insight	  into	  the	  machine	  used	  to	  create	  a	  perfectly	  
forged	   connection.	   By	   taking	   these	   anomalies	   into	   account,	   we	   can	   create	  
fingerprints	  of	  network	  devices	  and	  their	  associated	  operating	  systems.	  	  
The	  following	  metrics	  can	  used	  to	  generate	  unique	  fingerprints	  for	  a	  device:	  
§ IP	  protocol	  version	  
§ Initial	  TTL	  value	  used	  by	  the	  operating	  system	  
§ Length	  of	  IPv4/IPv6	  options	  parameter	  
§ Maximum	  segment	  size	  
§ Window	  size	  
§ Window	  scaling	  factor	  
§ Explicit	  end-­‐of-­‐options	  parameter	  
§ TCP	  protocol	  options,	  like:	  
o No	  option	  	  
o Timestamp	  
o Selective	  ACK	  	  
o Window	  scaling	  
o Maximum	  segment	  size	  
o Unsupported	  option	  IDs	  
§ TCP	  and	  IP	  header	  vendor	  implementations,	  like:	  
o IPv6	  flow	  ID	  
o Don’t	  fragment	  bit	  
o IPID	  number	  
o Must-­‐be-­‐zero	  field	  
o Urgent	  pointer	  and	  flag	  
o PUSH	  flag	  
o Explicit	  congestion	  notification	  support	  
o Sequence	  number	  
o ACK	  number	  
o Window	  scaling	  factor	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o Payload	  size	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  popular	  pieces	  of	  network-­‐level	  fingerprinting	  software	  is	  called	  
p0f.	   [45][92]	   P0f	   is	   an	   open-­‐source,	   entirely	   passive	   network-­‐level	   fingerprinting	  
tool	  capable	  of	  generating	  complex,	  yet	  accurate,	  device	   fingerprints	  based	  on	  TCP	  
network	  stack	  implementation	  quirks.	  P0f	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  extremely	  fast	  and	  
scalable	   for	   network	   segments	   of	   all	   sizes.	   In	   addition	   it	   provides	   API	   access	   for	  
external	   programs	   to	   further	   streamline	   its	   integration	  with	   external	   applications.	  
When	   used	   in	   TCP/IP	   environments,	   p0f	   “fingerprints	   the	   client-­‐originating	   SYN	  
packet	  and	  the	  first	  SYN+ACK	  response	  from	  the	  server,	  paying	  attention	  to	  factors	  
such	  as	   the	  ordering	  of	  TCP	  options,	   the	   relation	  between	  maximum	  segment	   size	  
and	  window	  size,	  the	  progression	  of	  TCP	  timestamps,	  and	  the	  state	  of	  about	  a	  dozen	  
possible	  implementation	  quirks	  (e.g.	  non-­‐zero	  values	  in	  ‘must	  be	  zero’	  fields).”	  [92]	  
Furthermore,	   p0f	   is	   capable	   of	   using	   various	   protocol	   implementation	   quirks	   to	  
detect	   remote	   connection	   setups	   (like	   NAT,	   modems,	   connection	   types,	   etc.),	   the	  
approximate	  uptime	  of	   a	  device,	   its	  distance	  –	   in	  hops	  –	   in	   the	  network,	   and	  even	  
various	  firewall	   technologies	  on	  a	  network.	  This	  can	  all	  be	  done	  without	  sending	  a	  
single	  packet	  on	  the	  wire.	  	  
After	   the	   p0f	   analyzes	   a	   packet’s	   protocol-­‐level	   anomalies,	   a	   fingerprint	   is	  
created	  to	  identify	  the	  device.	  One	  example	  of	  a	  device	  fingerprint	  is	  as	  follows:	  	  	  
	  
*	  :	  64	  :	  0	  :	  *	  :	  mss*10,6	  :	  mss,sok,ts,nop,ws	  :	  df,id+	  :	  0	  
Figure	  2:	  An	  Example	  Device	  Fingerprint	  
	  
During	   the	   baseline	   analysis	   phased	   used	   by	   flow-­‐based	   intrusion	   detection	  
technologies,	   one	   can	   use	   these	   anomalies	   to	   create	   a	   set	   of	   fingerprints	   for	   all	  
network	   devices.	   By	   monitoring	   and	   collecting	   fingerprints	   for	   all	   network	  
communication	   streams,	   we	   can	   provide	   a	   mechanism	   for	   identifying	   changes	   in	  
	  
79	  
these	  protocol-­‐level	  quirks,	  allowing	  us	   to	  detect	  device	   forgery	  attempts.	  Because	  
network	   protocol	   options	   and	   implementations	   are	   vendor	   specific	   (both	   at	   the	  
hardware	   and	   software	   level),	   it	   is	   sometimes	   possible	   to	   detect	   perfectly	   forged	  
communications	  based	  on	  packet	  anomalies	  at	  layers	  1	  through	  3	  of	  the	  OSI	  model.	  
The	   specific	   techniques	   used	   to	   detect	   these	   attacks	   will	   be	   elaborated	   upon	   in	  
upcoming	  chapters.	  
	  
4.3.2.4 Zero-­‐Day	  Attacks	  
	  
Another	   threat	   to	   SCADA	   networks	   involves	   an	   attacker’s	   use	   of	   novel	   and	  
unknown	  exploits	  against	  network	  services	  and	  software.	  These	  types	  of	  newfangled	  
exploits	  are	  called	  zero-­‐day	  attacks.	  When	  preparing	  to	  defend	  SCADA	  networks,	  one	  
cannot	   simply	  assume	   that	   all	   attacks	  will	   be	  a	   subset	  or	  modification	  of	   a	  known	  
attack	   vector.	   An	   advanced,	   persistent,	   or	   well-­‐funded	   attacker	   could	   reasonably	  
identify	  network	  devices	  and	  software	  used	  throughout	  a	  SCADA	  network	  and	  could	  
develop	   a	   custom	   exploit	   targeting	   a	   specific	   piece	   of	   hardware	   or	   software.	  
Although	  this	  type	  of	  attack	  may	  seem	  implausible	  at	   first,	   the	  evidence	  speaks	  for	  
itself:	   the	  Stuxnet	  attack	  alone	   leveraged	  multiple	  zero-­‐day	  exploits	   to	  successfully	  
exploit	  the	  targeted	  control	  system.	  [22][31]	  
Even	  if	  an	  attacker	  was	  not	  capable	  of	  developing	  a	  custom	  zero-­‐day	  exploit,	  a	  
well-­‐funded	  attacker	  may	  opt	  to	  purchase	  such	  an	  exploit	  from	  criminal	  networks	  on	  
the	  Internet.	  Assuming	  the	  attacker	  has	  already	  completed	  the	  enumeration	  phase	  of	  
the	  attack,	  they	  would	  then	  be	  capable	  of	  executing	  a	  targeted,	  efficient,	  and	  effective	  
attack	  against	  specific	  systems	  with	  little	  to	  no	  network	  noise.	  	  
Because	   of	   the	   unique	   nature	   of	   such	   attacks,	   traditional	   intrusion	   detection	  
controls	  would	  be	  incapable	  of	  detecting	  the	  attempted	  or	  successful	  exploitation	  of	  
targeted	  devices.	  In	  some	  cases,	  post-­‐exploitation	  payloads	  could	  be	  detected	  by	  IDS	  
technologies;	   however,	   it	   is	   reasonable	   to	   assume	   an	   APT	   would	   be	   more	   than	  
	  
80	  
capable	   of	   evading	   post-­‐exploitation	   detection	   through	   the	   use	   of	   encryption	   or	  
other	  technologies	  capable	  of	  obscuring	  exploit	  payloads.	  
It	   is	   still	   possible	   to	   detect	   these	   types	   of	   attacks	   by	   leveraging	   flow-­‐based	  
intrusion	   detection	   systems.	   Like	   many	   other	   types	   of	   network	   attacks,	   zero-­‐day	  
exploits	  still	  require	  a	  connection	  between	  hosts	  on	  the	  network.	  Likely,	  an	  attacker	  
using	  a	  zero-­‐day	  exploit	  would	  be	  attempting	   to	  pivot	   through	   the	  control	   system,	  
slowing	  working	  their	  way	  towards	  the	  intended	  target.	  If	  the	  connection	  containing	  
the	  exploit	  were	  to	   fall	  outside	  the	  baseline	  created	  for	  the	  monitored	  network	  (in	  
the	   case	   of	   flow-­‐based	   IDS),	   we	   could	   detect	   the	   attack	   regardless	   of	   the	   exploit	  
being	  used.	  	  
In	  a	  worst-­‐case	  scenario,	  one	  must	  assume	  the	  attacker	  has	  perfect	  knowledge	  
of	  both	  the	  system	  and	  the	  security	  technologies	  being	  used	  to	  detect	  attacks.	  In	  this	  
case,	  an	  attacker	  would	  need	  to	  ensure	  all	  exploitation	  attempts	  conform	  to	  typical	  
network	  connection	  baselines.	  This	  would	  significantly	  hamper	  their	  ability	  to	  pivot	  
through	  the	  network	  without	  raising	  alarms.	  	  
	  
4.3.2.5 Targeted	  Malware	  
	  
More	   in-­‐depth	   and	   stealthy	   APT	   attacks	   may	   rely	   on	   the	   creation	   and	  
propagation	   of	   customized	   malware	   targeting	   a	   specific	   control	   system.	   From	   an	  
attacker’s	  perspective,	  there	  are	  many	  merits	  to	  this	  attack	  vector:	  the	  malware	  can	  
be	   developed	   offsite	  without	   raising	   alarms	   pre-­‐attack,	   the	   designer	   can	   integrate	  
and	   automated	   various	   exploits	   to	   improve	   the	   probability	   of	   success,	   and	   the	  
attacker	   can	   eliminate	   his	   presence	   on	   the	   network	   to	   reduce	   the	   probability	   of	  
being	  caught.	  From	  a	  risk	  vs.	  reward	  perspective,	  this	  type	  of	  attack	  makes	  the	  most	  




In	  a	  way,	  customized	  malware	  follows	  the	  same	  patterns	  during	  an	  attack,	  albeit	  
a	  nosier	  version.	  The	  malware	  still	  needs	  to	  scan	  the	  network	  for	  target	  hosts	  before	  
launching	  an	  attack	  against	  a	  specific	  device	  or	  service.	  This	  initial	  scanning	  creates	  
significant	  noise	  on	  a	  SCADA	  network	  (due	  to	  its	  static	  nature)	  and	  is	  detectable	  by	  
flow-­‐based	   intrusion	   detection	   systems.	   Furthermore,	   the	   exploits	   used	   by	   the	  
malware	   to	   propagate	   (whether	   known	   or	   novel)	   require	   the	   malware	   to	   create	  
payloads	   that	   reach	   the	   target.	   Naturally	   the	   spray-­‐and-­‐pray	   method	   of	   viral	  
propagation	   would	   inevitably	   create	   an	   anomalous	   communication	   stream	  within	  
the	  monitored	  network.	  	  
In	  more	   simple	   cases,	   it	   is	   fair	   to	   assume	   that	  both	   traditional	   and	  variants	  of	  
known	  malware	  could	  be	  easily	  detected	  and	  removed	  using	  traditional	  network	  or	  
host-­‐based	   anti-­‐malware	   technologies;	   however,	   customized	   malware	   is	   often	  
capable	  of	  avoiding	  detection	  by	  even	  the	  most	  advanced	  antivirus	  and	  antimalware	  
software.	  To	  adequately	  protect	  critical	  control	  networks	  against	  targeted	  malware	  
attacks,	   we	   must	   assume	   the	   attacker	   has	   sufficient	   knowledge	   or	   resources	   to	  
create	  a	  piece	  of	  malware	  capable	  of	  evading	  antimalware	  technologies.	  	  
The	  effective	  detection	  of	  such	  attacks	  can	  only	  occur	  when	  coupling	  traditional	  
anti-­‐malware	   technologies	   with	   flow-­‐based	   intrusion	   detection	   systems.	   This	  
detection	   in	   depth	   approach	   to	  malware	   detection	  would	   significantly	   reduce	   the	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4.3.2.6 Exfiltration	  of	  Data	  via	  Covert	  Channels	  
	  
Lastly,	   in	  some	  cases	   internal	  SCADA	   information	  may	  be	  significant	  enough	   to	  
justify	   its	   exfiltration.	   Unlike	   traditional	   IT	   networks,	   SCADA	   networks	   are	   rarely	  
connected	   directly	   to	   the	   Internet.	   Because	   of	   this,	   the	   exploitation	   of	   SCADA	  
networks	   typically	   occurs	   by	   pivoting	   through	   attached	   corporate	   networks.	  
[12][16]	   Thanks	   to	   the	   isolated	   nature	   of	   SCADA	   networks,	   the	   detection	   of	   data	  
exfiltration	   attempts	   can	   be	   fairly	   simple.	   Ideally,	   communication	   streams	   leaving	  
and	   entering	   the	   network	   should	   be	   highly	   controlled.	   Very	   few	   legitimate	  
communications	  need	  to	  leave	  a	  SCADA	  network.	  Some	  examples	  of	  legitimate	  data	  
streams	  could	  be:	  
§ Pushing	  logs	  or	  historical	  data	  to	  offsite	  mirror	  servers	  
§ Sending	  relevant	  information	  to	  corporate	  business	  logic	  servers	  
§ Sending	  alerts	  to	  security	  staff	  
These	  types	  of	  communications	  are	  highly	  predictable	  by	  nature.	  Because	  of	  this,	  
controlling	   them	  would	  also	  be	  simple	   through	  the	  proper	  deployment	  of	  network	  
perimeter	   firewalls.	   If	   SCADA	   security	   deployments	   tightly	   restricted	  
communication	  channels	  leaving	  the	  network	  (e.g.:	  deny	  all,	  with	  limited	  exceptions),	  
data	  exfiltration	  would	  be	  extremely	  difficult	  for	  an	  attacker.	  
Furthermore,	   the	   detection	   of	   attacks	   that	   successfully	   bypass	   perimeter	  
controls	  is	  possible	  through	  the	  use	  of	  flow-­‐based	  intrusion	  detection	  systems.	  Like	  
our	   methods	   for	   detecting	   other	   types	   of	   attacks,	   flow-­‐based	   IDS	   is	   capable	   of	  
detecting	  anomalous	  connections	  anywhere	  in	  the	  network.	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4.3.2.7 Summary	  of	  APT	  Detection	  Technologies	  
	  
The	   following	   tables	   summarizes	   the	  methods	   an	   APT	   attacker	   uses	   to	   avoid	  
detection,	  and	  indicates	  which	  proposed	  mitigation	  technologies	  are	  most	  effective	  
for	  detecting	  the	  appropriate	  type	  of	  attack.	  [3][8][16][24][30][47][93]	  
	  














No	   Yes	   No	   Yes	  
Device	  
Impersonation	  
No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	  
Zero-­‐day	  
Exploits	  
No	   Yes	   No	   Yes	  
Targeted	  
Malware	  
No	   Yes	   No	   Yes	  
Data	  Exfiltration	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   No	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  APT	  Attack	  Vectors	  vs.	  Detection	  Technologies	  
	  
As	  one	  can	  see,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  detect	  the	  use	  of	  each	  technique	  using	  multiple	  
approaches	   to	   intrusion	   detection.	   By	   not	   relying	   on	   a	   single	   technology	   for	  
intrusion	  detection,	  one	  can	  increase	  the	  probability	  of	  successful	  incident	  detection	  
while	  reducing	  the	  rate	  of	  false-­‐negatives.	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Chapter	  5.	  	  Detection	  in	  Depth	  Algorithm	  and	  Architecture	  
	  
Given	   the	   reliance	   on,	   and	   the	   importance	   of,	   SCADA	   infrastructure,	   the	  
identification	   and	   mitigation	   of	   APT	   threats	   should	   be	   considered	   paramount.	  
Current	  security	  solutions	  aiming	  to	  mitigate	  both	  traditional	  and	  APT-­‐style	  attacks	  
put	  a	  heavy	  emphasis	  on	  the	  detection	  and	  management	  of	  a	  small	  subset	  of	  possible	  
attack	  vectors.	  This	  limited	  focus	  does	  help	  increase	  overall	  security	  in	  specific	  areas	  
of	   a	   SCADA	   network;	   however,	   it	   does	   not	   provide	   robust	   and	   effective	   security	  
controls	  comparable	  to	  those	  deployed	  in	  non-­‐SCADA	  networks.	  	  
Over	   time	   the	   lack	   of	   effective	   and	  well-­‐rounded	   security	   controls	   for	   SCADA	  
networks	   has	   created	   an	   ever-­‐increasing	   need	   for	   a	   security	   solution	   capable	   of	  
providing	   impactful	   and	   reliable	   security	   event	   detection	   and	   mitigation.	   This	  
chapter	  presents	  a	  novel	  solution	  that	  delivers	  a	  SCADA-­‐specific	  detection	  in	  depth	  
algorithm	   capable	   of	   countering	   SCADA-­‐specific	   advanced	   persistent	   threats.	   By	  
integrating	   multiple	   algorithmic	   approaches	   to	   security	   event	   detection,	   one	   can	  
create	   a	   security	   solution	   capable	   of	  managing	   a	   plethora	   of	   attack	   vectors	   while	  
providing	  simplicity	  and	  consolidation	  during	  deployment.	  
	  
5.1 Requirements	  for	  Countering	  SCADA	  APTs	  
	  	  
One	  must	   strictly	   outline	   both	   the	   design	   goals	   and	  detection	   capabilities	   of	   a	  
SCADA-­‐centric	  security	  solution	  to	  ensure	  any	  proposed	  algorithm	  can	  provide	  both	  
detection	   in	   depth	   and	   effective	   incident	   detection	  while	   not	   negatively	   impacting	  
network	  performance.	  	  
Fulfilling	  these	  requirements	  requires	  the	  development	  of	  a	  solution	  and	  security	  
event	  detection	  algorithm	  that	  is:	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1. Capable	  of	  detecting	  and	  alerting	  on	  various	  types	  of	  attacks,	  ranging	  from	  
network	  enumeration	  to	  advanced	  device	  exploitation	  	  
2. Integrating	  the	  best	  parts	  of	  various	  technologies	  to	  create	  a	  well-­‐rounded	  
intrusion	  detection	  framework	  
3. Capable	  of	  intercepting	  data	  streams	  and	  collecting	  forensic	  information	  to	  
assist	  investigations	  
4. Efficient	  while	  not	  significantly	  increasing	  network	  latency	  
	  
Only	   when	   these	   criteria	   are	   fulfilled,	   can	   one	   truly	   provide	   a	   detection	   in	   depth	  
security	   solution	   suitable	   for	   most	   sensitive	   SCADA	   networks.	   In	   the	   following	  
subsections	  I	  will	  go	  over	  these	  functional	  requirements	  in	  detail.	  	  
	  
5.1.1 Providing	  APT	  Incident	  Detection	  
	  
From	  an	  attack	  detection	  standpoint,	  an	  ideal	  security	  event	  detection	  solution	  
should	  be	  contained	  within	  a	  single	  entity	  capable	  of	  detecting	  and	  handling	  various	  
types	   of	   standard	   and	   advanced	   SCADA	   attack	   vectors.	   This	   solution	   must	   be	  
designed	  specifically	  for	  SCADA	  environments	  to	  increase	  its	  overall	  effectiveness,	  as	  
traditional	   security	   event	   detection	   algorithms	   often	   fail	   in	   SCADA	   environments	  
(see	  4.3.2	  for	  more	  details).	  	  
Furthermore,	   a	   viable	   security	   solution	   should	   provide	   a	   high	   level	   of	  
effectiveness	   not	   through	   a	   single	   technology,	   but	   by	   leveraging	   many	   incident	  
detection	   strategies	   to	   provide	   detection	   in	   depth.	   If	   implemented	   properly,	   the	  





5.1.1.1	  Network	  and	  Device	  Enumeration	  Phase	  
	  
The	   beginning	   of	   every	   network	   intrusion	   attempt	   starts	   with	   network	   and	  
device	   enumeration.	   Often	   the	   attacker	   will	   poke	   and	   prod	   the	   network	   using	  
various	  tools	  and	  strategies	  to	  gather	  a	  well-­‐rounded	  understanding	  of	  the	  network	  
infrastructure	   and	   security	   devices.	   These	   types	   of	   enumeration	   scans	   are	   usually	  
quite	  noisy	  and	  easy	  to	  detect.	  
The	   proposed	   inline	   security	   event	   detection	   solution	   should	   be	   capable	   of	  
detecting	  all	  kinds	  of	  network	  enumeration	  attacks,	  including	  but	  not	  limited	  to:	  
§ Ping	  scans	  
§ Port	  scans	  
§ Vulnerability	  scans	  
§ Router	  and	  network	  enumeration	  scans	  
§ Anomalous	  network	  connections	  
By	   placing	   a	   heavy	   emphasis	   on	   detecting	   these	   preliminary	   scans,	   one	   can	  
provide	   an	   early	  warning	   system	   for	   administrators,	   allowing	   them	   to	   investigate	  
the	  source	  of	  exploitation	  early	  in	  the	  attack	  lifecycle.	  
	  
5.1.1.2 	  Device	  Impersonation	  Attacks	  
	  
One	  must	   not	   solely	   rely	   on	   enumeration	   phase	   detection	   to	   provide	   an	   early	  
warning	  system	  in	  SCADA	  networks.	  Rather,	  one	  must	  make	  the	  assumption	  that	  all	  
attackers	   are	   capable	   of	   detecting	   network	   infrastructure	   devices	   or	   security	  
appliances	  while	  staying	  concealed	  –	  likely	  via	  passive	  network	  monitoring	  or	  social	  
engineering	  attacks.	  	  
At	   this	   point	   one	   must	   focus	   on	   detecting	   specific	   types	   of	   attacks	   while	  
assuming	   the	   attacker	   has	   perfect	   knowledge	   of	   the	   system	   being	   monitored.	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Specifically,	   the	   ideal	   security	   event	   detection	   algorithm	   should	   be	   capable	   of	  
identifying	   APTs	   impersonating	   legitimate	   network	   devices	   or	   intercepting	   and	  
modifying	  packets	  in	  transit.	  	  
In	   the	   case	  of	   a	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	   attack,	   a	   viable	   security	   solution	   should	  be	  
capable	   of	   detecting	   network	   packet	   interception	   attacks	   through	   the	   use	   of	  
signature-­‐based	  or	  flow-­‐based	  IDS	  algorithms.	  As	  mentioned	  in	  section	  3.5.4,	  these	  
types	   of	   intrusion	   detection	   systems	   are	   capable	   of	   detecting	   most	   man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐
middle	  attacks	  with	  a	  high	  level	  of	  accuracy.	  	  
More	  importantly,	  in	  non-­‐man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	  attacks,	  an	  attacker	  may	  attempt	  to	  
inject	  packets	  into	  the	  SCADA	  network	  with	  the	  hopes	  of	  perfectly	  impersonating	  an	  
existing	   and	   legitimate	   SCADA	   device.	   A	   viable	   security	   event	   detection	   solution	  
should	   be	   capable	   of	   detecting	   such	   attacks	   even	   if	   application-­‐layer	   payloads	   are	  
perfectly	   impersonating	   legitimate	   communication	   streams.	   Detecting	   such	  
advanced	  attacks	  can	  be	  done	  using	  both	  network	  stack	   fingerprint	   techniques	  (as	  
outlined	  in	  upcoming	  sections)	  and	  flow-­‐based	  intrusion	  detection	  systems.	  
Combined	   together,	   these	   detection	   strategies	   should	   enable	   the	   detection	   of	  
packet	  impersonation,	  modification,	  and	  replay	  attacks,	  denial	  of	  service	  conditions,	  
man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	  attacks,	  and	  active	  sniffing	  attempts	  
	  
5.1.1.3 	  Illegitimate	  Credential	  Use	  
	  
Continuing	   to	   assume	   the	   worst-­‐case	   scenario,	   there	   may	   be	   times	   that	   an	  
attacker	  has	  such	  perfect	  knowledge	  of	   the	  SCADA	  system	  that	   they	  are	  capable	  of	  
collecting	  and	  using	  legitimate	  network	  device	  credentials.	  This	   is	  particularly	  true	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  social	  engineering	  attacks.	  	  
Although	  it	  is	  almost	  impossible	  to	  detect	  when	  legitimate	  credentials	  are	  being	  
abused,	   one	   can	   still	   look	   for	   anomalous	   use	   of	   credentials	   to	   aid	   in	   exposing	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potential	   attacks.	   This	   has	   the	   benefit	   of	   detecting	   both	   APT	   attacks	   and	   insider	  
attacks	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Detection	  of	  such	  attacks	  can	  be	  done	  using	  SCADA-­‐specific	  
flow-­‐based	  intrusion	  detection	  techniques.	  
	  
5.1.1.4 	  Zero-­‐Day	  Exploitation	  
	  
In	  cases	  where	  a	  persistent	  attacker	  has	  managed	   to	  subvert	   security	  controls	  
capable	  of	  detecting	  network	  enumeration	  scans,	  one	  must	  be	  able	  to	  detect	  highly	  
targeted	   –	   yet	   novel	   –	   security	   exploitation	   attempts	   against	   remote	   devices.	   To	  
detect	   such	   an	   attack,	   one	   must	   combine	   traditional	   IDS	   mechanisms	   (like	  
traditional	   signature-­‐based	   IDS)	   with	   SCADA-­‐specific	   security	   technologies.	   By	  
utilizing	   a	   flow-­‐based	   network	   baseline,	   we	   can	   potentially	   catch	   zero-­‐day	  
exploitation	  attempts	  falling	  outside	  of	  typical	  network	  communication	  boundaries.	  	  
For	  example,	  an	  attacker	  may	  attempt	  to	  mass-­‐exploit	  a	  set	  of	  PLC	  devices	  using	  
a	  previously	  unknown	  exploit.	  By	  initiating	  a	  parallelized	  attack	  of	  this	  nature,	   it	   is	  
probable	   that	   an	   attacker	  will	   initiate	   a	   connection	   from	  an	   infected	  machine	   that	  
would	   not	   typically	   communication	   with	   a	   specific	   targeted	   device.	   Although	   this	  
does	   not	   indicate	   a	   zero-­‐day	   attack	   specifically,	   it	   would	   allow	   us	   to	   detect	   a	  
potential	   attack	   and	   collect	   relevant	   forensic	   information	   for	   a	   thorough	  
investigation.	  
	  
5.1.1.5 	  Covert	  Channel	  Detection	  
	  
It	  is	  possible	  that	  a	  skilled	  and	  motivated	  attacker	  may	  be	  capable	  of	  subverting	  
even	  the	  best	  security	  event	  detection	  algorithms.	  In	  this	  case,	  it	  may	  still	  be	  possible	  




Some	   attack	   scenarios	   may	   involve	   the	   eventual	   extraction	   of	   confidential	  
information	  from	  the	  target	  network.	  Many	  techniques	  exist	  to	  exfiltrate	  data	  from	  
exploited	   networks	   without	   raising	   any	   alarms;	   however,	   they	   still	   require	   an	  
attacker	  to	  initiate	  an	  outbound	  connection	  to	  an	  external	  server	  capable	  of	  storing	  
extracted	  data	  –	  this	  type	  of	  service	  would	  likely	  exist	  either	  on	  the	  Internet	  or	  on	  an	  
exploited	   computer	   within	   the	   corporate	   Intranet.	   In	   either	   case,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  
detect	  data	  exfiltration	  attempts	  by	  comparing	  outbound	  connections	  with	  a	  known	  
flow-­‐based	  network	  baseline.	  	  
Although	   detecting	   such	   an	   event	   would	   indicate	   an	   attack	   was	   almost	  
completed,	  it	  could	  provide	  significant	  forensic	  information	  to	  aid	  in	  an	  investigation.	  
Furthermore,	   the	   detection	   of	   a	   data	   exfiltration	   attempt	   could	   give	   us	   the	  
opportunity	  to	  hijack	  such	  a	  connection	  to	  collect	  additional	   information	  about	  the	  
attack	  and	  attacker.	  
	  
5.1.2 Intercepting	  Malicious	  Connections	  and	  Collecting	  Forensic	  Data	  
	  
Some	   might	   argue	   that	   the	   detection	   of	   events	   alone	   is	   not	   sufficient	   for	   a	  
security	   algorithm	   providing	   detection	   in	   depth.	   To	   collect	   the	   highest	   amount	   of	  
relevant	   attack	   data,	   the	   proposed	   solution	  must	   also	   be	   capable	   of	   hijacking	   and	  
monitoring	  connections	  that	  have	  a	  high	  probability	  of	  being	  malicious.	  This	  type	  of	  
connection	   hijacking	   should	   be	   transparent	   to	   the	   attacker,	   while	   enabling	   the	  
collection	  of	  relevant	  forensic	  information	  about	  an	  attack.	  Special	  attention	  should	  
be	   paid	   to	   exploratory	   network	   connections	   (i.e.:	   port	   scans):	   these	   connections	  
should	   not	   be	   blatantly	   hijacked	   or	   dropped,	   as	   to	   reduce	   the	   probability	   of	   an	  
attacker	   detecting	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   security	   appliance.	   Rather,	   exploratory	  
connections	  should	  be	  handled	  strategically	  by	  mimicking	  the	  expected	  behaviour	  of	  
the	  underlying	  network.	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  Intercepted	   connections	   should	   be	   sent	   to	   a	   just-­‐in-­‐time	   honeypot	   that	   is	  
capable	   of	   emulating	   a	   variety	   of	   known	   and	   unknown	   network	   services.	   By	  
intercepting	  malicious	  communications,	  we	  can	  learn	  about	  the	  techniques	  used	  by	  
the	  attacker	  and	  also	  collect	  extensive	  attack	  information	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  targeted	  or	  
automated	  attack.	  	  
	  
5.1.3 Solution	  Efficiency	  
	  
As	  mentioned	   previously,	   low	   latency	   in	   a	   SCADA	   environment	   is	   paramount.	  
Traditional	   IT	   security	   appliances	   deployed	   inline	   on	   a	   network	   may	   introduce	  
additional	   latency,	   causing	   connections	   to	   drop	   or	   SCADA	   information	   to	   become	  
stale.	  Any	  type	  of	  deployed	  algorithm	  should	  ensure	  that	  processing	  overhead	  does	  
not	   introduce	   any	   network	   latency	   or	   reduce	   link	   throughput	   rates,	   except	   in	   the	  
case	  of	  a	  fully	  hijacked	  connection.	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5.2 Architectural	  Overview	  
	  
Now	   that	   all	   algorithmic	   and	   architectural	   requirements	   have	   been	   strictly	  
defined,	   I	   can	   provide	   some	   relevant	   insight	   into	   the	   proposed	   SCADA-­‐specific	  
detection	   in	   depth	   algorithm	   and	   underlying	   architecture.	   Furthermore,	   one	   can	  
show	  how	  the	  proper	  design	  and	  implementation	  of	  such	  a	  solution	  can	  provide	  the	  
desired	  detection	   in	  depth	   functionality	  while	   conforming	   to	   the	   requirements	   set	  
out	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  
From	  a	  logical	  operations	  perspective,	  the	  proposed	  security	  solution	  consists	  of	  
a	   series	   of	   components	   working	   together	   to	   provide	   incident	   detection	   and	  
mitigation.	  	  
	  




Assuming	  the	  solution	  is	  implemented	  as	  a	  physical	  appliance	  that	  can	  be	  placed	  
inline	   on	   a	   network	   segment,	   the	   security	   event	   detection	   algorithm	   software	   is	  
capable	   of	   intercepting,	   sorting,	   analyzing,	   and	   redirecting	   all	   traffic	   flowing	  
between	   two	   points	   on	   the	   network.	   This	   is	   done	   using	   the	   following	   internal	  
components	  of	  the	  architecture:	  
1. Network	  Bridge:	  Used	  to	  tap	  the	  network	  segment	  and	  intercept	  traffic	  
2. ebtables:	  A	  userspace	  application	  used	  to	  control	  the	  Linux	  Kernel	  firewall	  
at	  OSI	  layer	  2	  
3. iptables:	  A	  userspace	  application	  used	  to	  control	  the	  Linux	  Kernel	  firewall	  
at	  OSI	  layers	  3-­‐7	  
4. NFQUEUE:	   A	   userspace	   packet	   queue	   allowing	   user-­‐defined	   programs	   to	  
analyze	  and	  accept/drop	  incoming	  packets	  
5. Analysis	   Engine:	   A	   custom	   application	   facilitating	   the	   analysis	   and	  
classification	   of	   network	   packet	   flows	   via	   a	   custom	   security	   event	  
detection	  algorithm	  
6. Honeypot:	   A	   just-­‐in-­‐time	   (JIT)	   honeypot	   application	   capable	   of	  
dynamically	  handing	  and	  analyzing	  malicious	  connections	  
7. Connection	   Monitor:	   A	   passive	   network	   sniffer	   used	   to	   collect	   forensic	  
information	  about	  suspicious	  connections	  
8. Snort	  IDS:	  A	  lightweight	  network	  intrusion	  detection	  system	  
The	   complete	   architecture	   of	   the	   security	   solution,	   including	   the	   internal	  
components	   facilitating	   traffic	   interception	   and	   analysis	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   Figure	   4.	  	  
These	   internal	   components	   work	   together	   to	   provide	   the	  main	   functionalities	   for	  
detecting	   security	   events.	   The	   system’s	   main	   functionalities	   include:	   intercepting	  
networking	   packets,	   analyzing	   packets	   contents	   and	   context,	   handling	   clean,	  
malicious	   and	   suspicious	   connections	   and	   sending	   alerts	   to	   an	   external	   security	  
event	  manager.	  Each	  of	   these	   functional	  components	   is	  described	  below,	  while	   the	  
security	  event	  detection	  algorithm	  is	  presented	  in	  section	  5.3.	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5.2.1 Intercepting	  Network	  Packets	  
	  
The	  first	  step	  for	  all	  security	  solutions	  or	  network	  monitoring	  applications	  is	  to	  
actually	   intercept	   network	   traffic.	   This	   can	   be	   done	   in	   one	   of	   two	   ways:	   using	   a	  
passive	  –	  and	  thus,	  non-­‐invasive	  -­‐	  network	  tap	  device	  (either	  physical	  or	  logical),	  or	  
by	   creating	   a	   man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	   condition	   between	   two	   network	   devices.	   In	   our	  
case,	   the	   man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	   approach	   works	   effectively	   considering	   the	   security	  
appliance	   is	   already	   deployed	   inline	   on	   a	   network	   segment.	   Furthermore,	   this	  
approach	  allows	  us	  to	  modify	  and	  hijack	  packets	  transparently	  and	  on	  the	  fly.	  
Once	   packets	   have	   been	   intercepted	   for	   analysis,	   the	   proposed	   userspace	  
security	   event	   detection	   algorithm	   is	   capable	   of	   reading	   the	   raw	   packets	   from	   a	  
queue,	  analyzing	  them	  for	  security	  threats,	  and	  deciding	  what	  should	  be	  done	  with	  
each	  packet.	  If	  the	  packet	  is	  deemed	  malicious,	  the	  security	  engine	  may	  forward	  the	  
packet	  to	  the	  just-­‐in-­‐time-­‐honeypot.	  Otherwise,	  the	  packet	  may	  be	  marked	  as	  clean	  
or	  suspicious	  and	  will	  be	  re-­‐introduced	  into	  the	  network.	  
	  
5.2.2 Analyzing	  Packet	  Contents	  and	  Context	  
	  
Once	  traffic	  is	  successfully	  intercepted,	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  is	  performed	  on	  every	  
packet.	   This	   is	   the	   core	   aspect	   of	   my	   security	   event	   detection	   algorithm	   seen	   in	  
section	  5.3.	  
Taking	  queued	  packets	   as	   input,	  my	  algorithm	   first	   separates	   each	  part	   of	   the	  
packet,	  isolating	  the	  IP	  and	  Transport	  layers	  to	  ease	  analysis.	  Next,	  the	  entire	  packet	  
is	   fingerprinted	   (discussed	   in	  detail	   in	   section	  0)	  and	  associated	  data	   is	   stored	   for	  
later	  use.	  	  
After	   the	   packet	   has	   been	   fingerprinted,	   the	   flow-­‐based	   intrusion	   detection	  
portion	  of	  my	  security	  event	  detection	  algorithm	  comes	  into	  play.	  The	  methodology	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used	  for	  malicious	  packet	  detection	  during	  this	  phase	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  detail	   in	  
section	  5.3.2.	  The	  packet	  is	  then	  passed	  through	  a	  series	  of	  security	  checks	  to	  classify	  
the	  packet	  as	  clean,	  malicious,	  or	  suspicious.	  Once	  the	  packet	  has	  been	  classified,	  the	  
result	  is	  logged	  and	  the	  appliance	  prepares	  to	  handle	  the	  packet	  accordingly.	  
	  
5.2.3 Handling	  Clean	  Connections	  
	  
If	   the	   security	   algorithm	   has	   deemed	   the	   packet	   clean	   and	   non-­‐malicious,	   the	  
packet	  is	  passed	  back	  to	  the	  underlying	  system	  for	  normal	  processing.	  This	  results	  in	  
the	   packet	   being	   sent	   back	   to	   the	   network	   tap	   interface	   and	   out	   through	   the	  
corresponding	   physical	   network	   card	   device,	   eventually	   reaching	   its	   original	  
destination.	  
	  
5.2.4 Handling	  Malicious	  Connections	  
	  
In	  contrast,	  if	  the	  security	  analysis	  process	  has	  marked	  the	  packet	  as	  malicious,	  
it	  must	  prepare	  to	  send	  the	  packet	  (and	  upcoming	  packets	  part	  of	  the	  connection)	  to	  
the	  just-­‐in-­‐time	  honeypot	  software.	  This	  is	  done	  by	  forwarding	  the	  packet	  to	  a	  queue,	  
thus	  passing	  the	  packet	  entirely	  to	  the	  honeypot	  software	  for	  handling.	  
Naturally,	   we	   must	   also	   handle	   upcoming	   packets	   that	   are	   part	   of	   the	   same	  
network	   stream.	   To	   handle	   this	   issue,	   the	   security	   appliance	   injects	   a	   custom	  
firewall	   rule,	   sending	  all	  new	  packets	  part	  of	   this	  network	  stream	  to	   the	  honeypot	  
queue	  before	  being	  routed.	  By	  injecting	  this	  new	  rule,	  we	  can	  ensure	  all	  new	  packets	  
that	   are	   part	   of	   the	   same	  network	   stream	   are	   also	   redirected	   to	   the	   honeypot	   for	  
handling.	  Details	  about	   the	  honeypot’s	  software,	   its	  merits,	  and	  capabilities	  will	  be	  
discussed	  in	  upcoming	  sections.	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Lastly,	   because	   all	   network	   streams	   eventually	   terminate	   or	   expire,	   we	   must	  
track	   the	   connection	   to	   ensure	   we	   can	   remove	   the	   injected	   firewall	   rules	   once	  
they’re	   no	   longer	   needed.	   This	   is	   done	   by	   sending	   a	   track	   request	   to	   the	   security	  
appliance’s	  database	  and	  requesting	  the	  Connection	  Monitor	  component	  to	  enforce	  
the	   injected	   rule	   until	   the	   stream’s	   session	   expires.	  Detailed	   technical	   information	  
about	   the	   internal	   Connection	  Monitor	   software	   and	   just-­‐in-­‐time	  honeypot	  will	   be	  
provided	  in	  later	  sections.	  
	  
5.2.5 Handling	  Suspicious	  Connections	  
	  
Finally,	  there	  may	  be	  conditions	  that	  cause	  a	  packet	  to	  be	  marked	  as	  suspicious	  
instead	  of	   clean	  or	  malicious.	   This	  may	  occur,	   for	   example,	   if	   a	   connection	  passed	  
most	   security	   checks	   but	   failed	   others.	   Because	   of	   the	   sensitive	   nature	   of	   SCADA	  
networks,	   we	  must	   not	   hijack	   or	   otherwise	   impede	   such	   connections.	   Rather,	   the	  
connection	   should	   be	   allowed	   to	   traverse	   the	   network	   link	   while	   enabling	   us	   to	  
collect	  relevant	  forensic	  information	  about	  a	  possible	  attack.	  
Like	   the	  method	  used	   to	  hijack	  malicious	   connections,	  we	  are	   able	   to	  monitor	  
suspicious	   network	   connections	   by	   sending	   a	   request	   to	   the	   internal	   Connection	  
Monitor,	   asking	   it	   to	   track	   and	   log	   all	   packets	   part	   of	   the	   network	   stream.	   This	  
ensures	   the	   connection	   is	   not	   blocked	   on	   the	   network	   while	   facilitating	   full	  
connection	  monitoring.	  
Detailed	  technical	   information	  about	  the	  internal	  Connection	  Monitor	  software	  
will	  be	  provided	  in	  later	  sections.	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5.2.6 Leveraging	  Traditional	  Signature-­‐Based	  IDS	  Technologies	  
	  
Lastly,	   to	   further	   reiterate	   the	   detection	   in	   depth	   capabilities	   of	   my	   security	  
event	  detection	  algorithm,	  we	  must	  assume	  that	  some	  advanced	  attacks	  may	  evade	  
the	  aforementioned	  security	  controls.	  For	  example,	  an	  exploited	  machine	  may	  create	  
a	   valid	   connection	   to	   another	   host	   and	   send	   exploit	   code	   over	   an	   approved	   and	  
unmonitored	  channel.	  	  
In	  this	  case,	  we	  can	  provide	  another	  layer	  of	  detection	  by	  integrating	  traditional	  
signature-­‐based	   network	   intrusion	   detection	   software	   alongside	  my	   own	   security	  
event	  detection	  algorithm.	  By	  using	  a	  traditional	  signature-­‐based	  NIDS	  alongside	  my	  
custom	   security	   engine,	   we	   can	   provide	   additional	   detection	   in	   depth	   capabilities	  
with	   little	   computational	   overhead.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   a	   layered	   and	   evasive	   attack,	  
traditional	   signature-­‐based	   IDS	   systems	   may	   provide	   additional	   valuable	   forensic	  
information	   about	   techniques	   used	   by	   an	   attacker	   during	   a	   security	   event.	   Like	  
details	  logged	  by	  my	  own	  security	  event	  detection	  algorithm,	  these	  IDS	  systems	  are	  
also	   capable	   of	   pushing	   real	   time	   security	   event	   information	   to	   a	   security	   event	  
manager	  (SEM),	  alerting	  administrators	  about	  events	  in	  real	  time.	  
	  
5.3 Security	  Event	  Detection	  Algorithm	  
	  
We	  will	  now	  take	  an	  in-­‐depth	  look	  at	  how	  my	  security	  event	  detection	  algorithm	  
(also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  analysis	  engine)	  provides	  detection	  in	  depth	  through	  the	  use	  
of	  multiple	  security	  event	  detection	  technologies.	  To	  fully	  understand	  the	  algorithm,	  
we	   must	   understand	   how	   a	   network	   baseline	   is	   created,	   the	   technologies	   and	  
indicators	   used	   for	   passively	   generating	   unique	   device	   fingerprints,	   and	   how	  
security	   incidents	   are	   identified	   in	   real	   time.	  By	  breaking	  down	   incident	  detection	  
into	   a	   series	   of	   test	   cases,	   we	   can	   identify	   each	   component	   of	   the	   algorithm	   and	  
provide	  a	  well-­‐rounded	  view	  of	  its	  incident	  detection	  mechanisms.	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Looking	   back	   at	   previous	   sections,	   we	   can	   see	   how	   my	   device’s	   logical	  
architecture	   has	   facilitated	   the	   real-­‐time	   collection	   and	   analysis	   of	   packets	  
traversing	   the	   network.	   In	   this	   section	   we	   will	   dive	   in	   to	   the	   strategies	   and	  
technologies	  used	  within	  my	  analysis	  engine	  to	  facilitate	  security	  event	  detection.	  
My	  algorithm	  detects	  network	   security	   events	   through	  a	   combination	  of	   three	  
main	   technologies:	   flow-­‐based	   intrusion	   detection,	   passive	   device	   fingerprinting,	  
and	   a	   traditional	   signature-­‐based	   IDS	   framework.	   How	   these	   technologies	   work	  
together	   to	   solve	   the	   requirements	  outlined	   in	   section	  5.1	  will	  be	  discussed	   in	   the	  
following	  subsections.	  
	  
5.3.1 Creating	  a	  Network	  Baseline	  
	  
Before	  actually	  relying	  on	  my	  security	  event	  detection	  algorithm,	  we	  must	  first	  
collect	  relevant	  data	  regarding	  connections	  and	  network	  flows	  commonly	  occurring	  
on	   the	   network.	   Since	   SCADA	   networks	   tend	   to	   have	   a	   set	   of	   static	   devices	   and	  
connections,	   the	   collection	   of	   very	   accurate	   network	   baseline	   information	   is	  
plausible.	  To	  do	  this,	  the	  algorithm	  software	  is	  initially	  placed	  in	  learning	  mode.	  	  
Learning	   mode	   allows	   my	   algorithm	   to	   passively	   monitor	   all	   connections	  
traversing	  a	  network	  segment.	  By	  passively	  monitoring	  the	  monitored	  link,	  we	  can	  
collect	  network	  flow	  information	  that	  accurately	  reflects	  the	  state	  of	  all	  connections	  
traversing	   the	   monitored	   portion	   of	   the	   network.	   Since	   SCADA	   systems	   are	   so	  
predictable	   and	   static	   by	   nature,	   running	   my	   algorithm	   in	   learning	   mode	   for	   an	  
extensive	  period	  of	  time	  -­‐	  for	  example,	  an	  entire	  week	  –	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  identify	  the	  
set	   of	   legitimate	   network	   flows	   occurring	   on	   the	   network,	   along	   with	   associated	  
device	  information.	  
The	  collection	  of	  an	  accurate	  and	  extensive	  network	  baseline	   is	   crucial	   for	   the	  
proposed	  security	  event	  detection	  algorithm;	  this	   initial	  network	  data	  will	  be	  used	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as	   a	   baseline	   for	   both	   the	   flow-­‐based	   intrusion	   detection	   system	   and	   fingerprint-­‐
based	  detection	  algorithm	  components	  of	  the	  system.	  	  
	  
5.3.1.1 Learning	  Network	  Flows	  
	  
During	   the	   baseline	   creation	   process,	   my	   algorithm	   monitors	   all	   packets	  
traversing	   the	   network	   link	   and	   logs	   the	   following	   data	   to	   a	   centralized	   database	  
(integrated	  within	  the	  analysis	  engine):	  
1. Layer	  3	  Source	  IP	  Address	  
2. Layer	  3	  Destination	  IP	  Address	  
3. Layer	  4	  Destination	  Port	  Number	  
Although	  not	   all	   of	   this	   information	   is	  used	  during	  each	   step	  of	  my	   flow-­‐based	  
intrusion	   detection	   implementation,	   it	   provides	   an	   adequate	   overview	  of	   common	  
connections	   occurring	   in	   the	   network.	   Combining	   this	   information	   with	   passive	  
device	  fingerprints	  (as	  seen	  shortly)	  can	  provide	  us	  with	  a	  well-­‐rounded	  picture	  of	  
how	  connections	  typically	  behave	  between	  two	  devices	  on	  the	  network.	  	  	  
All	  collected	  network	  flow	  data	  is	  stored	  in	  a	  centralized	  database	  accessible	  by	  
all	  components	  of	  my	  security	  event	  detection	  algorithm.	  Due	  to	  their	  commonality,	  
only	   IPv4,	   TCP	   and	   UDP	   connections	  were	  monitored	   and	   logged	   throughout	   this	  
process.	  This	  could	  easily	  be	  expanded	  to	  support	  additional	  layer	  3	  and	  4	  protocols	  
in	  the	  future.	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5.3.1.2 Fingerprinting	  Devices	  
	  
As	   mentioned	   previously,	   flow-­‐based	   intrusion	   detection	   is	   not	   the	   only	  
technology	   used	   by	   my	   appliance	   to	   detect	   the	   occurrence	   of	   network	   security	  
events.	  Since	  I	  aimed	  to	  create	  a	  security	  appliance	  capable	  of	  providing	  detection	  in	  
depth,	  I	  decided	  to	  leverage	  passive	  device	  fingerprinting	  technologies	  as	  well.	  The	  
creation	   of	   device-­‐specific	   and	   pseudo-­‐unique	   fingerprints	   capable	   of	   passively	  
identifying	  network	  devices	  provides	  an	  additional	  layer	  of	  detection,	  particularly	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	  and	  device	  impersonation	  attacks.	  
The	  generation	  of	  network	  device	  fingerprints	  was	  done	  using	  a	  custom	  Python	  
implementation	  of	  the	  p0f	   framework.	  [92]	  P0f	   is	  an	  open-­‐source	  passive	  network-­‐
level	   fingerprinting	   tool	  capable	  of	  generating	  highly	  complex,	  yet	  accurate,	  device	  
fingerprints	  based	  on	  TCP	  network	  stack	  implementations.	  [92]	  P0f	  has	  been	  shown	  
to	  provide	  extremely	  fast	  and	  scalable	  device	  fingerprinting	  for	  network	  segments	  of	  
all	  sizes.	  [45][92]	  
	  When	  used	  in	  TCP/IP	  environments,	  p0f	  “fingerprints	  the	  client-­‐originating	  SYN	  
packet	  and	  the	  first	  SYN+ACK	  response	  from	  the	  server,	  paying	  attention	  to	  factors	  
such	  as	   the	  ordering	  of	  TCP	  options,	   the	   relation	  between	  maximum	  segment	   size	  
and	  window	  size,	  the	  progression	  of	  TCP	  timestamps,	  and	  the	  state	  of	  about	  a	  dozen	  
possible	   implementation	   quirks	   (e.g.	   non-­‐zero	   values	   in	   ‘must	   be	   zero’	   fields).”	  
[45][92]	   These	   layer	   3-­‐4	   features	   and	   options	   are	   usually	   implemented	   on	   a	   per-­‐
operating	   system	   basis	   and	   tend	   not	   to	   conform	   to	   industry	   standards.	   These	   are	  
referred	  to	  as	  implementation	  quirks	  and	  can	  be	  exploited	  to	  help	  passively	  identify	  
and	   verify	   the	   identities	   of	   network	   devices.	   Generally	   speaking,	   p0f	   is	   used	   to	  
passively	  identify	  device	  operating	  system	  information;	  however,	  this	  is	  of	  little	  use	  
to	  us.	  Rather,	  the	  ability	  to	  generate	  reasonably	  unique	  fingerprints	  for	  all	  network	  




A	  custom	  implementation	  of	  p0f	  in	  Python	  was	  used	  to	  facilitate	  full	  integration	  
with	  my	  analysis	  engine.	  Furthermore,	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  custom	  p0f	  implementation	  
allowed	   us	   to	   streamline	   the	   packet	   examination	   process	   and	   increase	   device	  
efficiency.	  	  
When	  a	  network	   connection	   is	   analyzed	   to	   create	   a	  unique	  device	   fingerprint,	  
the	   following	   TCP	   protocol	   implementation	   quirks	   and	   options	   are	   extracted	   and	  
used	  to	  generate	  a	  pseudo-­‐unique	  device	  fingerprint	  [92]:	  
§ Layer	  3	  protocol	  version	  (ver)	  
§ TCP	  initial	  time-­‐to-­‐live	  (iTTL)	  
§ Layer	  3	  options/extension	  headers	  (olen)	  
§ TCP	  maximum	  segment	  size	  (mss)	  
§ TCP	  window	  size	  (wsize)	  
§ TCP	  window	  scaling	  factor	  (scale)	  
§ TCP	  options	  (layout	  +	  order):	  
o Explicit	  end	  of	  options	  (eol+n)	  
o No-­‐op	  option	  (nop)	  
o Maximum	  segment	  size	  (mss)	  
o Window	  scaling	  factor	  (ws)	  
o Selective	  ACK	  permitted	  (sok)	  
o Selective	  ACK	  (sack)	  
o Timestamp	  (ts)	  
o Other	  unknown	  TCP	  options	  (?n)	  
§ Implementation	  quirks	  observed	  in	  IP	  headers	  (quirks):	  
o IPv4	  don’t	  fragment	  bit	  is	  set	  (df)	  
o IPv4	  don’t	  fragment	  bit	  is	  set	  but	  IPID	  is	  non-­‐zero	  (id+)	  
o IPv4	  don’t	  fragment	  bit	  is	  not	  set	  but	  IPID	  is	  zero	  (id-­‐)	  
o Explicit	  congestion	  notification	  is	  supported	  (ecn)	  
o IPv4	  must-­‐be-­‐zero	  field	  is	  non-­‐zero	  (0+)	  
o IPv6	  flow	  ID	  is	  non-­‐zero	  (flow)	  
§ Implementation	  quirks	  in	  TCP	  headers	  (quirks):	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o Sequence	  number	  is	  zero	  (seq-­‐)	  
o ACK	  flag	  is	  not	  set	  and	  ACK	  number	  is	  not	  zero	  (ack+)	  
o ACK	  flag	  is	  set	  but	  ACK	  number	  is	  zero	  (ack-­‐)	  
o Urgent	  flag	  is	  not	  set	  but	  urgent	  pointer	  is	  non-­‐zero	  (uptr+)	  
o Urgent	  flag	  is	  used	  (urgf+)	  
o Push	  flag	  is	  used	  (pushf+)	  
o Timestamp	  is	  zero	  (ts1-­‐)	  
o Peer	  sent	  non-­‐zero	  timestamp	  in	  SYN	  (ts2+)	  
o Non-­‐zero	  trailing	  data	  in	  options	  segement	  (opt+)	  
o Window	  scaling	  factor	  is	  excessive	  (exws)	  
o TCP	  options	  are	  malformed	  (bad)	  
§ Payload	  Size	  (pclass)	  
To	   generate	   a	   device’s	   fingerprint,	   primary	   values	   listed	   above	   are	   strung	  
together	   using	   a	   colon	   as	   a	   delimiter.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   TCP	   options	   and	   TCP/IP	  
implementation	   quirks	   (items	   7-­‐9),	   sub-­‐values	   are	   delimited	   using	   a	   comma	  
between	   colons.	   The	   layout	   of	   each	   fingerprint	   is	   as	   follows	   (see	   list	   above	   for	  
parameter	  short	  names).	  
	  
ver	  :	  ittl	  :	  olen	  :	  mss	  :	  wsize	  ,	  scale	  :	  olayout	  :	  quirks	  :	  pclass	  
Figure	  5:	  Device	  Fingerprint	  Layout	  
	  
As	   an	   example,	   the	   fingerprint	   generated	   by	   the	   security	   appliance’s	   host	  
operating	  system	  (CentOS	  6.4	  with	  Kernel	  version	  2.5.32)	  is	  as	  follows:	  
	  	  
	  	  *	  :	  64	  :	  0	  :	  *	  :	  mss*10,6	  :	  mss,sok,ts,nop,ws	  :	  df,id+	  :	  0	  
Figure	  6:	  Security	  Appliance	  Fingerprint	  Value	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Whereas	  one	  of	  my	  client	  test	  machines	  (CentOS	  6.4	  with	  Kernel	  version	  2.6.32-­‐279)	  
yielded	  a	  slightly	  different	  fingerprint	  value:	  
	  
*	  :	  64	  :	  0	  :	  *	  :	  14480,6	  :	  mss,sok,ts,nop,ws	  :	  df	  :	  0	  
Figure	  7:	  Client	  Device	  Fingerprint	  Value	  
	  
As	   we	   can	   see,	   even	   a	   minor	   Kernel	   revision	   change	   has	   yielded	   a	   slightly	  
different	   fingerprint	  while	  running	  on	   the	  same	  hardware	  platform	  as	   the	  security	  
appliance.	   In	   both	   fingerprints	   shown	   above,	   IPv4	   and	   IPv6	   TCP	   packets	   were	  
observed	   and	   generated	   the	   same	   fingerprint	   –	   this	   is	   denoted	   by	   the	   wildcard	  
operator	   (*)	   at	   the	  beginning	  of	   each	   fingerprint.	  Next,	   both	  devices	  had	   an	   initial	  
TTL	  value	  of	   64	   and	  a	  normal	   variable	  maximum	  segment	   size	   (depending	  on	   the	  
network	  link’s	  parameters)	  –	  again,	  denoted	  by	  a	  wildcard	  operator.	  	  
However,	   similarities	   start	   fading	  away	  as	  we	   look	  deeper	   into	   the	   fingerprint	  
itself.	  In	  fingerprint	  one,	  the	  TCP	  window	  size	  appears	  to	  be	  10x	  the	  TCP	  maximum	  
segment	  size,	  whereas	  fingerprint	  two	  has	  a	  TCP	  window	  size	  that	  appears	  to	  have	  
no	   relation	   to	   the	   TCP	   maximum	   segment	   size.	   Furthermore,	   looking	   at	   the	   TCP	  
options,	  we	   can	   see	   that	   fingerprint	  one	  has	   set	   the	  TCP	  don’t	   fragment	   bit	  with	   a	  
non-­‐zero	  IPID.	  The	  same	  could	  not	  be	  said	  for	  fingerprint	  two.	  
Like	   the	   baseline	   creation	   process	   seen	   in	   the	   above	   section,	   accurate	   device	  
fingerprinting	   requires	   a	   learning	   process	   as	   well.	   Luckily,	   this	   can	   be	   done	  
automatically	   as	  my	   security	   event	   detection	   algorithm	   analyzes	   network	   packets	  
during	   its	   initial	  baseline	   learning	  process.	  As	  device	   fingerprints	  are	   learned,	   they	  
too	   are	   stored	   in	   a	   centralized	   database	   accessible	   to	   all	   components	   of	   the	  
algorithm’s	  analysis	  engine.	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Details	   regarding	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   device	   fingerprinting	  will	   be	   outlined	   in	  
the	   upcoming	   chapter.	   	   For	   now	   I	   will	   presume	   device	   fingerprints	   to	   be	   unique	  
enough	  to	  justify	  their	  inclusion	  in	  my	  security	  event	  detection	  methodology.	  	  
	  
5.3.2 Identifying	  Security	  Events	  
	  
Now	  that	  a	  viable	  network	  baseline	  has	  been	  generated,	  the	  algorithm	  is	  ready	  
to	   begin	   identifying	   network	   security	   events.	   In	   this	   subsection	   I	   will	   logically	  
traverse	  all	  algorithmic	  components	  of	  my	  security	  solution,	  providing	  details	  about	  
each	  event	  detection	  step	  and	  associated	  underlying	  technologies.	  
To	  protect	  against	  advanced	  and	  highly	  sophisticated	  attacks,	  we	  must	  provide	  
multiple	  layered	  mechanisms	  to	  increase	  the	  probability	  of	  security	  event	  detection.	  
To	   facilitate	   this	   layered	  approach	   to	  attack	  detection,	   I	  will	   combine	  both	  passive	  
device	  fingerprinting	  and	  traditional	  network	  intrusion	  detection	  systems	  alongside	  
my	  flow-­‐based	  analysis	  engine.	  By	  using	  these	  three	  combined	  technologies,	  we	  can	  
provide	   detection	   in	   depth,	   further	   increasing	   the	   probability	   of	   efficiently	   and	  
effectively	  detecting	  the	  most	  sophisticated	  and	  harmful	  attacks	  on	  SCADA	  networks.	  
Considering	   the	   possibility	   of	   collisions	   between	   device	   fingerprints	   –	   which	  
becomes	   apparent	   in	   the	   following	   chapter	   –	   it	  makes	   logical	   sense	   to	   first	   check	  
network	  packets	  and	  connections	  using	  the	  most	  effective	  mechanism	  for	  a	  SCADA	  
environment.	  Naturally,	   this	   is	   flow-­‐based	   intrusion	  detection	  –	   its	  highly	  effective	  
nature	   in	   static	   and	   predictable	   networks	   makes	   it	   an	   ideal	   candidate	   for	   my	  
primary	  approach	  to	  security	  event	  detection.	  	  
As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  a	  network	  baseline	  of	  known	  connections	  
and	   device	   fingerprints	   was	   generated	   to	   aid	   the	   detection	   of	   security	   events	  
traversing	  a	  monitored	  network	  link.	  Leveraging	  this	  baseline	  required	  us	  to	  make	  
the	  following	  assumptions:	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1. The	   security	   solution	   deployment	   is	   capable	   of	  monitoring	   all	   SCADA	   (and	  
other)	  traffic	  traversing	  between	  two	  infrastructure	  devices	  on	  a	  network	  
2. The	  monitored	  network	  is	  reasonably	  static	  by	  nature	  
3. The	   algorithm’s	   learning	   period	   occurred	   on	   a	   network	   clean	   of	   any	   active	  
security	  threats	  
4. The	   algorithm’s	   learning	   period	   was	   long	   enough	   to	   detect	   and	   log	   all	  
connections	  that	  regularly	  cross	  the	  monitored	  link	  
Naturally	   not	   all	   of	   these	   conditions	   are	   always	   met.	   In	   particular,	   it	   may	   be	  
difficult	   to	   ensure	   a	   monitored	   network	   is	   clear	   of	   all	   active	   threats	   during	   the	  
algorithm’s	   learning	  period.	  Like	  all	  other	  security	  appliances	  that	  rely	  on	  baseline	  
analysis	  to	  reduce	  false	  positives,	  the	  timing	  of	  an	  appliance’s	  learning	  period	  should	  
be	   considered	   best	   effort.	   Ideally	   this	   learning	   process	   would	   occur	   during	   the	  
inception	  period	  of	  the	  network	  and	  would	  be	  sustained	  of	  a	  period	  of	  weeks.	  	  
Once	   the	   network	   baseline	   has	   been	   created	   and	   sufficiently	   populated,	   can	  
begin	  to	  consider	  how	  the	  collected	  baseline	  information	  could	  be	  used	  to	  detect	  the	  
presence	  of	  anomalous	  network	  connections.	  Following	  the	  well-­‐mapped	  history	  of	  
flow-­‐based	  IDS	  systems,	  I	  derived	  a	  set	  of	  flows	  outlining	  various	  checks	  needed	  to	  
ensure	  the	  validity	  of	  network	  connections	  traversing	  the	  monitored	   link.	  This	  can	  




Figure	  8:	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  Event	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  Algorithm	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As	   new	   connections	   are	   analyzed	   by	  my	   security	   event	   detection	   algorithm,	   it	  
performs	  the	  following	  checks	  by	  comparing	  the	  connection	  to	  the	  known	  baseline:	  
Check	  1: Does	  the	  source	  host	  ever	  communicate	  with	  the	  destination	  host?	  
1.1 	  	   Does	  the	  destination	  host	  exist?	  
1.2 	  	   Does	   the	   destination	   host	   communicate	   with	   other	   hosts	   using	   the	  	  
	  	  	  	  connection’s	  layer	  2	  and	  3	  protocols?	  
1.3 	  	   Does	  the	  destination	  host	  provide	  the	  requested	  service	  to	  other	  hosts	  	  
	  	  	  	  (e.g.:	  Modbus,	  FTP,	  HTTP,	  etc.)?	  
Check	  2: Does	   the	   source	   host	   ever	   communicate	   with	   the	   destination	   host	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  using	  the	  connection’s	  layer	  2	  and	  3	  protocols?	  
Check	  3: Does	  the	  source	  host	  ever	  communicate	  with	  the	  destination	  host	  on	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  connection’s	  destination	  service	  (e.g.:	  Modbus,	  FTP,	  HTTP,	  etc.)?	  
3.1 	  	   Does	  the	  destination	  host	  provide	  the	  seen	  service	  to	  other	  hosts	  (e.g.:	  	  
	  	  	  	  Modbus,	  FTP,	  HTTP,	  etc.)?	  
Check	  4 Does	  the	  source’s	  fingerprint	  match	  its	  known	  baseline	  fingerprint?	  
Check	  5	   Has	  the	  source	  host	  recently	  triggered	  a	  security	  event?	  
Check	  6	   Does	   the	   connection	  pass	   all	   traditional	   network	   intrusion	  detection	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   system	  checks	  (via	  signature-­‐based	  IDS)?	  
It	   is	   important	   to	  mention	   that	   it	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	   just	   compare	   connections	  
against	  the	  known	  baseline	  and	  drop/allow	  packets	  accordingly,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  goals	  
of	   developing	   this	   algorithm	  was	   to	   provide	   transparent	   detection	   in	   depth	  while	  
limiting	  the	  ability	   for	  an	  attacker	  to	  detect	   the	  presence	  of	   the	  security	  appliance.	  
To	  meet	  these	  criteria,	  we	  must	  handle	  connections	  strategically	  by	   impersonating	  
the	  destination	  host	  when	  accepting	  or	  dropping	  connection	  attempts.	  Additionally,	  
we	  must	  not	  recklessly	  impede	  connections	  on	  the	  network	  in	  case	  of	  false-­‐positives.	  	  
Using	   the	   approach	   to	   security	   event	   detection	   outlined	   in	   Figure	   8,	   we	   can	  
strategically	  handle	  connections	  of	  all	  types	  while	  providing	  transparent	  handling	  of	  
malicious	  and	  suspicious	  connections.	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In	   the	   following	  subsections	   I	  will	  break	  down	  the	  algorithm	  seen	  above	   into	  a	  
series	   of	   checks	   that,	  when	  working	   in	   unison,	   are	   capable	   of	   providing	   a	   layered	  
approach	  to	  security	  event	  detection.	  	  
	  
5.3.2.1 Check	  1	  
	  
First,	   new	   connections	   are	   compared	   against	   the	   baseline	   to	   determine	   if	   the	  
source	  host	  has	  ever	  communicated	  with	  the	  destination	  host.	  If	  both	  hosts	  have	  not	  
communicated	   before,	  we	  must	   dive	   deeper	   into	   the	   packet	   before	   classifying	   the	  
connection	   as	   either	   malicious	   or	   suspicious.	   To	   do	   this,	   we	   next	   check	   if	   the	  
destination	   host	   even	   exists.	   If	   it	   does	   not,	   the	   connection	   can	   be	   dropped	   (or	   an	  
associated	   ICMP	   response	   can	   be	   generated).	   This	   may	   indicate	   an	   exploratory	  
attempt	   by	   an	   attacker	   and	   should	   be	   logged	   as	   such.	   However,	   if	   the	   destination	  
host	   does	   exist,	   we	  must	   next	   check	   if	   the	   destination	   host	   communicates	   on	   the	  
protocols	   (layer	   2	   and	   3)	   seen	   in	   the	   captured	   packet	   and	   provides	   the	   layer	   4	  
service	  being	   requested.	   If	   it	   does	  not,	   like	   in	   an	  unrestricted	  network,	   the	  packet	  
should	  be	  rejected/dropped	  and	  logged	  for	  future	  analysis.	  If	  all	  checks	  pass	  and	  the	  
source	   simply	   does	   not	   usually	   communicate	   with	   the	   destination	   host,	   we	   can	  
assume	   the	  connection	   is	  malicious.	  The	  handling	  of	  malicious	  connections	  will	  be	  
described	  in	  upcoming	  sections.	  	  
Generally	   speaking,	   failing	   these	   initial	   checks	   could	   indicate	   a	   brute	   force	  
exploratory	   attempt	   on	   the	   network	   –	   for	   example,	   a	   port	   scan	   or	   similar	   device	  
enumeration	  scan.	  Additionally,	  a	  new	  device	  added	  to	  the	  network	  will	  always	  fail	  
initial	  checks	  due	  to	  its	  non-­‐presence	  in	  the	  network	  baseline.	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5.3.2.2 Check	  2	  
	  
If	   initial	   checks	   pass	   and	   the	   source	   and	   destination	   hosts	   are	   known	   to	  
communicate,	  we	  must	  re-­‐check	  if	  they	  do	  so	  over	  the	  layer	  3	  and	  4	  protocols	  seen	  
in	   the	   monitored	   connection.	   If	   the	   hosts	   do	   not	   usually	   communicate	   using	   the	  
observed	  layer	  3	  and	  4	  protocols,	  the	  connection	  should	  be	  rejected	  or	  dropped	  as	  to	  
not	   raise	   alarms.	   Naturally,	   the	   connection	   should	   also	   be	   logged	   to	   the	   external	  
security	  event	  manager	  (SEM),	  as	  it	  is	  suspicious	  by	  nature.	  Generally	  speaking,	  this	  
type	  of	  alarm	  could	   indicate	  a	  strategic	  network	  exploration	  attempt	  or	  a	  network	  
device	  being	  used	  as	  a	  pivot	  point	  for	  an	  attack.	  	  
	  
5.3.2.3 	  Check	  3	  
	  
Not	   all	   packets	   can	   be	   dropped	   or	   rejected!	   If	   the	   source	   and	   destination	   are	  
known	   to	   communicate	   over	   the	   observed	   layer	   3	   and	   4	   protocols,	   we	   must	   not	  
reject	  packets	  sent	  to	  a	  layer	  4	  service	  legitimately	  provided	  by	  the	  destination.	  This	  
leads	  us	  to	  the	  next	  check.	  If	  the	  destination	  does	  not	  provide	  the	  requested	  layer	  4	  
service	  (e.g.:	  Modbus,	  FTP,	  HTTP,	  etc.),	   the	  connection	  should	  be	  dropped/rejected	  
and	   logged	   to	   the	   SEM.	   However,	   if	   the	   destination	   does	   provide	   the	   service,	   the	  
attacker	  must	  have	   some	   foreknowledge	  of	   the	  destination	   system.	  Since	  previous	  
flow-­‐based	  IDS	  checks	  have	  already	  failed	  (i.e.:	  the	  hosts	  don’t	  usually	  communicate	  
via	  the	  requested	  service),	  we	  can	  assume	  the	  connection	  is	  malicious	  and	  handle	  it	  
according.	  Generally	  speaking,	  this	  may	  occur	  when	  an	  attacker	  with	  foreknowledge	  
of	  the	  network	  performs	  a	  targeted	  attack	  against	  a	  specific	  host	  in	  hopes	  of	  evading	  
flow-­‐based	  IDS	  systems.	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5.3.2.4	  Check	  4	  
	  
If	   these	   initial	   checks	   have	   passed,	  we	   are	   dealing	  with	   a	   connection	   that	   has	  
made	  its	  way	  into	  the	  baseline	  during	  the	  security	  appliance’s	  learning	  processes.	  At	  
this	  point,	  all	  flow-­‐based	  IDS	  checks	  have	  occurred	  and	  passed.	  	  
However,	  we	  cannot	  assume	  the	  connection	  to	  be	  clean	  at	  this	  point.	  What	  if	  a	  
skilled	  and	  knowledgeable	  attacker	  has	  perfect	  knowledge	  of	   the	  network	  (as	  may	  
be	   the	   case	   in	   insider	  attacks)?	  We	  must	  assume	   that	   they	  are	   capable	  of	  pivoting	  
between	   network	   systems	   only	   using	   connection	   sequences	   conforming	   to	   the	  
network	   baseline,	   thus	   evading	   all	   forms	   of	   flow-­‐based	   intrusion	   detection.	  
Furthermore,	  attackers	  without	  perfect	  knowledge	  of	  the	  network	  may	  be	  capable	  of	  
evading	   flow-­‐based	   IDS	   by	   performing	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	   attacks	   on	   the	   network	  
and	  modifying	  packets	  on	  the	  fly.	  This	  too	  would	  evade	  all	  traditional	  forms	  of	  flow-­‐
based	  IDS.	  	  
To	   solve	   these	   issues,	   we	   must	   couple	   flow-­‐based	   IDS	   with	   additional	  
technologies	  to	  provide	  detection	  in	  depth.	  	  
These	   leads	   us	   back	   to	   the	   device	   fingerprinting	   technologies	   discussed	   in	  
section	  0.	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  during	  the	  security	  appliance’s	  learning	  process	  
we	   generated	   one	   or	   more	   fingerprints	   for	   each	   device	   communicating	   on	   the	  
network.	  Leveraging	  this,	  we	  can	  now	  check	  if	   the	  monitored	  connection	  conforms	  
to	  the	  fingerprint	  baseline	  created	  during	  the	  learning	  process.	  	  
This	  device	  fingerprint	  check	  is	  done	  by	  creating	  a	  device	  fingerprint	  on	  the	  fly	  
as	   each	   packet	   is	   analyzed	   for	   security	   threats.	   Once	   this	   real-­‐time	   fingerprint	   is	  
generated	   for	   the	   source	   device,	   it	   can	   be	   compared	   to	   the	   known	   baseline	  
fingerprint	   value	   to	   determine	   if	   the	   host	   device	   has	   changed	   in	   any	   way.	   If	   the	  
fingerprint	   process	   passes,	   we	   can	   be	   reasonably	   assured	   that	   the	   connection	   is	  
clean	  and	  can	  pass	  it	  off	  to	  the	  next	  detection	  technology.	  However,	  if	  the	  fingerprint	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process	  fails,	  the	  connection	  should	  be	  considered	  malicious	  and	  should	  be	  handled	  
and	  logged	  accordingly.	  	  
	  
5.3.2.4 	  Check	  5	  
	  
If	  all	  checks	  so	  far	  have	  passed,	  we	  can	  look	  at	  historical	  security	  event	  data	  to	  
determine	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  source	  being	  malicious.	  	  
First,	  historical	   security	  event	   information	   is	  polled	   to	  determine	   if	   the	  source	  
has	   recently	   triggered	   a	   security	   event.	   If	   a	   recent	   security	   event	   has	   occurred	   –	  
based	   on	   the	   threshold	   set	   by	   the	   appliance	   operator	   –	   the	   connection	   should	   be	  
considered	   suspicious	   and	   should	   be	   monitored	   accordingly.	   The	   handling	   of	  
suspicious	   events	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   upcoming	   sections.	   If	   the	   source	   has	   not	  
recently	  triggered	  a	  security	  event,	  the	  connection	  is	  considered	  clean	  and	  is	  ready	  
to	  be	  passed	  to	  a	  traditional	  signature-­‐based	  network	  intrusion	  detection	  system	  for	  
further	  analysis.	  	  
	  
5.3.2.6 	  Check	  6	  
	  
It	  is	  quite	  possible	  that	  a	  skilled	  attacker	  with	  perfect	  knowledge	  of	  the	  network	  
could	  have	  bypassed	  all	   security	   checks	  up	   to	   this	  point.	   For	   example,	   an	  attacker	  
may	  have	  gained	  access	  to	  a	  network	  device	  and	  performed	  a	  perfectly	  crafted	  one-­‐
time	   attack	   against	   another	   network	   device	   using	   known	   clean	   communication	  
streams.	  	  
In	  accordance	  with	  my	  detection	  in	  depth	  approach	  to	  security	  event	  detection,	  
we	  should	  pass	  all	  final	  connections	  through	  a	  traditional	  signature-­‐based	  network	  
IDS.	  This	  intrusion	  detection	  system	  should	  be	  capable	  of	  checking	  for	  known	  attack	  
patterns,	   shellcode	   and	  malware	   embedded	   in	   packets,	   and	   other	   common	   attack	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elements.	   For	   this	   purpose,	   I	   chose	   to	   integrate	   Snort	   as	   a	   final	   detection	   point	  
within	   my	   architecture.	   Snort	   has	   an	   extensive	   history	   of	   providing	   efficient	   and	  
effective	  signature-­‐based	  detection	  of	  network	  attacks	  while	  providing	  both	  passive	  
and	   reactive	   technologies	   capable	   of	   handling	   security	   events.	   [13]	   More	   details	  
about	  my	  use	  of	  Snort	  will	  be	  outlined	  in	  6.1.7.	  	  
For	  our	  purposes,	  any	  traditional	  signature-­‐based	  IDS	  can	  be	  used	  to	  provide	  an	  
additional	   layer	   of	   detection	   and	   forensic	   information	   within	   my	   security	   event	  
detection	   architecture.	   To	   ensure	   potential	   false	   positives	   did	   not	   impact	   the	  
monitored	   SCADA	   network,	   I	   decided	   to	   disable	   all	   reactive	   components	   of	   the	  
chosen	   IDS,	   ensuring	   it	   stayed	   entirely	   passive.	   Like	   the	   capabilities	   already	  
integrated	   into	  my	   appliance,	   the	   chosen	   IDS	   passed	   real	   time	   information	   about	  
potential	   attacks	   to	   a	   3rd	   part	   security	   event	  manager	   (SEM)	   for	   analysis,	   alerting,	  
and	  archiving.	  
	  
5.3.3 Handling	  Classified	  Network	  Traffic	  
	  
Once	   connections	   are	   classified	   as	   malicious,	   suspicious,	   or	   clean,	   they	   are	  
handled	   accordingly.	   As	   are	   we	   have	   seen,	   some	   connections	   should	   be	   handled	  
strategically	  to	  mask	  the	  presence	  of	  my	  security	  solution.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  a	  connection	  destined	  for	  an	  IP	  or	  service	  that	  is	  non-­‐existent.	  
In	  the	  following	  sections	  I	  will	  present,	  in	  detail,	  strategies	  used	  when	  handling	  
each	   type	   of	   connection	   and	   how	   proper	   handling	   can	   facilitate	   the	   effective	   and	  
efficient	  handling	  of	  potential	  security	  events.	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5.3.3.1 Dropping	  Irrelevant	  Connections	  
	  
First	  we	  must	   focus	  on	   the	  proper	  handling	  of	  malicious	   connections	  destined	  
for	  non-­‐existent	  hosts	  or	  services.	  As	  seen	  in	  Figure	  8,	  these	  connections	  would	  be	  
dropped	  as	  they	  attempt	  to	  traverse	  the	  security	  appliance,	  due	  to	  their	  potentially	  
malicious	  nature.	  To	  ensure	  my	  security	  appliance	  remains	   fully	   transparent	   to	  an	  
attacker,	  dropped	  connections	  should	  be	  handled	  in	  the	  same	  way	  a	  destination	  host	  
would	  manage	  them	  –	  either	  through	  a	  pure	  packet	  drop	  operation	  or	  by	  sending	  a	  
ICMP	  reject	   response	  packet.	  This	  can	  be	  done	  by	  marking	   the	  packet	  with	  a	  drop	  
packet	  request	  before	  sending	  it	  back	  to	  the	  underlying	  operating	  system.	  
Finally,	  all	  malicious	  packets	  destined	  for	  a	  non-­‐existent	  host	  or	  service	  should	  
be	  logged	  and	  pushed	  to	  a	  SEM	  to	  collect	  relevant	  forensic	  information.	  
	  
5.3.3.2 	   Sending	  Malicious	  Connections	  to	  the	  Honeypot	  
	  
In	   contrast,	   a	  malicious	  host	  may	  attempt	   to	   connect	   to	   an	   existing	  host	   in	   an	  
anomalous	   fashion	   not	   conforming	   to	   the	   network	   baseline.	   The	   destination	   host	  
may	   both	   exist	   and	   offer	   the	   service	   being	   contacted,	   making	   the	   requested	  
connection	  look	  seemingly	  legitimate.	  When	  this	  occurs,	  a	  different	  strategy	  should	  
be	  used	  to	  handle	  the	  connection	  properly:	  it	  should	  be	  handed	  off	  to	  a	  honeypot	  to	  
help	  collect	  valuable	  information	  about	  the	  attack	  taking	  place.	  	  
Luckily,	  handing	  off	   connections	   to	   the	  honeypot	   is	  provided	  by	   the	   functional	  
implementation	   of	   my	   algorithm.	   First,	   an	   iptables	   rule	   is	   injected	   into	   the	   Linux	  
Kernel	   firewall,	   forcing	  all	  packets	  part	  of	   the	  connection	  to	  be	  sent	  to	  a	  queue	  for	  
processing.	   This	   essentially	   bypasses	   the	   connection	   analysis	   process,	   handing	   all	  
packets	   part	   of	   the	   connection	   directly	   to	   the	   honeypot	   via	   NFQUEUE.	   Like	   my	  
analysis	  engine,	  the	  chosen	  honeypot	  software	  continually	  polls	  this	  queue,	  waiting	  
for	  new	  packets	  to	  process.	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When	   a	   new	  malicious	   connection	   needs	   to	   be	   intercepted,	   details	   about	   the	  
connection	  (source	  and	  destination	  information	  for	  layers	  2-­‐4)	  are	  pushed	  real-­‐time	  
to	   the	   Connection	   Monitor	   database,	   including	   a	   last-­‐seen	   timestamp.	   As	   the	  
connection’s	   packets	   continue	   to	   flow	   through	   the	   appliance,	   the	   connection’s	   last	  
seen	   timestamp	   stored	   in	   the	   Connection	   Monitor	   database	   is	   updated.	   If	   the	  
connection	  begins	  to	  time	  out	  (i.e.:	  no	  packets	  are	  received),	  the	  last	  seen	  timestamp	  
begins	   to	  drift	   away	   from	   the	   current	   time	  and	  approaches	   the	  maximum	   timeout	  
value	  set	  by	  the	  appliance	  operator.	  Once	  this	  threshold	  is	  exceeded,	  the	  appliance	  
assumes	  the	  connection	  has	  terminated	  and	  removes	  its	  associated	  firewall	  rule.	  	  
Similarly,	  connections	  terminated	  via	  standard	  TCP	  procedures	  are	  identified	  as	  
such,	   causing	   their	   iptables	   rule	   to	   be	   automatically	   removed	   by	   the	   Connection	  
Monitor.	  	  
Now	  that	  malicious	  connections	  are	  intercepted	  and	  handled	  properly,	  handing	  
them	   off	   to	   the	   awaiting	   honeypot	   service	   is	   rudimentary.	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	  
transparently	   hijacking	  malicious	   connections	   and	   collecting	   relevant	   information	  
about	  an	  attack,	  the	  ideal	  honeypot	  solution	  needs	  to	  be:	  
1. Low	  interaction,	  as	  to	  collect	  the	  greatest	  amount	  of	  attack	  information	  while	  
exhibiting	  a	  great	  amount	  of	  flexibility	  
2. Capable	   of	   handling	   all	   types	   of	   connections	   dynamically	   and	   without	   a	  
detectable	  service	  configuration	  period	  
3. Capable	   of	   interacting	   with	   attackers	   over	   protocols	   unknown	   to	   the	  
honeypot	  
4. Capable	   of	   collecting	   detailed	   forensic	   information	   about	   attacks,	   including	  
packet	  dumps,	  connection	   logging,	  and	  automated	  analysis	  of	  attack	  vectors	  
and	  payloads	  
	  
Based	   on	   these	   requirements,	   one	   ideal	   option	   was	   apparent:	   Honeytrap.	  
[62][89]	  Honeytrap	   is	  a	  dynamic	  meta-­‐honeypot	  capable	  of	  handling	  and	  analyzing	  
all	  types	  of	  network-­‐based	  attacks	  directed	  towards	  the	  honeypot.	  [89]	  While	  most	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honeypots	  aim	  to	  collect	  malware	  samples	  in	  the	  wild,	  like	  Honeypot’s	  predecessor	  
Dionaea,	   Honeytrap	   is	   capable	   of	   capturing	   the	   initial	   exploit	   used	   against	   a	  
vulnerable	   service.	   [89]	   This	   is	   particularly	   true	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   zero-­‐day	  
exploitation	   attempts.	   Furthermore,	  Honeytrap	   provides	   the	   ability	   to	   dynamically	  
spawn	  service	  handlers	  as	  packets	  reach	  the	  honeypot.	  This	  just-­‐in-­‐time	  approach	  to	  
honeypot	   service	   handling	   ensures	   that	   all	   incoming	   connections	   to	   the	   honeypot	  
will	  have	  a	  valid	  service	  listening	  before	  the	  packet	  arrives.	  	  
Comparing	  Honeytrap	   to	   other	   popular	   honeypot	   software	   shows	   us	   just	   how	  
versatile	  and	  ideal	  Honeytrap	  is	  for	  our	  situation.	  
	   Honeytrap	  
[89]	  
Dionaea	  [62]	   Honeyd	  [61]	   Nepenthes	  [9]	  
Interaction	  Level	   Low	   Low	   Low	   Low	  
Catches	  Malware	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   Yes	  
Catches	  Exploits	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   Yes	  
Dynamic	  Servers	   Yes	   No	   No	   No	  
Handles	  Unknown	  
Services	  
Yes	   No	   No	   No	  
Packet	  Logging	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Exploit	  Payload	  
Logging	  
Yes	   Yes	   No	   Yes	  
Antivirus	  Scanning	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   Yes	  
Antimalware	  
Scanning	  
Yes	   Yes	   No	   Yes	  
Malware	  Sandboxing	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   No	  
Stream/Payload	  
Decoding	  
Yes	   Yes	   No	   Yes	  
3rd	  Party	  Integration	  
Support	  	  
Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Report	  Generation	   Yes	  (3rd	  Party)	   Yes	  (3rd	  Party)	   Yes	  (3rd	  Party)	   Yes	  (3rd	  Party)	  
	  




As	  we	  can	  see,	  Honeytrap	   is	  the	  only	  piece	  of	  software	  that	  meets	  the	  criterion	  
outlined	   above	   while	   providing	   the	   largest	   set	   of	   features.	   Most	   importantly,	  
Honeytrap	   is	   the	   only	   piece	   of	   honeypot	   software	   providing	   the	   ability	   to	  
dynamically	  spawn	  service	  listeners	  before	  connection	  attempts	  are	  completed.	  This	  
feature	  is	  crucial	  to	  ensuring	  attack	  hijacking	  goes	  unnoticed	  long	  enough	  to	  capture	  
information	  about	  the	  exploit	  used	  or	  malicious	  payloads	  deposited.	  	  
From	   an	   operational	   perspective,	   the	  Honeytrap	   software	   deals	   with	   inbound	  
connections	   using	   three	  main	   components:	   a	   general	   connection	  monitor,	   a	   set	   of	  
one	  or	  more	   service	   listeners,	   and	  an	  analysis/logging	  engine.	  This	   can	  be	   seen	   in	  
Figure	  10.	  
	  
Figure	  10:	  Inner	  Workings	  of	  Honeytrap	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Incoming	  packets	  marked	  as	  malicious	  by	  my	  security	  event	  detection	  algorithm	  
are	  automatically	  hijacked	  and	  queued	   for	  processing.	  As	  packets	  enter	   the	  queue,	  
the	   Honeytrap	   monitor	   analyzes	   the	   packet’s	   properties	   and	   determines	   which	  
endpoint	  destination	  and	  service	  are	  being	  requested	  (i.e.:	  layers	  3	  and	  4	  connection	  
information).	   Once	   the	   destination	   host	   and	   service	   have	   been	   identified,	   a	  
Honeytrap	   listener	   is	   spawned	   to	   handle	   the	   incoming	   connection,	   which	   begins	  
listening	   on	   the	   destination	   IP	   and	   port	   number.	   This	   is	   all	   done	   in	   real	   time,	  
ensuring	  the	  process	  completes	  before	  the	  packet	  arrives	  at	  the	  honeypot.	  Because	  
the	   destination	   service	   is	   spawned	   just	   in	   time,	   the	   connection	   is	   completed	  
successfully	   (regardless	  of	   the	   service)	   and	   the	   source	  host	  begins	   communicating	  
with	  the	  (virtual)	  destination	  service.	  
While	   this	   service	   listener	   is	   spawned	   and	   is	   interacting	   with	   the	   connection	  
source,	   Honeytrap’s	   analysis	   and	   logging	   engine	   begins	   to	   collect	   connection	  
information	  and	  store	  raw	  packet	  data	  for	  offline	  analysis.	  In	  addition,	  the	  following	  
analysis	  steps	  are	  performed	  against	  the	  live	  connection	  to	  collect	  valuable	  forensic	  
information	  about	  the	  attack.	  Connections	  are	  checked	  for:	  
§ Known	  exploits	  and	  exploit	  code	  
§ Stream	  compression	  (streams	  are	  decoded	  if	  applicable)	  
§ Payloads	  and	  shellcode	  injected	  into	  a	  potential	  exploit,	  which	  are	  then:	  
o Extracted	  from	  the	  data	  stream	  
o Unpacked	  or	  decrypted	  (if	  possible)	  
o Saved	  to	  a	  file	  for	  later	  analysis	  
o Scanned	   in	   real	   time	   using	   a	   supported	   antivirus	   or	   antimalware	  
engine	  
o Executed	  in	  a	  sandbox	  to	  collect	  behavioural	  information	  
Upon	  the	  completion	  of	  these	  tasks,	  a	  full	  report	  is	  generated	  with	  details	  about	  the	  
connection,	  including:	  
§ Layer	  2-­‐7	  connection	  information	  
§ Presence	  of	  exploit	  code	  or	  shellcode	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§ Presence	  of	  malware	  or	  related	  payloads	  
§ Length	  of	  connection	  
§ Timestamp	  of	  connection	  
§ Name	  of	  file	  storing	  packet	  capture	  of	  incident	  
§ Name	  of	  file	  storing	  payloads	  extracted	  from	  the	  data	  stream	  
§ 3rd	  party	  malware	  analysis	  report	  
Thanks	  to	  the	  versatility	  of	  the	  chosen	  honeypot	  software,	  my	  security	  appliance	  
can	  simply	  hand	  off	  malicious	  connections	  into	  the	  queue	  and	  rely	  on	  the	  robust	  and	  
effective	   Honeytrap	   software	   to	   dynamically	   handle	   connections	   while	   collecting	  
detailed	  forensic	  information	  about	  the	  attack	  taking	  place.	  	  
Naturally,	   an	   attacker	  will	   eventually	   figure	   out	   that	   the	   connection	   has	   been	  
redirected	   to	  a	  honeypot;	  after	  all,	   it	   is	   low-­‐interaction	  by	  nature.	  However,	   this	   is	  
irrelevant:	  attack	  information	  has	  already	  been	  caught	  and	  logged	  for	  future	  analysis.	  
In	   the	   case	   of	   known	   and	   popular	   layer	   4	   service	   (e.g.:	   HTTP,	   SNMP,	   FTP,	   etc.),	  
Honeytrap	   is	   so	   robust	   that	   it	   is	   capable	   of	   handling	   an	   entire	   connection	  without	  
alerting	  the	  attacker	  to	   its	  presence	  –	  this	   includes	  emulating	  full	  exploitation,	  and	  
even	  a	  shell,	  as	  possible	  exploit	  code	  is	  “executed.”	  Furthermore,	  the	  flexibility	  and	  
open	  source	  nature	  of	  Honeytrap	  enables	  us	  to	  develop	  additional	  protocol	  plugins	  
to	  facilitate	  the	  full	  and	  realistic	  emulation	  of	  SCADA-­‐specific	  services.	  	  
	  
5.3.3.3 Monitoring	  Suspicious	  Connections	  with	  the	  Connection	  Monitor	  
	  
In	   contrast,	   some	   connections	   may	   not	   be	   considered	   entirely	   malicious	   by	  
nature.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  if	  a	  connection	  has	  passed	  all	  flow-­‐based	  IDS	  checks,	  
has	   a	   valid	  device	   fingerprint	   (as	  per	   the	  baseline),	   but	   the	   connection	   source	  has	  
recently	  triggered	  a	  security	  event.	  At	  this	  point	  we	  should	  assume	  that	  previously	  
triggered	   security	   events	   could	   have	   been	   false	   positives,	   thus	   removing	   our	  
justification	   for	   blocking	   the	   connection.	   Like	  most	   security	   software	   deployed	   in	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SCADA	  environments,	  blocking	  connections	  should	  occur	  only	  when	  the	  probability	  
of	  the	  connection	  being	  malicious	  is	  very	  high.	  	  
To	   deal	   with	   these	   ambiguous	   situations,	   I	   chose	   to	   implement	   additional	  
functionality	   into	   the	   aforementioned	   Connection	   Monitor	   component	   of	   my	  
algorithm	   –	   this	   component	   provides	   the	   capability	   of	   passively	   monitoring	   and	  
collecting	   forensic	   information	   about	   suspicious	   connections.	   The	   monitoring	  
process	  is	  extremely	  similar	  to	  tracking	  malicious	  connections	  and	  sending	  them	  to	  
the	   honeypot:	   connection-­‐specific	   information	   is	   collected	   and	   used	   to	   identify	  
packets	  part	  of	   the	  connection	  that	  need	  to	  be	  monitored.	  This	  connection-­‐specific	  
information	   is	   then	   injected	   real-­‐time	   into	   the	   Connection	   Monitor’s	   database,	  
requesting	   the	   component	   to	   passively	   collect	   forensic	   information	   about	   the	  
connection.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  11.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  11:	  Monitoring	  Suspicious	  Connections	  
	  
Forensic	  information	  about	  suspicious	  connections	  is	  collected	  passively	  using	  a	  
custom	   traffic	   monitor	   (called	   the	   proxy	  monitor	   service)	   that	   is	   spawned	   as	   the	  
security	   appliance	   starts	   up.	   The	   proxy	  monitor	   component	   of	   the	   security	   event	  
detection	  algorithm	  continually	  polls	  the	  Connection	  Monitor	  database,	  updating	  its	  
list	   of	   connections	   that	   need	   to	   be	   captured.	   As	   tracked	   packets	   begin	   flowing	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through	  the	  bridge	  device,	  the	  proxy	  monitor	  spawns	  a	  child	  process	  to	  monitor	  that	  
specific	  connection.	  	  
This	   child	   process	   then	   binds	   to	   the	   bridge	   interface	   using	   Scapy	   and	   a	   set	   of	  
custom	  Python	  software.	  Scapy	  is	  an	  open	  source	  Python	  library	  capable	  of	  binding	  
to	   an	   interface	   and	   intercepting	   raw	   packets	   that	   match	   a	   user-­‐defined	   Berkeley	  
Packet	  Filter	  expression.	  [15][55]	  Once	  packets	  part	  of	  the	  suspicious	  connection	  are	  
captured,	   duplicated,	   and	   passed	   to	   the	   appropriate	   child	   process,	   the	   original	  
packets	  continue	  to	  traverse	  to	  the	  signature-­‐based	  IDS	  component	  –	  and	  eventually	  
the	  destination	  device	  -­‐	  with	  no	  impedance.	  	  
Packets	  captured	  by	  a	  proxy	  monitor’s	  child	  processes	  are	  then	  logged	  to	  a	  PCAP	  
file	   as	   forensic	   evidence.	   By	   storing	   all	   connection	   information	   to	   disk	   in	   the	  
standardized	   PCAP	   format,	   we	   can	   provide	   invaluable	   forensic	   information	   to	  
administrators	  regarding	  connections	  that	  may	  have	  evaded	  security	  controls.	  	  
The	  following	  forensic	  information	  is	  collected	  about	  suspicious	  connections:	  
§ Layer	  2-­‐7	  connection	  information	  
§ Presence	  of	  exploit	  code	  or	  shellcode	  
§ Presence	  of	  malware	  or	  related	  payloads	  
§ Length	  of	  connection	  
§ Timestamp	  of	  connection	  
§ Name	  of	  file	  storing	  packet	  capture	  of	  incident	  
§ Name	  of	  file	  storing	  payloads	  extracted	  from	  the	  data	  stream	  
§ 3rd	  party	  malware	  analysis	  report	  (if	  applicable)	  
As	   you	   can	   see,	   the	   details	   extracted	   from	   the	   monitored	   connection	   are	  
extremely	   similar	   to	   those	   collected	   by	   the	   honeypot	   software.	   The	  malware	   and	  
payload	   analysis	   component	   of	   the	   proxy	   monitor	   is	   actually	   supported	   by	  
Honeytrap	  –	  since	  connections	  are	  logged	  to	  a	  PCAP	  file	  for	  future	  analysis,	  the	  PCAP	  
file	   is	  passed	   in	   real	   time	   to	  Honeytrap,	   requesting	   it	   to	  analyze	   the	   captured	  data	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stream.	  Naturally,	  this	  yields	  the	  same	  forensic	  information	  just	  as	  if	  the	  connection	  
had	  gone	  directly	  to	  the	  honeypot.	  
	  
5.3.3.4 Re-­‐Injecting	  Clean	  Connections	  
	  
Finally,	   connections	  passing	  all	   criterion	   listed	  above	  are	   still	   required	   to	   flow	  
passively	   through	   a	   traditional	   IDS	   to	   further	   increase	   the	   probability	   of	   event	  
detection.	  All	  connections	  exiting	  both	  the	  Connection	  Monitor	  and	  analysis	  engine	  –	  
regardless	   of	   their	   type,	   either	   clean	   or	   suspicious	   –	   are	   automatically	   passed	  
through	   Snort	   for	   additional	   analysis	   before	   re-­‐entering	   the	   network.	   This	   final	  
analysis	   procedure	   is	   entirely	   passive	   and	   occurs	  when	   packets	   are	   injected	   back	  
into	   the	  bridge	  device.	  Any	  alerts	  generated	  by	  the	   traditional	  signature-­‐based	  IDS	  
regarding	  security	  incidents	  missed	  by	  my	  security	  appliance	  are	  sent	  directly	  to	  the	  
external	  security	  event	  manager	  (SEM)	  for	  handling.	  
	  
5.3.4 Logging	  and	  Data	  Collection	  
	  
When	  a	  security	  incident	  is	  detected	  by	  the	  security	  appliance,	  and	  determined	  
to	  fall	  outside	  the	  baseline,	  the	  appliance	  must	  log	  this	  information	  and	  push	  an	  alert	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Figure	  12:	  Out-­‐of-­‐Band	  Security	  Event	  Logging	  
	  
Since	   Internet	   connectivity	  within	   a	   SCADA	   system	   should	   not	   exist,	   this	   alert	  
will	   likely	   be	   sent	   to	   an	   internal	   security	   event	  manager	   (SEM).	   As	  we	   can	   see	   in	  
Figure	  12,	  the	  network	  appliance	  contains	  an	  out-­‐of-­‐band	  network	  connection	  back	  
to	  the	  infrastructure	  device	  intercepting	  traffic.	  This	  communication	  line	  should	  be	  
isolated	   from	   other	   SCADA	   traffic	   –	   either	   physically	   or	   logically	   -­‐	   allowing	   the	  
appliance	  to	  safely	  send	  log	  information	  to	  a	  centralized	  server.	  	  
Logged	  information	  should	  include	  the	  following	  connection	  information:	  
§ IP	  addresses	  
§ Mac	  addresses	  
§ Protocol	  information	  
§ Baseline	  fingerprint	  value	  




§ Packet	  dump	  of	  network	  packets	  (if	  applicable)	  
§ Hash	  of	  forged	  network	  packet	  dump	  (if	  applicable)	  
§ Honeytrap	  malware	  and	  payload	  report	  
This	  information	  should	  be	  logged	  for	  future	  forensic	  examination.	  In	  addition	  to	  
this	  data	  being	  pushed	  to	  an	  external	  security	  event	  manager,	  a	  mechanism	  should	  
be	   in	   place	   to	   send	   real-­‐time	   alerts	   to	   a	   human	   operator	   or	   security	   officer.	   If	   a	  
syslog	  server,	  for	  example,	  is	  set	  up	  to	  send	  real	  time	  alerts	  in	  critical	  incidents,	  this	  
will	  suffice.	  
	  
5.4 Summary	  of	  Algorithmic	  and	  Architectural	  Capabilities	  
	  
In	   the	   preceding	   sections	   I	   have	   provided	   a	   detailed	   architectural	   and	  
algorithmic	   overview	   of	   my	   proposed	   security	   solution.	   From	   an	   architectural	  
viewpoint,	   I	  have	  shown	  the	  feasibility	  of	  developing	  a	  security	  solution	  capable	  of	  
intercepting,	   analyzing,	   handling,	   and	   even	   hijacking	   connections	   as	   they	   traverse	  
the	  monitored	  network	  link.	  	  
Furthermore,	   an	   in-­‐depth	   analysis	   of	   the	   proposed	   security	   event	   detection	  
algorithm	  provided	  a	  detailed	  explanation	  of	   the	  various	  components	  and	  security	  
checkpoints	  used	  to	  classify	  connections	  traversing	  the	  network.	  These	  technologies	  
included	   flow-­‐based	   intrusion	  detection	   systems,	   device	   fingerprinting	   algorithms,	  
historical	  security	  information,	  and	  traditional	  signature-­‐based	  IDS	  software.	  
As	  my	  algorithm	  classified	   connections,	   those	  with	   a	  high	  probability	   of	   being	  
malicious	  were	  transparently	  hijacked	  by	  my	  algorithm	  and	  sent	  to	  a	  honeypot	  for	  
analysis.	  I	  have	  shown	  how	  this	  honeypot	  is	  capable	  of	  strategically	  interacting	  with	  
an	   attacker	   and	   collecting	   valuable	   forensic	   information	   about	   the	   ongoing	   attack.	  
Conversely,	   a	   mechanism	   was	   provided	   for	   passively	   monitoring	   and	   collecting	  
forensic	   information	   from	   suspicious	   connections	   without	   impeding	   packet	   flow	  
between	  the	  source	  and	  destination.	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Finally,	   I	   have	   shown	   the	   plausibility	   of	   integrating	   multiple	   security	   event	  
detection	  processes	   into	   a	   single,	   aggregated	   event	   detection	   algorithm	   capable	   of	  
providing	  detection	  in	  depth	  for	  SCADA-­‐specific	  APT	  attacks.	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Chapter	  6.	  Implementation	  and	  Performance	  Evaluation	  
	  
This	   chapter	   describes	   the	   process	   of	   implementing	   and	   testing	   my	   security	  
event	  detection	  solution,	  including	  its	  effectiveness	  and	  efficiency	  rates.	  First,	  I	  will	  
give	  a	  brief	  technical	  overview	  of	  the	  platform	  used	  for	  implementing	  my	  algorithm.	  
Next,	   for	   each	   type	   of	   APT	   attack	   the	   algorithm	   aims	   to	   detect,	   I	   will	   define	   the	  
testing	  scenario	  deployed	  followed	  by	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  experiment’s	  results.	  Since	  a	  
detection	  in	  depth	  approach	  is	  used	  to	  provide	  a	  well-­‐rounded	  approach	  to	  security	  
event	   detection	   and	   mitigation	   for	   SCADA	   environments,	   I	   must	   break	   down	   the	  
implemented	   algorithm	   into	   components,	   highlighting	   the	   strengths	   of	   each	  when	  
detecting	   particular	   attack	   vectors.	   Finally,	   I	  will	   take	   a	   step	   back	   and	   look	   at	   the	  
implementation’s	  overall	  performance,	  highlighting	   its	  ability	   to	  detect	  and	  handle	  
events	  without	  impacting	  network	  performance.	  	  
	  
6.1 Deployment	  Architecture	  
	  	  
The	   proposed	   security	   solution	   can	   be	   implemented	   as	   a	   physical	   device	   -­‐	  
hereafter	  refered	  to	  as	  an	   inline	  security	  appliance	  -­‐	  with	  all	  components	  required	  
for	   attack	   detection	   and	   interception	   integrated	   into	   a	   set	   of	   modular	   software	  
loadable	  on	  a	  single	  computing	  device.	  For	  development	  and	  testing	  purposes,	  I	  used	  
a	   virtual	   machine	   running	   on	   traditional	   server	   hardware.	   Leveraging	  
infrastructure-­‐as-­‐a-­‐service	   cloud	   computing	   (IaaS)	   allowed	   us	   to	   recreate	   a	   real	  
SCADA	   environment	   while	   placing	   the	   security	   appliance	   inline	   between	   two	  





Figure	  13:	  Deploying	  an	  Inline	  Security	  Appliance	  
	  
Once	  the	  device	  was	  placed	  within	  the	  simulated	  SCADA	  environment,	  I	  could	  focus	  
on	   choosing	   the	   underlying	   operating	   system	   and	   network-­‐level	   redundancy	  
technologies	  needed	  to	  make	  the	  device	  truly	  effective.	  
In	  the	  following	  sections	  I	  will	  go	  over	  the	  specific	  technologies	  used	  to	  develop	  
my	  prototype	  and	  its	  security	  event	  detection	  algorithm.	  
	  





Due	   to	   hardware	   constraints	   I	   chose	   to	   leverage	   my	   access	   to	   an	   existing	  
infrastructure-­‐as-­‐a-­‐service	   (IaaS)	   virtualization	   platform	   to	   ease	   development	   and	  
testing	  of	  my	  security	  appliance.	  	  
By	   leveraging	   the	   IaaS	   platform,	   I	   was	   able	   to	   easily	   recreate	   the	   SCADA	  
environment	   seen	   in	   Figure	   13	  while	   ensuring	  my	   security	   appliance	  was	   able	   to	  
both	   access	   underlying	   hardware	   resources	   and	   intercept	   all	   communications	  
between	   two	   infrastructure	   devices.	   Full	   hardware	   virtualization	   allowed	   us	   to	  
simulate	  running	  software	  on	  a	  physical	  rack-­‐mountable	  server	  while	  the	  flexibility	  
of	   IaaS	  allowed	  us	   to	  ensure	  all	   traffic	   flowing	   through	   the	   infrastructure	  switches	  
was	  forced	  to	  flow	  through	  the	  security	  appliance.	  	  
Furthermore,	  the	  underlying	  hardware	  settings	  where	  chosen	  to	  closely	  mimic	  a	  
real	  1U	  or	  embedded	  appliance	  device	  with	  access	   to	  a	  decent	  processor	  and	   little	  
random	   access	   memory.	   By	   reducing	   the	   amount	   of	   memory	   and	   CPU	   power	  
available	  to	  the	  appliance,	  I	  was	  forced	  to	  create	  an	  application	  that	  was	  extremely	  
memory	  efficient	  and	  capable	  of	  running	  on	  limited	  hardware.	  	  
The	  hardware	  chosen	  (and	  minimum	  system	  requirements)	  is	  as	  follows:	  
§ Dual	  core	  Intel	  processor	  @	  2.53	  GHz	  
§ 2	  GB	  RAM	  
§ 80	  GB	  hard	  drive	  
§ 3	  x	  1000	  MB	  Intel	  E1000	  NIC	  
It	  is	  possible	  for	  the	  security	  appliance	  to	  also	  be	  deployed	  on	  small	  form	  factor	  
ARM-­‐based	  devices,	  assuming	  the	  minimum	  system	  requirements	  above	  can	  be	  met.	  
Additionally,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   power	   such	   an	   embedded	   ARM-­‐based	   device	   using	  
existing	   Power	   Over	   Ethernet	   (PoE)	   technologies.	   This	   can	   further	   reduce	   the	  
hardware	  and	  deployment	  requirements	  for	  the	  proposed	  device.	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6.1.2 Network-­‐Level	  Redundancy	  
	  
During	   the	   development	   phase	   I	   chose	   not	   to	   leverage	   network-­‐level	  
redundancy	   protocols	   like	   Link	   Aggregation	   Control	   Protocol	   (LACP)	   and	   Virtual	  
Link	  Aggregation	  Control	  Protocol	  (VLACP)	  thanks	  to	  existing	  redundancy	  provided	  
by	  the	  underlying	  infrastructure-­‐as-­‐a-­‐service	  platform.	  	  
If	  deployed	  in	  non-­‐virtualized	  environments,	  as	  will	   likely	  be	  the	  case	   for	  real-­‐
world	   implementations,	   ideally	   each	   network	   connection	   between	   the	   security	  
appliance	  and	  an	  infrastructure	  device	  or	  SEM	  should	  be	  layer	  2	  redundant.	  Bonding	  
pairs	  of	  network	  interface	  cards	  using	  redundancy-­‐centric	  protocols	   like	  LACP	  and	  
VLACP	   can	   deliver	   an	   ideal	   level	   of	   redundancy,	   while	   providing	   additional	  
throughput.	  	  
	  
6.1.3 Network	  Placement	  
	  
Since	  my	  security	  event	  detection	  algorithm	  needs	  to	  analyze	  network	  streams	  
traversing	   through	   the	   SCADA	   network,	   the	   appliance	   device	   should	   be	   placed	  
between	   two	  network	   infrastructure	   devices.	   By	   no	  means	   is	   a	   single	   deployment	  
location	  ideal	  -­‐	  security	  appliances	  should	  be	  deployed	  strategically	  throughout	  the	  
network	  based	  on	  the	  policies	  and	  procedures	  governing	  the	  SCADA	  environment.	  	  
Looking	  at	  Figure	  13,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  inline	  security	  appliance	  is	  capable	  of	  
intercepting	  and	  analyzing	  all	  network	  flows	  between	  the	  top	  set	  of	  devices	  (e.g.:	  the	  
HMI)	   and	   the	   endpoint	   devices	   located	   on	   the	   second	   infrastructure	   switch.	  
Naturally,	   in	   order	   for	   the	  HMI	   to	   send	   requests	   or	   responses	   to	   the	   PLCs	   in	   this	  
diagram,	   communications	   must	   traverse	   the	   link	   between	   the	   two	   infrastructure	  
devices.	   This	   results	   in	   the	   communication	   stream	   traversing	   the	   network	   link	  
monitored	   by	   my	   appliance	   device,	   subsequently	   facilitating	   the	   analysis	   and	  
interception	  of	  all	  packets.	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However,	   if	  the	  HMI	  device	  were	  to	  push	  logged	  data	  to	  the	  data	  historian,	  the	  
network	  communication	  stream	  will	  not	  flow	  across	  the	  monitored	  link.	  In	  this	  case	  
we	  would	  need	  multiple	  security	  appliance	  deployments	  to	  monitor	  each	  section	  of	  
the	  network	  effectively.	  	  
	  
6.1.4 Operating	  System	  and	  Analysis	  Engine	  
	  
From	  the	  start,	  I	  designed	  my	  security	  appliance	  software	  to	  run	  on	  a	  plethora	  of	  
Unix-­‐based	   operating	   systems.	   For	   development	   and	   testing	   purposes	   I	   chose	  
CentOS	  6.4	  (64-­‐bit)	  with	  kernel	  version	  2.5.32,	  due	  to	  familiarity.	  Any	  major	  Linux	  or	  
Unix	  variant	  is	  capable	  of	  running	  the	  security	  appliance	  software;	  however,	  major	  
Linux	  distributions	  like	  Debian,	  Fedora,	  and	  CentOS	  tend	  to	  make	  deployment	  easier	  
thanks	  to	  their	  easy	  to	  use	  and	  well-­‐rounded	  software	  package	  managers.	  	  
To	  assist	  in	  the	  interception,	  analysis,	  and	  hijacking	  of	  monitored	  connections,	  I	  
relied	   upon	   a	   set	   of	   commonly	   used	   and	   open-­‐source	   Linux	   software	   packages,	  
primarily:	   ebtables,	   iptables,	   NFQUEUE,	   Python,	   various	   Python	   libraries,	   and	  
Honeytrap.	  Each	  of	  these	  software	  packages	  is	  free	  to	  use	  and	  modify,	  thus	  providing	  
us	  with	  the	  freedom	  to	  tweak	  and	  integrate	  each	  component	  into	  an	  optimized	  and	  
singular	  analysis	  engine.	  	  
	  
6.1.6 Just-­‐in-­‐Time	  Honeypot	  Component	  
	  
For	  the	  just-­‐in-­‐time	  honeypot	  component	  of	  my	  solution,	  I	  chose	  to	  integrate	  the	  
open-­‐source	  Honeytrap	   software.	   [62][89]	  Honeytrap	   is	   a	   dynamic	  meta-­‐honeypot	  
capable	   of	   handling	   and	   analyzing	   all	   types	   of	   network-­‐based	   attacks	   directed	  
towards	  the	  honeypot	  on	  the	  fly.	  [62][89]	  While	  most	  honeypots	  aim	  to	  only	  collect	  
malware	  samples	  in	  the	  wild,	  like	  Honeytrap’s	  predecessor	  dionaea	  [62],	  Honeytrap	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is	  capable	  of	  capturing	  initial	  exploits	  used	  against	  a	  vulnerable	  service.	  [89]	  This	  is	  
particularly	   true	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   zero-­‐day	   exploitation	   attempts.	   Furthermore,	  
Honeytrap	   provides	   the	   ability	   to	   dynamically	   spawn	   service	   handlers	   as	   packets	  
reach	   the	   honeypot.	   This	   just-­‐in-­‐time	   approach	   to	   honeypot	   service	   handling	  
ensures	   that	   all	   incoming	   connections	   to	   the	   honeypot	   will	   have	   a	   valid	   service	  
listening	  before	  the	  packet	  arrives.	   	  Furthermore,	  Honeytrap	  provides	  the	  ability	  to	  
detect,	  analyze,	  and	  report	  on	  payloads	  detected	   in	  network	  streams.	  This	  analysis	  
can	  be	  done	  automatically	  as	  the	  honeypot	  handles	  incoming	  connections,	  or	  can	  be	  
done	  by	  reading	  stored	  historical	  PCAP	  data.	  Naturally,	  this	  met	  my	  implementation	  
goals	  and	  was	  an	  ideal	  fit	  within	  my	  algorithm.	  
	  
6.1.7 Traditional	  Signature-­‐Based	  IDS	  Component	  
	  
For	  the	  traditional	  signature-­‐based	  IDS	  component	  of	  my	  solution,	  I	  chose	  to	  use	  
the	   open	   source	   and	   robust	   Snort	   network	   intrusion	   detection	   system.	   Snort	   is	   a	  
signature-­‐based	  network	   intrusion	  detection	   system	   (NIDS)	   capable	  of	   detecting	   a	  
plethora	   of	   attacks,	   ranging	   from	   port	   scanning	   to	   post-­‐exploitation	   payload	  
injection.	   [13]	   It	   can	   perform	   real-­‐time	   network	   stream	   analysis	   and	   logging	  with	  
little	   computational	   complexity.	   [13]	   This	   NIDS	  was	   chosen	   specifically	   due	   to	   its	  
efficiency	   and	   robustness	   when	   collecting	   forensic	   information	   about	   network	  
connections.	  Additionally,	  it	  ability	  to	  passively	  analyze	  threats	  while	  providing	  real-­‐
time	  alerting	  to	  an	  external	  SEM	  proved	  invaluable	  to	  my	  proposed	  solution.	  	  
	  
6.1.8 Out-­‐of-­‐Band	  SEM	  Connection	  	  
	  
Although	  my	  security	  appliance	   is	   capable	  of	  handling	  and	   logging	  all	   security	  
events	  internally,	  it	  is	  advantageous	  to	  forward	  some,	  if	  not	  all,	  security	  events	  logs	  
to	  an	  existing	  remote	  security	  event	  manager	  (SEM).	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When	   the	   security	   appliance	   detects	   a	   security	   event	   and	   needs	   to	   notify	   a	  
network	   administrator,	   ideally	   it	   would	   communicate	   with	   a	   SEM	   out-­‐of-­‐band	   to	  
stay	  covert.	  Even	  if	  the	  communications	  with	  a	  SEM	  are	  encrypted,	  an	  attacker	  that	  
has	   subverted	   the	   network	   infrastructure	   can	   use	   the	   presence	   of	   these	  
communications	   to	   determine	   if	   an	   attack	   has	   triggered	   a	   security	   event.	   By	  
communicating	  with	   a	   SEM	  out-­‐of-­‐band	  –	   for	   example,	   using	   a	  VLAN	  or	  dedicated	  
physical	   connection	   –	   we	   can	   facilitate	   seamless	   communication	   between	   the	  
security	  appliance	  and	  SEM	  without	  risking	  an	  attacker	  detecting	  alert	  messages.	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6.2 Security	  Event	  Detection	  and	  Mitigation	  Evaluation	  
	  
My	  security	  appliance’s	  modular	  nature	  requires	  us	  to	  break	  down	  the	  security	  
event	   detection	   and	  mitigation	   algorithm	   into	   a	   series	   of	   testable	   and	  measurable	  
components.	  In	  particular,	  this	  breakdown	  needs	  to	  show	  the	  algorithm’s	  ability	  to	  
detect	  each	  APT	  attack	  type,	  as	  highlighted	  in	  my	  implementation	  goals	  (see	  section	  
5.1	   for	  more	   details).	   In	   the	   following	   subsections	   I	  will	   define	   the	   type	   of	   attack	  
being	   detected,	   outline	   the	   scenario	   designed	   to	   measure	   the	   algorithm’s	  
performance	  in	  said	  situation,	  and	  analyze	  its	  effectiveness.	  
	  
6.2.1 Detecting	  the	  Device	  Enumeration	  Phase	  
	  
Looking	  at	  the	  big	  picture,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  most	  fundamental	  portion	  of	  any	  
attack	   is	   the	   device	   enumeration	   phase.	   Since	   this	   phase	   is	   crucial	   for	   all	   attacks	  
where	  perfect	  knowledge	  of	  the	  system	  is	  not	  known,	  it	  can	  be	  considered	  the	  best	  
indicator	  of	  a	  developing	  or	  ongoing	  attack.	  The	  successful	  detection	  of	  this	  phase	  of	  
an	   attack	   serves	   as	   an	   early	   warning	   system,	   allowing	   network	   administrators	   to	  
collect	   relevant	   forensic	   information	   from	   my	   appliance	   while	   crafting	   the	  
appropriate	  incident	  response	  strategy.	  	  
	  
6.2.1.1 Scenario	  and	  Setup	  
	  
Generally	  speaking,	  network	  reconnaissance	  attempts	  occur	  in	  one	  of	  two	  ways:	  
either	  passively	  or	  actively.	  Naturally,	  fully	  passive	  network	  reconnaissance	  attacks	  
are	   impossible	  to	  detect	   if	   the	  host	  device	  has	  been	  fully	  subverted	  by	  an	  attacker.	  
Luckily,	  only	  a	  limited	  set	  of	  information	  about	  network	  devices	  can	  be	  collected	  via	  
a	  fully	  passive	  reconnaissance	  attack.	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Because	  of	   this,	   attackers	  common	  use	  active	  network	  reconnaissance	   tools	   to	  
enumerate	  network	  devices,	  services,	  vulnerabilities,	  and	  network	  layouts.	  Typically	  
this	   is	   done	   using	   popular	   security	   tools	   like	   Nmap,	   Nessus,	   and	   the	   Metasploit	  
framework.	  These	  tools	  provide	  a	  variety	  of	  mechanisms	  for	  enumerating	  network	  
devices	   and	   their	   corresponding	   services.	  Depending	   on	   their	   usage,	   they	   are	   also	  
capable	   of	   connecting	   to	   hosts	   and	   polling	   services	   for	   identity	   information.	   This	  
allows	   some	   tools	   to	   compare	   service	   identities	   and	   versions	   to	   the	   exploit	  
databases	  to	  detect	  the	  presence	  of	  known	  vulnerabilities.	  
To	  assess	  the	  capability	  of	  my	  algorithm	  to	  detect	  these	  types	  of	  reconnaissance	  
attacks,	  I	  designed	  a	  scenario	  in	  which	  an	  attacker	  uses	  a	  popular	  network	  scanning	  
tool,	   Nmap,	   to	   enumerate	   devices	   and	   services	   on	   a	   network.	   In	   this	   setup,	   three	  
devices	  were	  set	  up	  on	  a	  local	  subnet:	  the	  first,	  a	  machine	  fully	  compromised	  by	  an	  
attacker;	   the	   other	   two,	   host	  machines	   listening	  on	   common	  SCADA	   service	  ports.	  
The	  network	  layout	  used	  is	  seen	  in	  Figure	  14.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  14:	  Device	  Enumeration	  Scenario	  
	  
As	  we	  can	  see,	  the	  attacker	  is	  located	  on	  infrastructure	  switch	  number	  one	  and	  
has	   an	   IP	   address	   of	   172.16.0.1.	   In	   this	   network	   the	   next	   contiguous	   devices	   are	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located	  on	  a	  different	  infrastructure	  switch,	  simulating	  the	  presence	  of	  spanning	  and	  
geographically	  sparse	  VLANs.	  On	  infrastructure	  switch	  number	  two,	  two	  devices	  are	  
connected:	  a	  human-­‐machine	  interface	  (HMI)	  at	  IP	  172.16.0.2,	  and	  a	  programmable	  
logic	  controller	  (PLC)	  at	   IP	  172.16.0.3.	  The	  HMI	  device	   is	  providing	  a	  web-­‐enabled	  
HMI	  control	  panel	  on	  TCP	  port	  80,	  whereas	  the	  PLC	  device	  has	  a	   listening	  Modbus	  
service	  on	  TCP	  port	  502	  and	  a	  web	  configuration	  service	  on	  TCP	  port	  80.	  	  
In	   this	   scenario,	   I	   created	   a	   network	   baseline	   where	   the	   attacking	   machine	  
(172.16.0.1)	   has	   only	   made	   connections	   to	   the	   PLC	   device’s	   Modbus	   service	  
(172.16.0.3).	  This	  is	  simulating	  a	  network	  setup	  where	  the	  attacking	  machine	  is,	  say,	  
a	   Modbus	   Master	   Terminal	   Unit	   (MTU)	   responsible	   for	   only	   polling	   Modbus	   PLC	  
devices	   on	   the	   network.	   Since	   its	   responsibilities	   are	   static,	   as	   in	   real	   SCADA	  
environments,	   it	   should	   not	   be	   observed	   connecting	   to	   the	   HMI	  machine,	   nor	   the	  
PLC’s	  web	  configuration	  service.	  	  
To	   simulate	   a	   real	   attacker	   attempting	   to	   enumerate	   network	   devices	   and	  
services,	   I	   used	   the	   popular	   network	   scanning	   tool,	   Nmap.	   In	   this	   scenario,	   the	  
attacking	  machine	   (172.16.0.1)	   performs	   a	   TCP	   connect	   port	   scan	   against	   all	   254	  
possible	   hosts	   in	   the	   local	   subnet	   (172.16.0.0/24).	   This	   results	   in	   the	   attacking	  
machine	  attempting	  to	  perform	  full	  TCP	  handshakes	  with	  all	  hosts	  on	  1001	  common	  
TCP	  ports.	  Typically,	  Nmap	  scans	  only	  attempt	  to	  connect	  to	  the	  1000	  most	  common	  
TCP	  services;	  however,	  the	  Modbus	  service	  was	  explicitly	  added	  to	  the	  list	  to	  ensure	  
the	  service’s	  presence	  was	  detected.	  	  






Figure	  15:	  Scanning	  for	  Network	  Devices	  
	  
As	   we	   can	   see,	   the	   network	   scan	   completed	   and	   successfully	   detected	   the	  
presence	   of	   two	   live	   hosts	   on	   the	   network:	   the	   HMI	   and	   PLC,	   as	   expected.	  
Furthermore,	  Nmap	   discovered	   that	   the	  HMI	   device	   (172.16.0.2)	   is	   hosting	   a	  web	  
server	  on	  TCP	  port	  80,	  and	  the	  PCL	  device	  (172.16.0.3)	  is	  hosting	  both	  the	  Modbus	  
listener	   on	  TCP	  port	   502	   and	   a	  web	   service	   on	  TCP	  port	   80.	   These	  were	   the	   only	  
services	  configured	  on	  each	  host	  -­‐	  both	  of	  which	  were	  detected	  easily	  by	  the	  Nmap	  
utility.	   From	   the	   attacker’s	   standpoint,	   two	   devices	   were	   discovered	   and	   three	  
possible	  vulnerable	  services	  were	  enumerated.	  This	  type	  of	  preliminary	  information	  
is	  paramount	  to	  an	  attacker	  during	  the	  beginning	  stages	  of	  the	  attack	  lifecycle.	  	  
	  
6.2.1.2 Observations	  and	  Analysis	  
	  
Now	   that	   the	   network	   enumeration	   scan	   has	   completed	   successfully,	   we	   are	  
ready	  to	  take	  a	  look	  at	  the	  security	  algorithm’s	  log	  entries	  during	  the	  event.	  Based	  on	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the	   scenario	   outlined	   above,	   we	   should	   expect	   that	   the	   algorithm	   has	   done	   the	  
following:	  
1. Dropped	  all	  connections	  to	  non-­‐existent	  hosts	  
2. Dropped	  all	  connections	  to	  existing	  hosts	  that	  do	  not	  provide	  services	  being	  
requested	  (e.g.:	  FTP,	  SSH,	  HTTPS,	  etc.)	  
3. Forwarded	   TCP	   port	   80	   connections	   directed	   at	   the	   HMI	   to	   the	   honeypot	  
instead	   (since	   the	   attacking	   machine	   never	   communicates	   with	   the	   HMI	  
device	  previously)	  
4. Forwarded	   TCP	   port	   80	   connections	   directed	   at	   the	   PLC	   to	   the	   honeypot	  
instead	   (since	   the	   attacking	   machine	   never	   communicates	   with	   the	   PLC	  
device’s	  service	  configuration	  port)	  
5. Monitored	   the	   connection	   between	   the	   attacking	   machine	   and	   the	   PLC’s	  
Modbus	  port	  (TCP	  port	  502)	  since	  a	  security	  event	  has	  recently	  taken	  place	  
(see	  above)	  
Looking	  at	  the	  logs	  from	  the	  security	  event	  detection	  algorithm	  during	  the	  time	  





Figure	  16:	  Analyzing	  Security	  Event	  Logs	  
	  
As	   we	   can	   see,	   the	   attacking	   machine	   attempted	   to	   make	   a	   variety	   of	  
connections	   to	   non-­‐existent	   hosts	   (as	   the	   scan	   is	   brute-­‐force	   by	   nature).	  	  
Connections	  to	  non-­‐existent	  hosts	  were	  identified	  as	  such	  and	  dropped	  accordingly.	  	  
Eventually	  the	  scan	  encounters	  the	  HMI	  device	  at	  172.16.0.2.	  Connections	  aimed	  
at	  services	  not	  hosted	  by	  the	  HMI	  (e.g.:	  FTP	  and	  SMTP,	  as	  seen	  above)	  are	  dropped	  
and	  logged.	  However,	  once	  a	  connection	   is	  established	  on	  TCP	  port	  80	  (HTTP),	  the	  
security	   appliance	   recognizes	   an	   existing	   service	   hosted	   by	   the	   destination.	   This	  
connection	   does	   not	   conform	   to	   the	   network	   baseline,	   causing	   the	   appliance	   to	  
forward	  the	  connection	  to	  the	  honeypot	  for	  analysis.	  The	  connection	  is	  forwarded	  to	  
the	   honeypot	   just	   in	   time,	   as	   expected,	   to	   ensure	   the	   TCP	   handshake	   occurs	  
seamlessly.	   Looking	   at	   the	   Nmap	   scan	   results,	   we	   can	   see	   that	   the	   connection	  
reaches	   the	   honeypot	   successfully	   without	   dropping	   any	   packets	   (else,	   the	   port	  
would	  show	  as	  filtered	  or	  closed).	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Next,	  Nmap	  begins	  scanning	  the	  PLC	  device	  for	  available	  services.	  As	  mentioned	  
in	   the	  scenario	  outlined	  previously,	   the	  attacking	  device	   is	  known	  to	  communicate	  
regularly	  with	  the	  Modbus	  service	  (TCP	  port	  502)	  on	  the	  destination	  device.	  This	  is	  
included	   in	   the	   network	   baseline	   used	   by	  my	   algorithm	  when	   the	   initial	   learning	  
period	  took	  place.	  First,	  Nmap	  begins	  requesting	  services	  on	  the	  device	  that	  do	  not	  
exist	  -­‐	  these	  requests	  are	  dropped	  transparently.	  Next,	  TCP	  port	  80	  is	  contacted	  (the	  
PLC’s	   service	   configuration	   port),	   triggering	   the	   security	   appliance	   to	   forward	   the	  
connection	   to	   the	   honeypot	   for	   analysis.	   Finally,	   TCP	   port	   502	   is	   contacted	   (note:	  
this	   is	   considered	   a	   legitimate	   communication	   channel)	   and	   the	   connection	   is	  
monitored	  due	  to	  recent	  security	  events	  generated	  by	  the	  attacking	  device.	  
Based	  on	  the	  results	  seen	  above,	  the	  security	  event	  detection	  algorithm	  handled	  
all	   connections	   as	   expected:	   irrelevant	   connections	   were	   dropped,	   malicious	  
connections	  not	  conforming	  to	  the	  baseline	  were	  hijacked	  and	  sent	  to	  the	  honeypot,	  
and	   suspicious	   connections	  were	  monitored.	   	   From	   these	   results	  we	   can	   conclude	  
that	   the	   flow-­‐based	   IDS	   approach	   to	   security	   event	   detection	   has	   proven	   effective	  
during	  an	  attacker’s	  reconnaissance	  phase.	  	  
The	  detection	  of	  such	  events	  provides	  administrators	  with	  a	  first	  line	  of	  defense	  
–	  sensing	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  attacker	  poking	  and	  prodding	  the	  network	  helps	  trigger	  
existing	   incident	   response	  mechanisms,	   hopefully	   dealing	  with	   an	   attack	   before	   it	  
develops	  into	  something	  more	  difficult	  to	  manage.	  	  
	  
6.2.2 Detecting	  Device	  Impersonation	  Attacks	  
	  
We	   should	   not	   assume	   that	   all	   attacks	   begin	   with	   a	   detectable	   device	  
reconnaissance	   scan.	   This	   is	   particularly	   true	   when	   an	   attacker	   has	   detailed	   or	  
insider	   knowledge	   of	   the	   network	   –	   perfect	   knowledge	   of	   the	   system	   allows	   the	  
perfect	  evasion	  of	  flow-­‐based	  intrusion	  detection	  algorithms.	  If	  an	  attacker	  has	  such	  
	  
138	  
knowledge,	   he	   can	   evade	   these	   security	   controls	   by	   ensuring	   all	   connections	  
conform	  to	  the	  network	  baseline.	  	  
By	  conforming	  all	  attacks	   to	   the	  network	  baseline	  (or	  a	  known	  set	  of	  common	  
connections),	  an	  attacker	  becomes	  severely	  limited	  in	  the	  attacks	  he	  can	  perform:	  all	  
exploitation	   attempts	   must	   target	   destination	   device	   services	   that	   the	   host	   has	  
already	  contacted.	  This	  forces	  an	  attacker	  to	  pivot	  strategically	  through	  the	  network,	  
exploiting	  and	  jumping	  from	  host	  to	  host	  until	  the	  final	  target	  it	  reached.	  Naturally,	  
this	  process	  is	  tedious	  at	  best.	  	  
From	   the	   attacker’s	   perspective,	   it	   makes	   more	   sense	   to	   modify	   legitimate	  
packets	   in	   transit	   on	   the	   network	   to	   inject	   exploits	   or	   values	   capable	   of	  
compromising	  the	  targeted	  system.	  This	  can	  be	  done	  easily	  using	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	  
and	  device	  impersonation	  attacks.	  In	  these	  attacks,	  an	  attacker	  will	  attempt	  to	  forge	  
connections	  to	  look	  like	  they	  came	  from	  a	  legitimate	  device	  –	  this	  can	  be	  done	  easily	  
for	   all	   UDP	   connections	   or	   by	   performing	   IP	   or	   TCP	   session	   hijacking	   attacks.	  
[16][72]	  Both	  session	  hijacking	  and	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	  conditions	  allow	  the	  attacker	  
to	  transparently	  modify	  or	  inject	  data	  into	  packets	  with	  ease.	  In	  either	  case,	  network	  
streams	  are	  easily	  compromised	  and	  hijacked	  to	  further	  the	  goals	  of	  an	  attacker.	  If	  
done	  properly,	   it	  may	  be	   extremely	   difficult	   to	   detect	   these	   types	   of	   attacks	   using	  
traditional	  security	  controls.	  
Looking	  back	   at	   the	   security	   event	   detection	   algorithm	  used	  by	  my	   appliance,	  
we	   can	   see	   that	   one	   main	   technology	   is	   used	   to	   combat	   these	   types	   of	   attacks:	  
network	  device	   fingerprinting.	  To	   test	   the	   effectiveness	   of	  my	   security	   appliance’s	  
fingerprinting	   algorithm,	   I	   designed	   two	   scenarios:	   one	   to	   test	   the	   overall	  
uniqueness	   of	   fingerprints	   and	   another	   to	   test	   the	   algorithm’s	   ability	   to	   detect	   IP	  





6.2.2.1 Fingerprint	  Uniqueness	  Testing	  Setup	  
	  
Before	   diving	   into	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   my	   algorithm,	   we	   must	   step	   back	   and	  
justify	  the	  use	  of	  device	  fingerprinting	  within	  my	  security	  event	  detection	  algorithm.	  
As	   outlined	   in	   pervious	   sections,	   there	   exists	   a	   set	   of	   IP	   and	   TCP	   related	  
implementation	  quirks	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  pseudo-­‐uniquely	  distinguish	  devices	  on	  a	  
network.	   Because	   IP	   and	   TCP	   implementations	   are	   both	   vendor	   and	   software-­‐
specific,	   we	   can	   leverage	   these	   implementation	   quirks	   to	   generate	   reasonably	  
unique	  fingerprints	  for	  network	  devices.	  [45][92]	  
Naturally	  the	  variety	  of	  implementation	  quirks	  is	  limited	  at	  best:	  there	  are	  only	  
so	  many	  possible	  combinations	  of	  IP	  and	  TCP	  header	  values.	  Because	  of	  this,	  I	  felt	  it	  
was	   important	   to	   gauge	   the	   uniqueness	   of	   device	   fingerprints	   from	   a	   variety	   of	  
computing	  devices.	  To	  do	  this,	  I	  developed	  a	  Python	  application	  capable	  of	  initiating	  
connections	  with	  various	  services	  on	  the	  Internet	  via	  web	  spidering.	  Because	  device	  
fingerprint	   generation	   is	  not	   reliant	  on	   layer	  6	   and	  7	  protocols,	   the	  most	   effective	  
way	   to	   harvest	   fingerprints	   for	   a	   variety	   of	   devices	   was	   to	   crawl	   the	   Internet,	  
initiating	  connections	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  web	  servers.	  
To	   test	   the	   uniqueness	   factor	   of	   fingerprints,	   I	   queried	   a	   specified	   number	   of	  
Internet	   devices	   (via	   spidering)	   and	   generated	   a	   fingerprint	   for	   each	  device.	  Next,	  
fingerprints	   were	   compared	   to	   each	   other	   to	   derive	   the	   percentage	   of	   unique	  
fingerprints	   for	   each	   set	   of	   hosts.	   These	   samples	  were	   then	   retested	   over	   a	   set	   of	  
increments	  to	  derive	  an	  accurate	  representation	  of	  fingerprint	  uniqueness	  over	  a	  set	  






6.2.2.2 Fingerprint	  Uniqueness	  Results	  
	  
After	   connecting	   to	   and	   fingerprinting	   a	   variety	   of	   hosts	   (totalling	   10,050)	   on	  
the	   Internet	  over	  a	  variety	  of	  query	   sizes	   ranging	   from	  50	   to	  1000	   (increments	  of	  
50),	  I	  derived	  the	  following	  fingerprint	  distribution	  statistics:	  
	  
	  
Figure	  17:	  Unique	  Fingerprint	  Distribution	  Over	  N	  Hosts	  
	  
Looking	   at	   the	   collected	   data	   we	   can	   see	   an	   emerging	   pattern	   in	   regards	   to	  
unique	  fingerprint	  distribution	  over	  a	  set	  of	  hosts:	  the	  uniqueness	  factor,	  regardless	  
of	   the	   sample	   size,	   closely	   follows	   40%.	  However,	   as	   the	   sample	   sizes	   increase	   to	  
sets	   of	  more	   than	  800	  hosts,	  we	   see	   a	  quick	   tapering	  off	   of	   unique	   fingerprints.	   It	  
appears	  as	  if	  the	  number	  of	  unique	  fingerprints	  becomes	  saturated	  when	  sampling	  
greater	  than	  800	  hosts.	  Looking	  deeper	  at	  the	  data	  we	  can	  see	  that	  this	  cap	  equates	  
to	  roughly	  300	  unique	  fingerprints.	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After	  analyzing	  the	  data	  collected	  above,	   I	  concluded	  that	  –	  on	  average	  –	  there	  
appears	   to	   be	   a	   40%	   uniqueness	   rate	   for	   fingerprints	   when	   sampling	   random	  
network	   blocks	   containing	   less	   than	   800	   hosts.	   Considering	   the	   average	   network	  
broadcast	  domain	  contains	  254	  hosts	  or	  less,	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  assume	  approximately	  40%	  
of	   fingerprints	   are	   truly	   unique	   to	   a	   device.	  Although	   this	   seems	   low	   initially,	   this	  
equates	  to	  over	  100	  potential	  device	  fingerprints	  for	  a	  class	  C	  network	  block.	  	  
Although	  fingerprinting	  devices	  does	  not	  ensure	  a	  100%	  success	  rate,	  there	  is	  a	  
1%	  chance	  that	  an	  attacker	  machine	  will	  accidentally	  generate	  a	  fingerprint	  identical	  
to	   the	   host	   machine	   being	   impersonated.	   This	   rate	   is	   low	   enough	   to	   justify	   the	  
inclusion	   of	   device	   fingerprinting	   technologies	  within	  my	   security	   event	   detection	  
algorithm.	  Furthermore,	  as	  network	  subnets	  approach	  800	  devices	  per	  subnet,	   the	  
probability	  of	  a	  device	  fingerprint	  collision	  approaches	  1/300.	  	  
	  
6.2.2.3 Fingerprint	  Algorithm	  Testing	  Scenario	  
	  
Now	  that	  the	  collision	  rate	  between	  fingerprints	  has	  been	  defined,	  we	  are	  ready	  
to	   test	   my	   algorithm’s	   ability	   to	   detect	   real	   life	   device	   impersonation	   attacks.	  
Keeping	   in	   line	  with	  my	  previous	   setup,	   I	   created	   a	   scenario	   in	  which	   an	   attacker	  
was	   capable	   of	   performing	   an	   IP	   hijacking	   attack	   where	   he	   could	   impersonate	   a	  








Figure	  18:	  Device	  Impersonation	  Attack	  via	  IP	  Hijacking	  
	  
As	  we	  can	  see,	  the	  attacker	  has	  created	  a	  feasible	  IP	  hijacking	  condition	  in	  which	  
he	   can	   impersonate	   the	   MTU	   device	   on	   infrastructure	   switch	   number	   one.	  
Leveraging	   this	   opportunity,	   the	   attacker	   has	   hijacked	   the	   IP	   address	   of	   the	  MTU	  
device,	  claiming	  it	  as	  his	  own.	  From	  the	  PLC’s	  (and	  security	  appliance’s)	  perspective,	  
packets	   sent	   from	   the	   MTU	   device	   appear	   to	   be	   legitimate.	   Furthermore,	   by	  
establishing	  a	  connection	  between	  the	  supposed	  MTU	  device	  and	  PCL	  device	  via	  the	  
Modbus	  service	  (TCP	  port	  502),	   the	  attacker	  has	  ensured	  the	  connection	  conforms	  
to	   the	   network	   baseline	   known	   to	   the	   security	   appliance.	   From	   a	   flow-­‐based	   IDS	  
perspective,	  this	  connection	  passes	  all	  security	  tests	  and	  looks	  100%	  legitimate.	  	  
To	   test	   the	   accuracy	   and	   feasibility	   of	  my	   fingerprinting	   algorithm,	   I	   leveraged	  
the	  above	  scenario	  where	  the	  attacker	  is	  using	  one	  of	  two	  operating	  systems	  as	  his	  
platform	  for	  preforming	  the	  attack:	  
1. Windows	  XP	  machine	  SP3	  
2. CentOS	  6.4	  with	  Kernel	  Version	  2.6.32-­‐279	  
To	   simulate	   the	   attacker	   communicating	  with	   the	  PLC	  device	  over	   the	  Modbus	  
protocol,	  a	  Modbus	  packet	  capable	  of	  polling	  one	  of	   the	  PLC	  device’s	  registers	  was	  
crafted	  using	  Scapy.	  [15]	  This	  packet	  was	  then	  injected	  into	  the	  TCP	  stream	  to	  solicit	  
a	  response	  from	  the	  PLC	  device,	  exactly	  like	  in	  a	  real	  Modbus	  poll	  request.	  This	  was	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done	  using	  both	  attacking	  host	  operating	   systems	   to	   test	  my	  algorithm’s	   ability	  of	  
detecting	   both	   large	   underlying	   software	   changes	   (Windows	   XP)	   and	   minor	  
software	  changes	  (CentOS).	  	  
The	  PLC	  device	  was	  simulated	  using	  a	  custom	  piece	  of	  Python	  software	  running	  
on	  CentOS	  6.4	  with	  Kernel	  version	  2.5.32.	  This	  software	  was	  bound	  to	  TCP	  port	  502	  
and	   listened	   for	   Modbus	   packets	   containing	   register	   read	   requests.	   When	   a	   read	  
request	   is	   sent	   to	   the	   server,	   a	   response	   is	   sent	   back	   containing	   an	   associated	  
register	   value.	   This	   was	   done	   using	   the	   pymodbus	   Python	   library	   to	   ensure	   all	  
communications	   conformed	   to	   the	  Modbus	   standard.	   [76]	  We	  must	   note	   that	   the	  
original	  MTU	  device	  used	  during	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  network	  baseline	  had	  the	  same	  
operating	  system	  platform	  as	  the	  PLC	  device,	  for	  efficiency’s	  sake.	  
	  
6.2.2.4 Fingerprint	  Algorithm	  Observations	  and	  Analysis	  
	  
During	   this	   simulation,	   connections	  were	   initiated	   between	   the	   original	   device	  
and	  the	  PLC	  using	  the	  two	  distinct	  operating	  systems	  noted	  above.	  In	  all	  versions	  of	  
the	  simulation	  I	  expected	  to	  see	  the	  following	  occur:	  
1. The	   connection	   from	   the	   legitimate	  MTU	   device	   passes	   the	   fingerprint	   test	  
and	  continued	  undisturbed	  
2. The	  connection	  from	  Windows	  XP	  failed	  the	  fingerprint	  test	  and	  was	  sent	  to	  
the	  honeypot	  
3. The	   connection	   from	  CentOS	   failed	   the	   fingerprint	   test	   and	  was	   sent	   to	   the	  
honeypot,	  as	  the	  operating	  system’s	  kernel	  revision	  is	  slightly	  different	  than	  
the	  real	  MTU	  
After	   running	   the	   two	   simulations	   and	   looking	   at	   the	   security	   event	   detection	  





Figure	  19:	  Analyzing	  Fingerprint	  Algorithm	  Security	  Event	  Logs	  
	  
At	   the	   beginning	   of	   this	   scenario,	   the	   original	   MTU	   device	   (172.16.0.1)	  
connected	  to	  the	  PLC	  device	  (172.16.0.3).	  As	  we	  can	  see	  in	  the	  first	  log	  entry	  above,	  
the	  MTU	  device’s	  fingerprint	  conformed	  to	  the	  network	  device’s	  baseline	  fingerprint	  
value.	   Because	   of	   this,	   the	   connection	   passed	   all	   tests	   and	   continued	   on	   to	   the	  
destination	  without	  being	  impeded	  in	  any	  way.	  	  
Conversely,	   in	   scenario	   two	   when	   the	   Windows	   XP	   machine	   was	   used	   to	  
impersonate	  the	  MTU	  device,	  the	  fingerprint	  integrity	  check	  failed	  (as	  seen	  in	  the	  log	  
above).	   This	   is	   expected,	   considering	   the	   divergence	   between	   host	   operating	  
systems	  is	  significant.	  Once	  the	  appliance	  detected	  the	  device	  impersonation	  attack,	  
the	   connection	   was	   hijacked	   and	   forwarded	   to	   the	   honeypot	   for	   further	   analysis.	  
This	  was	  done	  in	  real	  time	  and	  totally	  transparent	  to	  the	  attacking	  device.	  	  
Lastly,	   in	  scenario	  three	  when	  the	  extremely	  similar	  CentOS	  machine	  was	  used	  
to	  impersonate	  the	  MTU	  device,	  the	  fingerprint	  integrity	  check	  also	  failed.	  Looking	  at	  
the	  fingerprint	  values	  seen	  in	  the	  log	  shows	  a	  variety	  of	  similarities	  in	  the	  TCP	  and	  IP	  
stack	   implementations	  between	  slightly	  different	  Linux	  kernel	  revisions	  (2.5.32	  vs.	  
2.6.32-­‐279).	   However,	   these	   similarities	   are	   undermined	   by	   the	   slight	   variations	  
present	  between	  each	  kernel’s	  network	  stack	  implementation.	  Because	  of	  these	  tiny	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differences,	   the	   fingerprint	   algorithm	   successfully	   detected	   the	   device	  
impersonation	  attack,	  sending	  the	  connection	  to	  the	  honeypot	  as	  expected.	  	  
Based	   on	   these	   results	   we	   can	   see	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   detecting	   device	  
impersonation	  attacks	  using	  my	  fingerprinting	  algorithm.	  This	  is	  true	  for	  both	  major	  
and	   minor	   differences	   in	   operating	   systems	   used	   to	   stage	   the	   attack.	   Although	  
SCADA	   environments	   may	   exist	   that	   have	   many	   identical	   devices	   deployed,	   my	  
fingerprint	   algorithm	   creates	   another	   layer	   of	   detection	   technology	   capable	   of	  
detecting	   extremely	   sophisticated	   and	   targeted	   attacks.	   Coupling	   this	   with	   other	  
detection	  technologies,	  as	  per	  my	  implementation,	  allows	  the	  fingerprint	  algorithm	  
to	  provide	  another	  layer	  of	  detection	  in	  depth.	  
	  
6.2.3 Detecting	  Illegitimate	  Credential	  Use	  	  
	  
In	  scenario	  three	  I	  took	  a	  look	  at	  my	  algorithm’s	  ability	  to	  detect	  the	  illegitimate	  
use	  of	  device	  credentials.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  an	  attacker	  attempts	  to	  connect	  to	  a	  PLC	  
device’s	   configuration	   utility	   hosted	   on	   TCP	   port	   80.	   No	   IP	   hijacking	   takes	   place:	  
rather,	  a	  compromised	  legitimate	  device	  (in	  this	  case,	  the	  MTU	  at	  172.16.0.1)	  is	  used	  
to	   establish	   the	   connection	   to	   the	   PLC	  device.	   In	   this	   scenario	   I	   aimed	   to	  mimic	   a	  
situation	  in	  which	  an	  insider	  with	  legitimate	  credentials	  attempts	  to	  bypass	  security	  
controls	  by	  directly	  manipulating	  the	  PLC	  device	  on	  its	  configuration	  service	  port.	  	  
	  
6.2.3.1 Scenario	  and	  Setup	  
	  
Like	  previous	  scenarios,	   the	  connection	  between	  the	  host	  device	  and	  PLC	  does	  
not	   conform	   to	   the	   network	   baseline:	   the	   MTU	   device	   does	   not	   regularly	  
communicate	   with	   the	   PLC	   device	   on	   TCP	   port	   80.	   To	   simulate	   the	   PLC	   device’s	  
service	   configuration	   port,	   I	   spawned	   an	  HTTP	  webserver	   on	   the	   PLC	   device	   that	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required	   HTTP	   authentication	   before	   allowing	   a	   user	   to	   modify	   the	   PLC’s	  
configuration	  values.	  	  
Since	  this	  scenario	  assumes	  the	  attacker	   is	  using	  a	   legitimate	  device	  to	  contact	  
the	  PLC,	  I	  initiated	  a	  connection	  from	  the	  MTU	  device	  using	  the	  built	  in	  web	  browser	  
on	  CentOS.	  This	   connection	   contacted	   the	  PLC’s	  webserver,	  which	   responded	  with	  
an	  HTTP	  authentication	  request	  asking	  the	  user	  to	  supply	  credentials.	  Normally	  the	  
attacker	  would	   then	   input	   the	   illegitimate	  credentials,	   subsequently	  gaining	  access	  
to	  the	  configuration	  utility.	  	  
In	  this	  scenario	  I	  expect	  my	  security	  appliance	  to	  do	  the	  following:	  
1. Identify	  the	  connection	  as	  anomalous	  
2. Mark	  the	  connection	  as	  malicious	  
3. Hijack	  the	  connection	  and	  forward	  it	  to	  the	  honeypot	  
Furthermore,	   once	   the	   hijacked	   connection	   reaches	   the	   honeypot,	   I	   expect	  
Honeytrap	   to	   mimic	   the	   HTTP	   server	   being	   contacted,	   allowing	   us	   to	   collect	   the	  
credentials	   used	   by	   the	   attacker	   to	   gain	   access	   to	   the	   service.	   This	   information	   is	  
crucial	   for	   identifying	   the	   compromised	   credentials,	   allowing	   administrator	   to	  
swiftly	  revoke	  them.	  	  
	  
6.2.3.2 Observations	  and	  Analysis	  
	  
After	   initiating	  the	  connection	  from	  the	  compromised	  host	  to	  the	  targeted	  PLC	  
device,	  the	  following	  showed	  up	  in	  the	  security	  appliance’s	  logs:	  
	  
	  




As	   we	   can	   see,	   the	   flow-­‐based	   IDS	   component	   of	   my	   algorithm	   successfully	  
identified	   that	   the	   connection	   did	   not	   conform	   to	   the	   network	   baseline.	  
Consequently,	   the	  connection	  was	  hijacked	  and	  transparently	  sent	  to	  the	  honeypot	  
for	  analysis.	  	  
When	   analyzing	   the	   honeypot	   logs,	   I	   could	   see	   the	   incoming	   connection	  
interacting	   with	   Honeytrap’s	   dynamic	   service	   component.	   Next,	   looking	   at	   the	  
attacking	  machine’s	  browser,	  I	  could	  see	  that	  the	  honeypot	  has	  successfully	  hijacked	  
the	   connection	   and	   prompted	   the	   browser	   to	   authenticate	   using	   HTTP	  
authentication.	   After	   entering	   credentials	   into	   the	   browser,	   mimicking	   a	   real	  
attacker,	   I	   took	   a	   look	   at	   the	   packets	   captured	   from	   the	   connection	   via	   the	  
honeypot’s	  logging	  utility.	  By	  opening	  up	  the	  PCAP	  file	  logged	  for	  forensic	  purposes,	  
I	   could	   see	   the	   HTTP	   request	  made	   by	   the	   attacker’s	   web	   browser,	   including	   the	  




Figure	  21:	  Identifying	  Abused	  Credentials	  
	  
As	  expected,	  my	  algorithm	  has	  successfully	  identified	  the	  credential	  reuse	  attack,	  
hijacking	  the	  connection	  successfully	  and	  collecting	  relevant	  information	  regarding	  
the	  attack	  that	  took	  place.	  Furthermore,	  the	  whole	  process	  occurred	  instantaneously	  
and	   transparently.	   Considering	   this	   type	   of	   attack	   is	   extremely	   plausible	   in	  
sophisticated	   attacks	   against	   SCADA	   infrastructure,	   I	   have	   shown	   that	   even	   subtle	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attacks	  like	  credential	  reuse	  can	  be	  detected	  using	  flow-­‐based	  IDS	  technologies.	  Like	  
all	   technologies,	   this	   isn’t	   the	   silver	   bullet	   needed	   to	   detect	   all	   types	   of	   credential	  
reuse	   attacks:	   rather,	   it	   is	   another	   layered	   means	   to	   increase	   the	   probability	   of	  
identifying	  attacks	  taking	  place	  on	  SCADA	  networks.	  
	  	  
6.2.4 Detecting	  Zero-­‐Day	  Vulnerabilities	  and	  Targeted	  Malware	  	  
	  
It	   is	   possible	   that	   some	   attacks	   may	   not	   require	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   attacker	  
within	  the	  targeted	  network.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  in	  the	  case	  of	  targeted	  malware	  
attacks,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  Stuxnet	  incident	  of	  2010.	  [22][31]	  Stuxnet,	  a	  highly	  targeted	  
and	  complex	  piece	  of	  malware,	  was	  used	  to	  automatically	  infiltrate	  SCADA	  networks	  
worldwide.	   This	   malware	   leveraged	   multiple	   zero-­‐day	   exploits	   to	   facilitate	   its	  
propagation	  towards	  the	  target.	  [22][31]	  
Because	   of	   the	   high	   level	   of	   risk	   associated	   with	   zero-­‐day	   vulnerabilities	  
combined	  with	  targeted	  malware	  attacks,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  measure	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  
my	  proposed	  algorithm	  against	  such	  attacks.	  Some	  might	  say	  these	  attacks	  are	  the	  
Achilles	   heel	   of	  many	   current	   SCADA	   security	   solutions	   –	   this	   is	   particularly	   true	  
with	  zero-­‐day	  exploits,	  considering	  their	  novel	  nature.	  	  
	  
6.2.4.1 Scenario	  and	  Setup	  
	  
To	   gauge	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   my	   security	   event	   detection	   algorithm	   in	  
circumstances	   where	   an	   attacker	   has	   leveraged	   both	   zero-­‐day	   exploits	   and	  
customized	  malware,	   I	  decided	  to	  combine	  both	  attacks	   into	  a	  single	  attack	  vector.	  
Naturally	   this	   formulates	  a	  worst-­‐case	   scenario	   in	  which	   to	   test	  my	  security	  event	  
detection	   algorithm.	   The	   designed	   test	   scenario	   should	   highlight	   my	   algorithm’s	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ability	  to	  both	  detect	  the	  presence	  of	  self-­‐propagating	  malware	  and	  the	  use	  of	  novel	  
exploits.	  	  
For	  this	  scenario	  I	  designed	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  an	  automated	  piece	  of	  malware	  
is	   self-­‐propagating	   and	   attacking	   a	   single	   remotely	   exploitable	   SCADA	   service.	   To	  
keep	  things	  relevant	  to	  real-­‐life	  SCADA	  deployments,	  I	  set	  up	  a	  network	  host	  running	  
the	  ABB	  MicroSCADA	  software	  on	  Windows	  XP	  SP3.	  	  
	  ABB	  MicroSCADA	  is	  a	  piece	  of	  centralized	  substation	  automation	  software	  used	  
to	   interact,	   control,	   and	   log	  data	   from	  various	  SCADA	  devices.	   [1]	  This	   software	   is	  
designed	   to	   run	  on	  Windows	   systems	  and	  provides	   a	   listener	   service	  on	  TCP	  port	  
12221.	   ABB	   MicroSCADA	   Pro	   SYS600	   version	   9.3	   has	   a	   well-­‐known	   remote	   code	  
execution	  vulnerability	  allowing	  attackers	  to	  remotely	  control	  the	  device,	  including	  
spawning	  a	  remote	  shell.	   [69]	  This	  vulnerability	  was	  discovered	   in	  April	  2013	  and	  
has	  been	  openly	  published	  in	  the	  OSV	  database.	  In	  addition,	  a	  Metasploit	  framework	  
module	  was	  published,	   providing	   attackers	  with	   an	   easy-­‐to-­‐use	   tool	   for	   exploiting	  
vulnerable	  hosts.	  	  
To	   emulate	   a	   true	   zero-­‐day	   vulnerability,	   I	   verified	   that	   no	   attack	   signature	  
existed	   in	   Snort	   that	   was	   capable	   of	   detecting	   this	   specific	   exploit.	   Next,	   the	  
MicroSCADA	   software	   was	   set	   up	   on	   a	   Windows	   XP	   SP3	   machine	   at	   IP	   address	  
172.16.0.4.	   As	   a	   platform	   for	   mounting	   the	   attack,	   I	   reused	   the	   attacker	   machine	  
used	   in	  all	  previous	  scenarios	  –	   this	  machine	  was	   located	  at	  172.16.0.1.	  To	  ensure	  
real	  working	   exploit	   code	  was	   injected	   into	   the	   vulnerable	   service,	   the	  Metasploit	  
framework	   was	   installed	   to	   assist	   in	   the	   exploitation	   attempt.	   Finally,	   a	   network	  
baseline	  was	  created	  in	  which	  the	  attacking	  machine	  did	  not	  access	  the	  vulnerable	  
host.	  
In	  this	  scenario	  I	  expect	  my	  security	  algorithm	  to:	  
1. Detect	  the	  service	  identification	  phase	  of	  the	  attack	  
2. Drop	  all	  packets	  destined	  to	  non-­‐existent	  hosts	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3. Hijack	  malicious	  connections	  destined	   toward	   the	  vulnerable	  host	  and	  send	  
them	  to	  the	  honeypot	  
Once	  connections	  are	  hijacked	  and	  sent	  to	  the	  honeypot,	  I	  expect	  the	  just-­‐in-­‐time	  
honeypot	   to	   interact	   with	   the	   simulated	   malware,	   emulating	   a	   full	   successful	  
exploitation	  attempt.	  Logs	  should	  then	  be	  created	  that	  provide	  detailed	  information	  
about	  the	  code	  and	  techniques	  used	  to	  successfully	  exploit	  the	  target.	  
	  
6.2.4.2 Observations	  and	  Analysis	  
	  
To	   simulate	   the	   vulnerable	   service	   identification	   portion	   of	   the	   automated	  
malware	  attack,	  I	  first	  scanned	  the	  local	  subnet	  for	  devices	  hosting	  the	  MicroSCADA	  
service	  on	  TCP	  port	  12221.	  This	  was	  done	  using	   the	  open	  source	  Nmap	   tool.	   Scan	  
results	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  22.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  22:	  Scanning	  for	  Vulnerable	  Hosts	  
	  
Upon	   the	   completion	   of	   the	   enumeration	   scan,	   I	   can	   see	   that	   Nmap	   has	  
successfully	   identified	   the	   vulnerable	   host	   at	   172.16.0.4.	   	   Looking	   at	   the	   security	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algorithm’s	  logs,	  I	  can	  see	  that	  the	  scan	  attempted	  to	  connect	  to	  all	  hosts	  in	  the	  local	  
subnet	  and	  successfully	  interacted	  with	  the	  target	  host.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  23.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  23:	  Viewing	  Connection	  Logs	  
	  
As	  we	  can	  see,	  probes	  destined	  for	  nonexistent	  hosts	  were	  dropped,	  as	  expected.	  
However,	   as	   the	   scan	   worked	   its	   way	   through	   the	   subnet,	   it	   eventually	   tried	   to	  
contact	  the	  vulnerable	  host.	  Since	  this	  type	  of	  connection	  between	  the	  attacking	  host	  
and	  vulnerable	   service	   is	  not	  present	   in	   the	  network	  baseline,	   the	   connection	  was	  
hijacked	   in	   real	   time	   and	   sent	   to	   the	   honeypot	   for	   handling.	   This	   conforms	   to	   the	  
expected	  behaviour	  of	  my	  security	  algorithm.	  	  
Now	  that	  the	  malware	  has	  completed	  its	  vulnerability	  scan	  and	  accrued	  a	  list	  of	  
potentially	  exploitable	  targets,	  it	  will	  attempt	  to	  exploit	  each	  target	  in	  an	  automated	  
fashion.	  To	  simulate	  this	  type	  of	  blind	  attack,	  I	  used	  the	  Metasploit	  framework’s	  ABB	  
MicroSCADA	  exploit	  module	  to	  attack	  the	  host	  machine.	  After	  simply	  specifying	  the	  
target	   IP	   address	   and	   running	   the	   module,	   I	   managed	   to	   successfully	   exploit	   the	  






Figure	  24:	  Successfully	  Exploiting	  the	  Target	  
	  
Looking	   at	   the	   output	   above,	   we	   can	   see	   the	   exploit	   code	   and	   payload	   were	  
uploaded	   successfully	   to	   the	   target,	   causing	   a	  Windows	   command	   line	   shell	   to	   be	  
sent	   back	   to	   us.	   In	   a	   real-­‐world	   scenario,	   a	   piece	   of	   automated	   malware	   may	  
alternatively	   inject	   a	   payload	   capable	   of	   creating	   a	   backdoor	   on	   the	   target	   or	  
executing	  a	  set	  of	  malicious	  commands.	  In	  this	  scenario	  I	  focused	  on	  simply	  gaining	  a	  
remote	  shell.	  	  
Now	   that	   the	   exploit	   has	   completed	   successfully,	   we	   should	   expect	   that	   the	  
honeypot	  has	  collected	  a	  useful	   set	  of	   forensic	   information	  about	   the	  exploit	  used.	  
This	   information	  should	  assist	  an	  administrator	   in	  recreating	  the	  vulnerability	  and	  
creating	  a	  viable	  remediation	  strategy.	  	  
Looking	  at	  the	  honeypot	  logs	  for	  this	  specific	  event,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  zero-­‐day	  





Figure	  25:	  Capturing	  Zero-­‐Day	  Exploit	  Code	  
	  
At	  first	  glance	  it	  is	  very	  apparent	  what	  is	  going	  on:	  the	  exploitable	  service	  allows	  
the	   use	   of	   an	  Execute	   command	   capable	   of	   executing	   arbitrary	   commands	   on	   the	  
host	  machine.	   Likely,	   this	   execute	   command	   requires	   some	   level	   of	   authentication	  
before	  passing	  commands	  to	  the	  underlying	  operating	  system.	  	  
Looking	   further	  down	   the	   list	  of	   captured	  data	   confirms	   this	  presumption:	  we	  
can	   see	   that	   a	   buffer	   overflow	   exploit	   is	   taking	   place,	   as	   indicated	   by	   excessive	  
payload	  padding	  with	  the	  ‘A’	  character.	  This	  padded	  payload	  is	  then	  stored	  to	  a	  file	  
called	   owQAm.b64.	   Based	   on	   the	   naming	   convention	   and	   payload	   content,	   we	   can	  
safely	  assume	  that	  this	  exploit	  requires	  the	  generation	  of	  a	  payload	  long	  enough	  to	  
successfully	  create	  a	  buffer	  overflow	  condition	  on	  the	  target	  service.	  Naturally,	  this	  
exploit	   code	   is	   encoded	   using	   Base64	   to	   ensure	   non-­‐printable	   characters	   are	   not	  





Figure	  26:	  Capturing	  Additional	  Zero-­‐Day	  Exploit	  Code	  
	  
Continuing	  on,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  original	  payload	  is	  being	  decoded	  on	  disk	  and	  
turned	  into	  a	  Visual	  Basic	  Scripting	  (VBS)	  executable.	  Shortly	  after	  the	  malicious	  VBS	  
file	  is	  executed,	  a	  reverse	  shell	  connection	  is	  initiated	  and	  received	  by	  a	  Metasploit	  
listener.	  Finally,	  temporary	  files	  are	  deleted	  from	  the	  target	  to	  remove	  any	  evidence	  
of	   the	   attack.	   This	   attack	   resulted	   in	   the	   full	   exploitation	   of	   the	   target	   machine,	  
providing	  us	  with	  a	  limited	  shell	  on	  the	  target	  device.	  This	  limited	  shell	  could	  then	  
be	  escalated	   into	  a	   full	  System	  user	  shell	  via	  any	  number	  of	  well-­‐known	  Windows	  
privilege	  escalation	  exploits.	  	  
As	   we	   saw	   in	   the	   security	   event	   logs	   above,	   the	   connection	   was	   successfully	  
identified	   as	   being	  malicious	   and	  was	   redirected	   to	   the	   honeypot.	   This	   fooled	   the	  
malware	   into	   interacting	   with	   the	   honeypot	   and	   attempting	   to	   get	   a	   shell.	  
Furthermore,	   the	  Honeytrap	   software	  was	   able	   to	   emulate	   the	   target	   service	  well	  
enough	  to	  facilitate	  the	  collection	  of	  detailed	  forensic	  information	  about	  the	  attack.	  
This	  information	  was	  then	  analyzed,	  enabling	  us	  to	  reverse	  engineer	  the	  attack	  and	  
determine	   the	   exploit	   used.	  Packet	   captures	   from	   the	   event	   could	   then	  be	  used	   to	  
generate	   Snort	   signatures	   capable	   of	   detecting	   and	   blocking	   attacks	   using	   this	  




6.2.5 Detecting	  Data	  Exfiltration	  Attempts	  	  
	  
In	   some	  cases	  we	  must	   assume	   that	   a	  highly	   skilled	  and	  persistent	   attacker	   is	  
capable	  of	  evading	  even	  the	  most	  complex	  and	  layered	  security	  technologies.	  When	  
this	   occurs,	   we	   can	   presume	   that	   the	   attacker	   has	   successfully	   manipulated	   the	  
SCADA	  system	   into	   conforming	   to	  his	   goals.	   Furthermore,	  we	   can	  assume	   that	   the	  
attacker	  may	  want	   to	   exfiltrate	   sensitive	   data	   from	   compromised	   hosts	   to	   one	   or	  
more	  centralized	  Internet	  hosts.	  This	  may	  be	  of	  particular	  concern	  if	  an	  insider	  has	  
managed	  to	  subvert	  security	  controls	  and	  gain	  access	  to	  sensitive	  documents.	  	  
This	  threat	  should	  not	  be	  ignored,	  even	  if	  the	  attack	  has	  already	  taken	  place.	  The	  
successful	  interception	  of	  data	  exfiltration	  attempts	  can	  provide	  extremely	  valuable	  
forensic	   information	  about	   the	  attacker,	  documents	  and	   files	  being	   targeted	   in	   the	  
attack,	  and	  Internet-­‐facing	  servers	  assisting	  in	  the	  attack.	  Together	  this	  information	  
helps	   create	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   a	   security	   event	   when	   conducting	   a	   post-­‐
incident	  investigation.	  	  
Because	   of	   this,	   I	   will	   test	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   my	   algorithm	   when	   data	  
exfiltration	   attempts	   occur	   on	   a	   SCADA	   network.	   I	   expect	   that	   my	   security	   event	  
detection	  algorithm	  will:	  
1. Identify	  the	  anomalous	  outbound	  connections	  	  
2. Hijack	  outbound	  connections	  
3. Collect	  useful	  forensic	  information	  about	  data	  exfiltration	  attempts	  
My	   algorithm’s	   effectiveness	  will	   be	   tested	   by	   simulating	   a	   compromised	  host	  






6.2.5.1 Scenario	  and	  Setup	  
	  
In	  this	  scenario,	  I	  have	  reused	  the	  compromised	  CentOS	  host	  used	  in	  all	  previous	  
simulations.	   This	   host,	   located	   at	   172.16.0.1,	   has	   been	   fully	   compromised	   by	   an	  
attacker	  who	  has	  managed	   to	  download	  sensitive	  documents	   from	  other	  exploited	  
internal	  hosts.	  After	  collecting	  these	  documents,	  the	  simulated	  attacker	  will	  attempt	  
to	  exfiltrate	  the	  documents	  to	  a	  webserver	  under	  his	  control	  on	  the	  Internet,	  located	  
at	  IP	  address	  199.212.33.87.	  File	  uploads	  will	  be	  handled	  by	  the	  command	  line	  Curl	  
utility,	   as	   per	   typical	   command-­‐line	   methods	   for	   uploading	   documents	   to	   a	  
webserver.	  This	  was	  done	  using	  the	  following	  command:	  
	  
curl	  -­‐i	  -­‐F	  name=name	  -­‐F	  filedata=@Transparency_august.pdf	  
http://199.212.33.87/asdf.php	  
Figure	  27:	  Using	  Curl	  to	  Exfiltrate	  Data	  
	  
Once	   the	   command	   was	   executed,	   the	   compromised	   machine	   attempted	   to	  
initiate	  a	  connection	  with	  the	   Internet-­‐facing	  server	  awaiting	   file	  uploads	   from	  the	  
attacker.	  	  
	  
6.2.5.2 Observations	  and	  Analysis	  
	  
Looking	   at	   the	   security	   event	   detection	   algorithm’s	   logs,	   we	   can	   see	   that	   this	  
connection	  did	  not	  conform	  to	  the	  network	  baseline,	  naturally,	  and	  was	  successfully	  





Figure	  28Hijacking	  the	  Outbound	  Connection	  
	  
As	   expected,	   the	   hijacked	   outbound	   connection	   was	   redirected	   to	   the	   just-­‐in-­‐
time	   honeypot	   service	   listener	   on	   TCP	   port	   80.	   From	   the	   command	   line	   of	   the	  




Figure	  29:	  Emulating	  a	  Successful	  File	  Transfer	  
	  
At	  this	  point	  the	  attacker	  would	  likely	  believe	  that	  the	  sensitive	  document	  was	  
exfiltrated	   successfully	   to	   the	   target	   server.	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case!	   The	  
connection	   has	   been	   hijacked	   and	   sent	   to	   the	   honeypot,	   fully	   bypassing	   the	  
destination	  host.	  	  
Once	  the	  file	  transfer	  between	  the	  host	  and	  honeypot	  completed	  successfully,	  I	  
opened	   the	   packet	   capture	   file	   generated	   by	  Honeytrap	   using	   the	   popular	   packet	  
analysis	   tool,	   Wireshark.	   Looking	   at	   the	   packets	   generated,	   I	   saw	   that	   an	   HTTP	  
connection	  occurred	  towards	  an	  Internet	  host	  at	  199.212.33.87	  (as	  expected).	  This	  




Figure	  30:	  Analyzing	  the	  Exfiltration	  Attempt	  
	  
By	   decoding	   the	   HTTP	   stream	   using	  Wireshark,	   we	   can	   see	   that	   the	   attacker	  
tried	   to	   POST	   a	   PDF	   file	   called	   Transparency_august.pdf	   to	   a	   PHP	   page	   at	  
http://199.212.33.87/asdf.php.	   Based	   on	   the	   file’s	   name,	   we	   can	   conclude	   that	   the	  
exfiltrated	   file	   was	   likely	   an	   internal	   and	   possibly	   sensitive	   document.	   Since	   the	  
honeypot	  software	  stores	  a	  full	  packet	  capture	  of	  the	  transfer,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  scrape	  
the	   PDF	   file	   out	   of	   the	   packet	   capture,	   allowing	   us	   to	   open	   and	   analyze	   the	  
compromised	  file.	  	  
Based	  on	  these	  results,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  my	  security	  algorithm	  has	  successfully	  
identified	  the	  data	  exfiltration	  connection,	  marked	  it	  as	  malicious,	  and	  redirected	  it	  
to	  the	  internal	  honeypot.	  The	  attacker	  was	  then	  fooled	  into	  believing	  the	  connection	  
completed	   successfully.	   As	   per	   my	   expectations,	   my	   algorithm	   leveraged	   the	  
Honeytrap	   honeypot	   software	   to	   successful	   collect	   valuable	   forensic	   information	  
about	  the	  data	  exfiltration	  attempt.	  Furthermore,	  this	  forensic	  information	  provided	  
enough	   detailed	   information	   to	   help	   us	   identify	   and	   extract	   the	   compromised	  





6.3 Evaluating	  Device	  Efficiency	  
	  
Now	  that	  I	  have	  assessed	  the	  viability	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  my	  security	  algorithm	  
in	  a	  variety	  of	  attack	  scenarios,	  we	  must	  step	  back	  and	  look	  at	  its	  overall	  operational	  
efficiency.	   Considering	   the	   low-­‐latency	   and	   near	   real-­‐time	   nature	   of	   SCADA	  
environments,	  we	  must	   ensure	   that	   any	   inline	   security	   appliance	   does	   not	   impact	  
the	  overall	  performance	  of	  the	  monitored	  network	  link.	  	  
	  
6.3.1 Testing	  Goals	  
	  
To	   accurately	   assess	   the	   efficiency	   of	  my	   algorithm	  and	   associated	   software,	   I	  
must	   stress	   test	   the	  monitored	   link	   under	   a	   variety	   of	   scenarios	   to	   determine	   its	  
throughput	   before	   and	   after	   placing	   my	   device	   inline.	   By	   measuring	   the	   device’s	  
throughput	  when	   handling	   a	   single	   type	   of	   security	   event,	   I	   can	   provide	   accurate	  
efficiency	   measurements	   for	   all	   worst-­‐case	   attack	   scenarios.	   This	   is	   done	   by	  
comparing	  worst-­‐case	   scenario	   throughput	  measurements	   against	   the	   overall	   link	  
throughput	  capacity	  between	  two	  infrastructure	  devices.	  	  
During	  the	  stress	  testing	  process,	  I	  aimed	  to	  measure	  my	  device	  and	  algorithm’s:	  
1. Ability	   to	   robustly	   handle	   all	   traffic	   and	   events	   without	   crashing	   or	  
encountering	  other	  software	  related	  exceptions	  
2. Throughput	  when	  handling	  clean	  traffic	  fully	  saturating	  the	  network	  link	  
3. Throughput	  when	  handing	  and	  monitoring	  suspicious	  traffic	  fully	  saturating	  
the	  network	  link	  
4. Throughput	  when	  hijacking	  and	  redirecting	  malicious	  traffic	  to	  the	  honeypot	  
during	  full	  link	  saturation	  




6. Overall	   performance	   when	   compared	   to	   the	   network	   link’s	   effective	  
throughput	  
The	  measurement	  of	  each	  factor	  above	  can	  help	  us	  effectively	  and	  accurately	  assess	  
the	  viability	  of	  deploying	  my	  algorithm	  in	  live	  SCADA	  environments.	  	  
Before	   continuing	   with	   the	   device	   efficiency	   assessment	   process,	   we	   must	  
remember	   that	  my	   deployment	   relied	   on	   the	   (relative)	   inefficiency	   of	   the	   Python	  
interpreted	   programming	   language.	   Although	   Python	   provides	   some	   increased	  
efficiency	   through	   precompiled	   byte	   code,	   this	   optimization	   process	   does	   not	  
compare	   to	   truly	   compiled	   language	   like	   C	   and	   C++.	   To	   further	   increase	   the	  
efficiency	  of	  my	  appliance,	  I	  should	  consider	  porting	  all	  code	  to	  a	  language	  capable	  of	  
being	  fully	  compiled	  on	  the	  target	  host.	  This	  was	  not	  done	  during	  the	  development	  
of	  my	  prototype	  to	  save	  both	  time	  and	  effort.	  	  	  
	  
6.3.2 Data	  Collection	  
	  
For	   each	   of	   my	   testing	   scenarios,	   I	   assumed	   the	   monitored	   network	   link	  
between	  two	  infrastructure	  devices	  had	  a	  bandwidth	  of	  100Mbps.	  Because	  this	  link	  
is	  point-­‐to-­‐point,	  network	  latency	  and	  processing	  delay	  is	  negligible,	  allowing	  us	  to	  
assume	   an	   effective	   link	   throughput	   of	   approximately	   100Mbps.	   This	   is	   used	   as	   a	  
baseline	   to	   evaluate	   the	   true	   performance	   of	   my	   device.	   If	   my	   implementation	   is	  
capable	  of	  providing	  an	  overall	  throughput	  speed	  greater	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  the	  actual	  
link	   throughput,	  only	   then	  can	   it	  be	  considered	  eligible	   for	  a	   live	  deployment	  on	  a	  
legacy	  SCADA	  network.	  
As	   mentioned	   previously,	   I	   decided	   to	   measure	   the	   performance	   of	   my	  
deployment	   in	   three	  distinct	  worst-­‐case	  scenarios:	  when	  the	   link	   is	   fully	  saturated	  
with:	  
1. Clean	  traffic	  conforming	  to	  the	  network	  baseline	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2. Suspicious	   traffic	   conforming	   to	   the	  network	  baseline,	  with	   the	  presence	  of	  
recent	  security	  events	  	  
3. Malicious	  traffic	  not	  conforming	  to	  the	  network	  baseline	  
Since	   traffic	   tends	   to	   be	   variable	   on	   a	   live	   network,	   both	   in	   packet	   size	   and	  
transmission	  duration,	  I	  decided	  to	  measure	  the	  three	  scenarios	  above	  with	  a	  variety	  
of	  transmission	  durations	  per	  connection	  stream.	  To	  do	  this,	  each	  scenario	  was	  run	  
18	  times,	  each	  time	  with	  static	  sustained	  connection	  durations	  ranging	  from	  100ms	  
to	   1000ms.	   By	   doing	   this,	   I	   could	   observe	   my	   device’s	   capacity	   for	   handling	  
connection	   streams	   and	   individual	   packets	   of	   various	   sizes.	   This	   data	   was	   then	  
plotted	  to	  gauge	  the	  overall	  throughput	  of	  the	  device	  in	  various	  scenarios.	  	  
To	   aid	   in	   the	   generation	   of	   the	   scenarios	   outlined	   above,	   I	   used	   iPerf,	   an	   open	  
source	  network	  performance	  tool	  capable	  of	  measuring	  TCP	  and	  UDP	  performance	  
in	  a	  variety	  of	  scenarios.	  [43]	  In	  each	  test	  two	  hosts	  -­‐	  A	  and	  B	  -­‐	  were	  wired	  directly	  
to	  my	  security	  appliance,	  allowing	   it	   to	   fully	  monitor	  and	  control	   the	   link.	  The	   link	  
speed	   used	   between	   each	   device	  was	   set	   to	   1000Mbps,	   as	   to	   not	   cap	  my	   device’s	  
maximum	   effective	   throughput.	   Furthermore,	   I	   solely	   relied	   upon	   the	   TCP	  
throughput	  efficiency	  capabilities	  of	  iPerf,	  considering	  –	  by	  design	  -­‐	  TCP	  throughput	  
performance	  is	  always	  less	  than	  UDP	  due	  to	  protocol	  overhead.	  	  
Next,	   iPerf	   was	   installed	   on	   host	   A	   to	   act	   as	   the	   client	   device	   for	   each	   testing	  
scenario.	   A	   short	   Python	   script	   was	   created	   to	   execute	   iPerf	   continuously	   with	   a	  
variety	  of	  settings	  conducive	  to	  each	  test.	  Since	  I	  aimed	  to	  measure	  the	  throughput	  
performance	   of	   my	   device	   when	   handing	   variable	   packet	   sizes	   and	   connection	  
durations,	   iPerf	  was	   executed	   16	   times	   per	   test	  with	   a	   static	   connection	   duration	  
period	   (measured	   in	   milliseconds).	   This	   was	   done	   by	   looping	   through	   the	  
connection	   durations	   chosen	   (100ms	   to	   1000ms,	   steps	   of	   50ms)	   and	   calling	   the	  





Figure	  31:	  Stress	  Testing	  Using	  iPerf	  
	  
Looking	  at	  the	  code	  above,	  I	  can	  see	  that	  my	  script	  is	  asking	  iPerf	  to	  connect	  to	  
host	  B	  (172.16.0.2)	  using	  a	  connection	  duration	  of	  time	  and	  with	  a	  thread	  count	  of	  
threads.	  Naturally,	  the	  connection	  duration	  is	  static	  depending	  on	  the	  test	  being	  run,	  
while	  the	  thread	  count	  is	  set	  high	  enough	  (10,000	  threads	  per	  experiment)	  to	  ensure	  
total	  link	  saturation	  at	  any	  point	  in	  time.	  	  
Next,	  host	  B	  was	  set	  up	  with	  iPerf	  in	  server	  mode.	  In	  this	  mode,	  iPerf	  only	  listens	  
for	  connections	  and	  redirects	  all	  transferred	  data	  to	  /dev/null.	  	  
When	  iPerf	  is	  executed	  via	  my	  testing	  script,	  the	  network	  link	  is	   fully	  saturated	  
with	  connections	  conforming	  to	  the	  connection	  duration	  specified	  for	  each	  test.	  The	  
instance	  of	   iPerf	  on	  host	  A	  then	  measures	  the	  overall	  connection	  performance	  and	  
throughput,	   saving	   statistics	   to	  disk.	   Link	   saturation	   is	   continuous	  until	   all	   10,000	  
threads	  execute	  successfully.	  	  
Now	   that	   iPerf	   has	   been	   scripted	   to	   execute	   and	   record	   data	   for	   each	   test	  
scenario,	  I	  am	  ready	  to	  create	  and	  measure	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  three	  worst-­‐case	  
scenario	  conditions	  mentioned	  above.	  	  
In	  scenario	  one,	  clean	  traffic	  is	  generated	  to	  fully	  saturate	  the	  link.	  To	  create	  this	  
scenario,	  a	  network	  baseline	  was	  generated	  on	  my	  device	   in	  which	  all	  connections	  
between	  host	  A	  and	  B	  were	  whitelisted,	  regardless	  of	  the	  source	  or	  destination	  ports.	  
Next,	  iPerf	  was	  run	  for	  each	  connection	  duration	  scenario	  (100ms	  to	  1000ms,	  step	  of	  
50ms)	  to	  measure	  the	  device’s	  effective	  throughput.	   In	  this	  scenario,	  my	  algorithm	  
would	   execute	   through	   all	   security	   event	   detection	   steps,	   including	   the	   intensive	  
device	   fingerprinting	  process.	  This	   scenario	  most	  accurately	   represents	   the	  worst-­‐
case	  efficiency	  of	  my	  device.	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In	  scenario	  two,	  suspicious	  traffic	  is	  generated	  to	  fully	  saturate	  the	  link.	  To	  create	  
this	   scenario,	   a	   network	   baseline	   was	   first	   generated	   on	   the	   device	   in	   which	   all	  
connections	   between	   host	   A	   and	   B	   were	   whitelisted,	   regardless	   of	   the	   source	   or	  
destination	  ports.	  Next,	  host	  A	  attempted	  performed	  a	  port	  scan	  against	  the	  network	  
subnet,	  creating	  a	  series	  of	  events	  not	  conforming	  to	  the	  network	  baseline.	  Naturally	  
this	   created	   a	   security	   event	   pinned	   to	   host	   A.	   Next,	   iPerf	   was	   run	   for	   each	  
connection	   duration	   scenario	   (100ms	   to	   1000ms,	   steps	   of	   50ms)	   to	   measure	   the	  
device’s	  effective	  throughput.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  my	  algorithm	  would	  execute	  through	  
all	  security	  event	  detection	  steps,	  fully	  monitoring	  each	  connection	  due	  to	  the	  recent	  
security	   event.	   This	   test	   most	   accurately	   represents	   my	   algorithm’s	   ability	   to	  
passively	  monitor	  network	  connections	  on	  the	  fly	  while	  collecting	  relevant	  forensic	  
data	  about	  possibly	  malicious	  connections.	  	  
In	  scenario	  three,	  entirely	  malicious	  traffic	  is	  generated	  to	  fully	  saturate	  the	  link.	  
To	  create	  this	  scenario,	  a	  network	  baseline	  was	  not	  generated	  on	  my	  device,	  creating	  
a	   condition	   in	  which	  all	   communications	   are	  marked	  as	  malicious.	  Next,	   iPerf	  was	  
run	   for	   each	   connection	   duration	   scenario	   (100ms	   to	   1000ms,	   steps	   of	   50ms)	   to	  
measure	   the	   device’s	   effective	   throughput.	   In	   this	   scenario,	   my	   algorithm	   would	  
execute	   only	   through	   the	   preliminary	   flow-­‐based	   security	   event	   detection	   steps,	  
sending	  all	   connections	   to	   the	  honeypot	   for	   interception	  and	  monitoring.	  This	   test	  
most	   accurately	   represents	   my	   appliance’s	   capacity	   for	   handing	   off	   malicious	  
connections	   to	   the	   third-­‐party	   honeypot	   software.	   This	   test	   also	   showcases	  
Honeytrap’s	   overall	   efficiency	   when	   handling	   these	   connections.	   Since	   each	  
connection	  in	  this	  scenario	  should	  not	  reach	  the	  destination	  –	  as	  it	  is	  hijacked	  –	  the	  
efficiency	   of	   Honeytrap	   only	   needs	   to	   be	   great	   enough	   to	   ensure	   its	   continual	  






6.3.3 Observations	  and	  Analysis	  
	  
After	  executing	  the	  testing	  scenarios	  outlined	  above,	  I	  found	  my	  deployment	  to	  
be	  surprisingly	  efficient	  considering	  the	  interpreted	  nature	  of	  the	  Python	  language.	  	  
In	   scenario	   one	  where	   all	   connections	  were	   non-­‐malicious,	   I	   found	  my	   device	  
had	  a	  worst-­‐case	  effective	  throughput	  speed	  of	  380	  Mbps	  during	  full	  link	  saturation	  
with	  an	  average	  connection	  duration	  of	  100ms.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  32.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  32:	  Effective	  Throughput	  for	  Non-­‐Malicious	  Connections	  
	  
However,	   as	   connection	   durations	   approached	   1000ms,	   the	   average	   effective	  
throughput	  also	  increased	  before	  tapering	  off	  at	  around	  1200	  Mbps.	  	  Looking	  at	  the	  
data,	  I	  can	  conclude	  that	  under	  such	  loads	  my	  device	  would	  be	  capable	  of	  sustaining	  
throughput	  speeds	  exceeding	  that	  of	  the	  physical	  link.	  	  
In	   scenario	   two	  where	  all	   connections	  were	  marked	  as	   suspicious,	   I	   found	  my	  
device	  had	  a	  worst-­‐case	  effective	  throughput	  speed	  of	  290	  Mbps	  when	  experiencing	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full	  link	  saturation	  with	  an	  average	  connection	  duration	  of	  100ms.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  
in	  Figure	  33.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  33:	  Effective	  Throughput	  for	  Suspicious	  Connections	  
	  
However,	   as	   connection	   durations	   approached	   1000ms,	   average	   effective	  
throughput	  also	  increased	  before	  tapering	  off	  at	  around	  1100	  Mbps.	  	  Looking	  at	  the	  
data,	   it	   appears	   as	   if	   the	   device	   has	   some	   increased	   computational	   overhead	   for	  
connections	  of	  short	  duration	  (<	  200ms);	  however,	  it	  was	  still	  capable	  of	  sustaining	  
throughput	  speeds	  exceeding	  that	  of	  the	  physical	  link.	  	  
In	  scenario	  three	  where	  all	  connections	  were	  marked	  as	  malicious,	   I	   found	  my	  
device	  had	  a	  worst-­‐case	  effective	  throughput	  speed	  of	  38	  Mbps	  when	  experiencing	  
full	   link	   saturation	  with	   an	   average	   connection	  duration	   greater	   than	  150ms.	  This	  





Figure	  34:	  Effective	  Throughput	  for	  Malicious	  Connections	  
	  
At	   first	   the	   device	   appears	   to	   handle	   connections	   extremely	   efficiently,	   at	   a	  
throughput	  rate	  far	  exceeding	  the	  physical	  link	  speed	  of	  100Mbps.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  
all	  packets	  are	  transparently	  hijacked	  and	  handed	  off	  to	  the	  honeypot	  for	  processing.	  
Before	   interpreting	   the	   results	   above,	   I	   must	   note	   that	   Honeytrap	   is	   an	   entirely	  
separate	  application	  from	  my	  algorithm’s	  software:	  connections	  are	  only	  hijacked	  by	  
my	  software	  and	  queued	  in	  NFQUEUE	  for	  Honeytrap.	  
Looking	   at	   the	   data	   present	   above,	   we	   can	   see	   that	   my	   appliance’s	   ability	   to	  
intercept	   and	   redirect	   traffic	   is	   not	   the	   limiting	   factor	   for	   overall	   performance:	  
extremely	  high	  numbers	  of	  connections	  (due	  to	  low	  connection	  durations)	  equate	  to	  
a	  high	   level	  of	  performance.	  This	   indicates	  that	  my	  device	   is	  efficiently	  handing	  off	  
connections	  and	  Honeytrap	  is	  efficiently	  analyzing	  and	  logging	  incoming	  connections.	  	  
Conversely,	  as	  connection	  durations	  begin	  to	  exceed	  200ms	  per	  packet,	  overall	  
throughput	   decreases	   quickly	   before	   re-­‐sustaining	   at	   around	   40Mbps.	   Naturally,	  
increased	   connection	   durations	   equate	   to	   large	   TCP	  windows	   sizes	   and	   increased	  
packet	  data	  sizes	  as	  well.	  By	  looking	  at	  the	  data	  above,	  we	  can	  logically	  understand	  
why	   throughput	   performance	   decreases	   and	   sustains	   at	   40Mbps:	   as	   packet	   sizes	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increases,	  so	  does	  the	  data	  being	  logged	  to	  disk	  for	  forensic	  usage.	  It	  appears	  as	  if	  the	  
hard	  disk	  write	  times	  of	  my	  system	  have	  become	  the	  performance	  bottleneck	  of	  the	  
device.	  Additionally,	   it	   seems	  as	   if	   there	   is	   implementation	   issue	  within	  Honeytrap	  
causing	  a	  disk-­‐writing	  bottleneck;	  after	  all,	  such	  a	  bottleneck	  does	  not	  exist	  when	  my	  
software	  monitors	  and	  logs	  packets	  in	  the	  same	  fashion.	  
However,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  relevant	  issue:	  connections	  redirected	  to	  the	  honeypot	  are	  
not	   actually	   being	   reintroduced	   into	   the	  network.	  As	   long	   as	   hijacked	   connections	  
continue	  interacting	  with	  the	  attacker,	  forensic	  data	  is	  continually	  logged	  and	  alerts	  
are	   generated.	  The	  overall	   performance	   cap	  due	   to	   the	  disk	  write	  bottleneck	  does	  
not	  actually	  impact	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  my	  device	  in	  this	  scenario.	  	  	  
After	   extensive	   testing	   I	   found	   that	   my	   device	   did	   not	   decrease	   the	   overall	  
throughput	   of	   the	   system	   to	   a	   rate	   lower	   than	   the	   physical	   link’s	   effective	  
throughput,	  except	   in	   the	  case	  of	  malicious	  connections	  sent	   to	   the	  honeypot.	  This	  
can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  35.	  
	  
	  




As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  throughput	  loss	  can	  only	  really	  impact	  a	  
SCADA	  environment	  when	  my	  device	  creates	  a	  processing	  delay	  that	  decreases	  the	  
link’s	  effective	  throughput	  speed	  below	  the	  speed	  of	  the	  monitored	  network	  link.	  In	  
all	   scenarios	   tested,	   I	   found	  my	   device	   introduced	   no	   processing	   delay	   capable	   of	  
reducing	  the	  effective	  throughput	  of	  a	  physical	   link	  with	  a	  bandwidth	  of	  100Mbps.	  
This	   conforms	   to	   all	   efficiency	   goals	   outlined	   previous	   while	   not	   introducing	   any	  
delay	  or	  throughput	  reduction	  into	  the	  monitored	  SCADA	  system.	  
Finally,	   I	   have	   concluded	   that	   by	   porting	   my	   code	   to	   a	   more	   efficient	  
programming	   language	   capable	   of	   being	   compiled	   for	   the	   target	   system,	   I	   could	  
reasonably	   increase	  overall	  device	  efficiency	  enough	   to	  potentially	  handle	   full	   link	  
saturation	  for	  1Gbps	  links	  between	  infrastructure	  devices.	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Chapter	  7.	  	  Conclusions	  and	  Future	  Work	  
	  
At	   first	  glance	  SCADA	  networks	  appear	   to	  be	  similar	   to	   IT	  networks;	  however,	  
this	   is	   not	   the	   case.	   Traditionally	   SCADA	   networks	   were	   physically	   isolated,	  
providing	  some	  inherent	  level	  of	  security;	  yet,	  as	  SCADA	  networks	  slowly	  converged	  
with	   both	   corporate	   intranets	   and	   the	   Internet,	   their	   security	   continually	   eroded.	  
The	   gradual	   evolution	   of	   SCADA	   systems	   introduced	   many	   novel	   and	   previously	  
unknown	  security	  risks.	  
During	   the	  advent	  of	  SCADA	  technologies,	  a	  heavy	   focus	  was	  put	  on	  providing	  
system	   robustness,	   safety,	   and	   reliability.	   Because	   of	   this	   initial	   focus,	   widely	  
deployed	   SCADA	   protocols	   like	   DNP3	   and	   Modbus	   provide	   no	   inherent	   security	  
controls.	  This	  makes	  managing	  security	  inherently	  difficult.	  Additionally,	  due	  to	  the	  
unique	   nature	   of	   ICS	   networks,	   traditional	   IT	   security	   protection	   and	   mitigation	  
mechanisms	  prove	  to	  be	  ineffective.	  
Ideally	   these	   insecure	   protocols	   would	   be	   replaced	   with	   newer,	   more	   secure	  
variations;	   however,	   the	   need	   for	   backwards	   compatibility	   and	   high	   availability	  
impedes	  the	  adoption	  of	  newer	  protocols.	  	  
Furthermore,	   the	   advent	   of	   advanced	   persistent	   threats	   in	   recent	   years	   has	  
showcased	  the	  vulnerable	  nature	  of	  SCADA	  systems	  deployed	  throughout	  the	  world.	  
These	   attackers,	   often	   highly	   skilled,	   persistent,	   and	   resourceful,	   highlighted	   the	  
relative	  ineffectiveness	  of	  existing	  SCADA-­‐centric	  security	  solutions.	  
Throughout	  this	  thesis	  I	  have	  outlined	  common	  attack	  vectors	  used	  by	  advanced	  
persistent	  threats	  to	  subvert	  the	  few	  security	  controls	  deployed	  in	  SCADA	  networks.	  
These	   vectors	   include:	   customized	   malware,	   zero-­‐day	   exploits,	   illegitimate	  
credential	   use,	   man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	   attacks,	   device	   impersonation	   attempts,	   brute-­‐
force	  network	  scans,	  and	  even	  insider	  attacks.	  Each	  of	  these	  attack	  vectors	  requires	  
a	   specific	   approach	   to	   event	   detection	   and	   mitigation.	   Unfortunately,	   a	   catchall	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solution	   capable	   of	   providing	   robust	   security	   event	   detection	   in	   depth	   specifically	  
for	  SCADA	  networks	  does	  not	  currently	  exist.	  
In	   response	   to	   this	   need,	   I	   have	   identified	   various	   algorithmic	   strategies	   for	  
detecting	  and	  mitigating	  these	  common	  APT	  attack	  vectors,	  pertaining	  specifically	  to	  
SCADA	   networks.	   Primarily,	   the	   integration	   of	   flow-­‐based	   intrusion	   detection	  
systems,	   passive	   device	   fingerprinting,	   and	   traditional	   signature-­‐based	   IDS	  
technologies	   provides	   a	   highly	   effective	   capacity	   for	   detecting	   all	   common	   attack	  
vectors	  used	  by	  APTs.	  	  
After	  extensive	  testing,	  it	  was	  shown	  how	  the	  integration	  of	  these	  technologies	  
into	  a	  single	  security	  solution	  has	  provided	  a	  verifiably	  robust	  and	  effective	  solution	  
to	  the	  problem	  at	  hand.	  Furthermore,	  the	  deployment	  of	  this	  unified	  security	  event	  
detection	   algorithm	   was	   shown	   to	   provide	   detection	   in	   depth	   without	   negatively	  
impacting	   network	   throughput	   or	   latency	   –	   a	   problem	   plagued	   by	   most	   types	   of	  
SCADA-­‐specific	  security	  controls.	  
Future	  work	  should	  aim	  to	  optimize	  the	  current	  platform	  by	  porting	  it	  to	  a	  more	  
efficient	  programming	  language	  and	  underlying	  platform.	  This	  type	  of	  optimization	  
could	   increase	   the	   solution’s	   traffic	   analysis	   capacity	  enough	   to	   sufficiently	  handle	  
network	   speeds	   exceeding	   1Gbps.	   Furthermore,	   a	   hardware-­‐based	   deployment	  
should	   be	   placed	  within	  multiple	   live	   SCADA	  networks	   to	  measure	   the	   real-­‐world	  
effectiveness	  of	  my	  solution.	  	  
Although	   industrial	   control	   systems	   still	   have	   a	   long	   way	   to	   go	   before	   being	  
considered	  extremely	  secure,	  this	  should	  not	  dissuade	  us.	  Cyber	  warfare	  has	  become	  
an	  integral	  component	  of	  modern	  warfare;	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  recent	  supposed	  
‘state-­‐sponsored’	   attacks	   against	   Iran’s	   nuclear	   facilities.	   For	   years,	   countries	   like	  
China	  and	  North	  Korea	  have	  been	  openly	  training	  technology	  experts	  in	  preparation	  
for	  cyber	  attacks.	  This	  fundamental	  shift	  towards	  state-­‐sponsored	  hacking	  cannot	  be	  
ignored.	   In	   order	   to	   ensure	   the	   pervasive	   security	   of	   our	   nation’s	   critical	  
infrastructure,	   we	   must	   work	   towards	   providing	   simple,	   secure,	   and	   robust	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mitigating	  security	  controls.	  After	  all,	  compensating	  controls	  only	  delay	  our	  system’s	  
inevitable	  exploitation.	  These	  issues	  must	  not	  be	  ignored.	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